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Agency-Specific Precedents 
Richard E. Levy* & Robert L. Glicksman** 
I. Introduction 
As a field of legal study and practice, administrative law rests on the 
premise that legal principles concerning agency structure, administrative 
process, and judicial review cut across multiple agencies.1  Administrative 
law treatises and textbooks largely treat the particular agency in which a case 
arises as an incidental factor that is not material to the administrative law 
principle the case represents and assume that the principle articulated applies 
to all (or almost all) agencies.  This premise certainly holds true for iconic 
administrative law decisions like Chenery,2 Overton Park,3 Florida East 
Coast Railway,4 Vermont Yankee,5 State Farm,6 and Chevron,7 which are 
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George Washington University Law School for very helpful input on a draft of this Article.  Any 
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1. Thus, for example, early works on administrative law focus considerable attention on 
defining the subject but presuppose that the term designates a meaningful body of law that applies 
to agencies as such, as distinguished from a system in which each agency is governed solely by a 
discrete body of law applicable only to it.  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT § 1.01 (3d ed. 1972) (“Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and procedures of 
administrative agencies . . . .”); FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1905) (“A function of government called ‘administration’ is being 
differentiated from the general sphere of governmental activity, and the term ‘administrative law’ is 
applied to the rules of law which regulate its discharge.”). 
2. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (holding that agency 
decisions cannot be sustained on the basis of reasons not given by the agency); see also SEC v. 
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that an agency may adopt a general 
rule or policy in the course of an adjudication and apply it to past conduct). 
3. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 413–14, 420 (1971) 
(construing exceptions to the reviewability of agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), discussing APA standards of review, and requiring judicial review to be conducted on 
the basis of the record before the agency). 
4. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1973) (holding that 
formal, on-the-record procedures are not required in rulemaking proceedings under the APA or 
provisions in the agency’s organic statute requiring a hearing). 
5. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978) (holding that courts have no power to impose rulemaking procedures beyond those required 
by the agency’s organic statute, the APA, the agency’s regulations, or due process). 
6. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–57 (1983) 
(interpreting the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review under the APA and applying it to the 
agency’s decision to rescind previously adopted regulatory requirements). 
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widely cited and applied.  Of course, administrative law doctrine necessarily 
reflects the interaction between agency-specific law, such as the agency’s 
organic statute, and generally applicable law, such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).  But the very essence of administrative law as a 
concept presumes the existence of a body of generally applicable legal prin-
ciples and doctrines concerning administrative agencies. 
In our recent work on an administrative law casebook,8 however, we 
observed a phenomenon that we refer to in this Article as “agency-specific 
precedents.”  In looking for cases involving a particular agency to illustrate a 
specific administrative law issue or principle,9 we noticed that judicial prece-
dents tend to rely most heavily on other cases involving the agency under 
review, even for generally applicable administrative law principles.  As the 
courts repeated the verbal formulations or doctrinal approaches reflected in 
those cases, both the articulation and application of the doctrine often began 
over time to develop their own unique characteristics within the precedents 
concerning the specific agency.  In some cases, these formulations deviated 
significantly from the conventional understanding of the relevant principles 
as a matter of “administrative law.” 
The phenomenon of agency-specific precedents has important 
descriptive and normative implications for administrative law as a discipline.  
Descriptively, to the extent that agency-specific precedents deviate from 
standard administrative law doctrine, they challenge the very foundations of 
administrative law.  To be sure, agencies have differing organic statutes and 
administer different regulatory and benefit programs, so some degree of vari-
ation is implicit in administrative law doctrine.  But administrative law 
assumes the existence of core statutes and principles that apply consistently 
across agencies.  Our observations, however, suggest that the universality of 
administrative law doctrine may not be as pervasive as is commonly 
assumed.10  The proliferation of agency-specific precedents creates 
anomalies and inconsistencies in some cases and hampers the development 
of administrative law in others.  Nonetheless, because agency statutes and 
 
7. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(adopting a two-step approach to judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of its organic statute 
in which courts determine whether the statute is clear and, if not, are obliged to defer to permissible 
agency constructions). 
8. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN 
LEGAL CONTEXT (2010). 
9. Because our book focuses on five important and representative federal agencies, we 
examined the application of basic administrative law principles, such as the procedural requirements 
for rulemaking or the standards of judicial review, within the context of these particular agencies.  
The agencies are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  We selected these agencies as illustrative models for 
the application of administrative law doctrine.  The book focuses on a different agency in analyzing 
each of five distinct procedural mechanisms by which agencies adopt law and policy. 
10. Analogous issues may arise in other areas of the law as well.  See infra notes 77, 422 and 
accompanying text. 
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programs vary, there may also be advantages to agency-specific precedents, 
at least in some cases.11 
Thus, agency-specific precedents raise fundamental questions about the 
premise that administrative law principles are universal, when and how 
agency-specific precedents are likely to arise, and what, if anything, should 
be done about them.  The subject of agency-specific precedents has none-
theless gone virtually unnoticed in the administrative law literature.  
Certainly, we have found no systematic analysis of the existence, origins, and 
implications of these precedents.  This Article begins to fill that gap by call-
ing attention to the phenomenon, exploring its causes, and discussing its 
implications.  Our central thesis is that agency-specific precedents are a 
manifestation of the “silo effect,” a phrase commonly used in the literature 
concerning the operation of large organizations to describe the tendency of 
subdivisions within organizations to develop their own bureaucratic impera-
tives that create obstacles to information sharing and other forms of 
cooperation.12 
The discussion proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides general 
background on the emergence of administrative law as a body of general law 
applicable to agencies and introduces the concept of the silo effect.  Part II 
presents five case studies of agency-specific precedents involving different 
agencies and different administrative law doctrines.  For each case study, we 
briefly describe the general administrative law doctrine in the area and then 
consider how the precedent with respect to the relevant agency deviates from 
that doctrine.  Part III argues that agency-specific precedents are a 
manifestation of the silo effect and discusses how the dynamics of 
information costs, the specialized bar, and the process of judicial review tend 
to produce that effect.  Finally, Part IV considers the normative aspects of 
agency-specific precedents, concluding that while the balance of costs and 
benefits from agency-specific precedents varies according to the 
circumstances, greater attention to the phenomenon by practitioners, courts, 
and scholars would help to break down undesirable agency-specific 
precedential silos. 
II. Administrative Law as General Law 
Although administrative agencies have been with us since the 
founding,13 the development of administrative law is largely a twentieth-
century phenomenon,14 with the adoption of the APA as its defining feature.  
 
11. We explore the costs and benefits of agency-specific precedents further infra at notes 380–
409 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 75–88 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
14. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in 
U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 716 n.56 (1997) (“[T]he establishment of a field of 
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During this period, the law governing administrative agencies was trans-
formed from a disconnected set of constitutional principles, common law 
remedies, and organic statutes into a more comprehensive and generally ap-
plicable body of jurisprudence concerning the structure, procedures, and 
judicial review of agencies.15  Notwithstanding its generally applicable 
character, however, administrative law must take into account the distinctive 
provisions of each agency’s organic statute and the specific features of the 
program(s) it administers.16 
A. The Emergence of Administrative Law 
As Jerry Mashaw has pointed out in an important series of recent 
articles,17 administrative agencies have existed ever since the founding.18  
Professor Mashaw’s research reveals that during the first couple of decades 
of the new Republic, “Congresses delegated broad policymaking powers to 
the President and to others, combined policymaking, enforcement, and adju-
dication in the same administrative hands, [and] created administrative 
bodies outside of executive departments.”19  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
issued some important decisions in what we today call administrative law in 
the nineteenth century.20  As Mashaw also points out, however, until well 
 
administrative law is a relatively recent (mid- to late-twentieth century) and still somewhat debated 
phenomenon.”); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public, 23 A.B.A. J. 871, 873 (1937) (“[I]t 
is conceded that the growth of administrative law is the outstanding legal phenomenon of the 
twentieth century . . . .”).  See generally Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative 
Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473 (2003) (discussing the growth of 
administrative procedures and their displacement of judicial trials); Robert L. Rabin, Federal 
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (discussing the history of 
federal regulation). 
15. See infra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
17. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, Federalist Foundations].  The other 
articles in the series are Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 
1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362 (2010). 
18. Thus, for example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), has been called “the 
first great administrative law decision.”  Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great 
Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 481 (2004).  See generally 
RICHARD E. LEVY, THE POWER TO LEGISLATE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 26–30 (2006) (discussing early delegations of authority and early nondelegation-
doctrine decisions of the Supreme Court); id. at 26 (“[The First] Congress adopted legislation 
authorizing the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War, acting as an 
early administrative agency, to grant patents.”). 
19. Mashaw, Federalist Foundations, supra note 17, at 1268.  Professor Mashaw describes the 
early years after adoption of the Constitution as a period of “state building.”  Id. at 1266. 
20. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1855) (upholding an administrative determination of deficiency in a tax collector’s account against 
the argument that the determination violated the judicial power); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United 
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (upholding a legislative delegation of discretion to the 
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into the twentieth century, federal judicial remedies for administrative action 
were primarily confined to common law actions against agency officers or 
suits challenging the constitutionality of the agencies’ organic statutes.21  As 
a result, for more than a century after the founding, administrative law 
“disappear[ed] into common law subjects like torts, contracts, property, and 
civil procedure or into constitutional law.”22 
Throughout much of this period, a laissez-faire approach to economic 
and social activity tended to dominate public policy, and reluctance to au-
thorize government intervention into economic matters meant that the 
administrative state remained relatively small.23  By the late nineteenth 
century, however, the social and economic problems created by 
industrialization spawned the Progressive Movement, which sought an in-
creased role for government and led to the creation of some new federal 
agencies.24  The role of agencies increased further during the New Deal 
when, in response to the Great Depression, Congress created a myriad of new 
regulatory and benefit programs and created new administrative agencies to 
implement them.25  The result was a significant expansion in the role of the 
federal government in economic and social matters.  Although the Supreme 
Court initially resisted regulatory efforts and invalidated a number of federal 
programs on various constitutional grounds, in 1937 it changed course 
abruptly and accommodated the administrative state.26 
Thus, while administrative agencies and administrative law precedents 
predated the New Deal shift, that shift ushered in a period of dramatic growth 
in administrative agencies.  That growth, in turn, highlighted the limits of the 
prior law concerning administrative agencies, which largely consisted of 
 
President to impose a trade embargo and rejecting the argument that the delegation violated the 
legislative power). 
21. Mashaw, Federalist Foundations, supra note 17, at 1258. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. at 1259 (discussing the minimal levels of administrative action by the federal 
government in the nineteenth century). 
24. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal 
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (positing that “administrative law . . . can be regarded 
as the product of the Progressive movement”). 
25. Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 338–39 (1990) 
(remarking that the Great Depression spurred the creation of regulatory and welfare programs, 
which in turn prompted the formation of large administrative bureaucracies to implement the 
programs). 
26. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of 
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 342–45 (1995) (recounting how the Court’s persistent 
invalidation of state and federal regulatory efforts through the Lochner Era abruptly ended in 1937 
when the Court began upholding regulatory measures).  Although some protest that the modern 
administrative state is unconstitutional, see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative 
state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a 
bloodless constitutional revolution.”), there seems little doubt that it is here to stay. 
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common law causes of action and the organic statutes of each agency.27  To 
be sure, the Court had developed and applied a few key general administra-
tive law principles derived from separation of powers principles and due 
process.  In SEC v. Chenery Corp., for example, the Court drew on separa-
tion of powers concepts to conclude that agency decisions must stand or fall 
on the basis of the reasons given by the agency and that courts cannot uphold 
the agency decision on other grounds.28  Similarly, in Londoner v. City of 
Denver29 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,30 the 
Court developed the basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication 
and held that due process does not require hearings when agencies adopt 
rules.31 
Although other important cases and doctrines emerged during the first 
half of the twentieth century, the administrative law that governed the New 
Deal agencies was limited and inadequate.  Administrative law scholars be-
gan to advocate for procedural reform that was responsive to the emerging 
science of public administration.32  At the same time, opponents of the 
administrative state pushed for legislative reforms to control the burgeoning 
power of agencies.33  These forces ultimately culminated in 1946 in the adop-
tion of the APA, which confirmed both the administrative state and broad 
administrative discretion while establishing generally applicable procedural 
mandates and judicial-review provisions to constrain the administrative 
state’s operation.34 
 
27. See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century 
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 956 (2000) (describing the initial 
lack of specific guidelines directing New Deal administrative agencies). 
28. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“If an order is valid only as a 
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has 
not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”). 
29. 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
30. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
31. See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385 (holding that due process requires a hearing before the 
imposition of a special tax assessment on property owners); Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445–46 
(distinguishing Londoner and holding that due process does not require a hearing before the 
imposition of an across-the-board increase in assessed valuation of property). 
32. See generally, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Reform of Federal Administrative Procedure, 2 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 141 (1942) (supporting governmental measures to preserve procedural fairness); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern 
Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997) (describing Jaffe’s influence on the 
development of administrative law). 
33. The familiar rallying cry was to describe agencies as the “headless fourth branch of 
government.”  PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH 
STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937).  The term 
lingers.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009) (referring to “the 
separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch”). 
34. See generally Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 219 (1986) (discussing the history and significance of the APA); Martin Shapiro, APA: 
Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452–67 (1986) (describing the history of the APA); 
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 
264–79 (1978) (discussing the development of the APA). 
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B. The APA and Administrative Law 
The APA transformed federal administrative law from a loose 
assortment of constitutional and common law doctrines into a body of law 
that centered on a single, overarching statute.  It established a general statu-
tory framework to govern two key aspects of administrative law: the 
procedures agencies must follow35 and the availability and scope of judicial 
review of agency decisions.36  The APA is thus at the core of what we may 
call administrative law even if it interacts with an agency’s organic statute in 
important ways and is supplemented or informed by preexisting doctrines 
and underlying constitutional principles. 
1. APA Overview.—The APA’s procedural provisions establish two 
basic modes of agency action—rulemaking and adjudication—and prescribe 
procedures for each.  Consistent with the distinction drawn in Londoner and 
Bi-Metallic,37 the APA contemplates that rulemaking will ordinarily be 
accomplished through “legislative-type” hearings that involve notice by 
publication in the Federal Register and the opportunity for submission of 
written comments but that are not formal, “on the record” proceedings.38  
Nonetheless, the language of the organic statute may trigger formal proce-
dures if it specifies that a hearing on the record is required.39  In addition, the 
APA contains a number of exceptions from notice-and-comment 
requirements, including an exception for “interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.”40  This exception allows an agency to promulgate “nonlegislative” 
(nonbinding) rules without following any prescribed procedures provided 
that it publishes them in accordance with § 552.41 
The APA’s procedures for adjudication require personal notice42 and 
opportunity for a formal hearing at which a party may appear, present 
 
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
36. Id. §§ 701–706. 
37. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
38. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
39. See id. § 553(c) (providing that “[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing,” the formal hearing procedures of §§ 556 and 557 
apply).  This language has been narrowly construed and formal rulemaking procedures are hardly 
ever required.  See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244–46 (1973) (relying in 
part on Londoner and Bi-Metallic to hold that formal rulemaking procedures were not triggered by a 
statute that required a hearing but did not specify that the hearing must be on the record). 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).  Other exceptions include matters relating to the military and foreign 
affairs, id. § 553(a)(1); grants, contracts, and other government benefits, id. § 553(a)(2); and an 
exception for good cause, id. § 553(b)(B). 
41. See id. §§ 552(a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(B)–(C) (requiring agencies to publish substantive rules 
authorized by law and statements of general policy adopted by the agency in the Federal Register 
and to make available for public inspection statements of policy not published in the Federal 
Register as well as administrative staff manuals that affect members of the public). 
42. Id. § 554(b). 
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witnesses and evidence, and cross-examine opposing witnesses.43  If the 
agency head does not preside over the hearing, it is conducted by an admin-
istrative law judge (ALJ) whose independence from the agency is protected 
by statute44 and whose decision is normally subject to de novo review by the 
agency.45  Although the rules of evidence do not generally apply to APA 
adjudications,46 the ALJ’s decision must be based on the evidence in the 
record, and ex parte communications are strictly forbidden.47  These formal 
adjudicatory procedures, however, apply only to an “adjudication required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing.”48  Although many statutes trigger formal hearings, informal 
adjudications comprise a great bulk of administrative activity, and the APA 
is silent on what procedures apply when the organic statute does not trigger 
formal adjudication.49 
The APA’s judicial-review provisions create a broadly available cause 
of action for review of agency decisions,50 closing gaps in the prior system 
that limited the availability of review to traditional writs such as mandamus 
and to actions authorized by specific statutory review provisions.51  Related 
provisions address the timing of judicial review.52  While judicial review is 
generally available, it may be precluded by the agency’s organic statute or 
when an agency action is committed by law to agency discretion.53  Section 
706, which governs the scope of judicial review, authorizes a reviewing court 
to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed or to 
set aside agency action if it violates one of six standards of review.  The most 
significant standards for administrative law are the generally applicable 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,54 the “substantial evidence” 
 
43. Id. § 556(d). 
44. See id. § 7521(a) (providing that actions to remove, suspend, or reduce the pay of ALJs may 
be taken by the agency employing the ALJ “only for good cause established and determined by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board”). 
45. GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 8, at 537. 
46. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 257–58 (2d ed. 2006). 
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(e), 557(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
48. Id. § 554(a).  The APA creates other exceptions to its adjudicatory procedures.  See id.  
(including “proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections” and “the 
conduct of military or foreign affairs” in a list of exceptions to adjudicatory procedures). 
49. AMAN, supra note 46, at 241, 435. 
50. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
51. See id. (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof.”). 
52. See id. § 704 (providing for review of final agency action and requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in certain contexts). 
53. Id. § 701(a)(1)–(2). 
54. See id. § 706(2)(A) (authorizing reversal when an agency decision is “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).  Although this provision actually 
specifies four distinct grounds for reversing an agency, these grounds are seldom, if ever, 
disaggregated, and the standard is conventionally referred to as the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of review. 
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standard for factual determinations in formal hearings,55 and the requirement 
of consistency with applicable statutes.56  Section 706 also makes clear that 
judicial review is to be conducted on the basis of the record produced by the 
agency and that the reviewing court must consider the record as a whole.57 
The APA reflects a norm of generality in administrative law.  Its 
procedures and judicial-review provisions strike a balance between agency 
autonomy and accountability that is intended to apply broadly to all agencies 
except to the extent that an agency’s organic statute provides otherwise.58  
Nonetheless, the APA also allows a certain degree of variation.  Some of this 
variation is built into the APA itself.  Agencies have discretion to choose 
among various modes of action, and the standards of judicial review are rela-
tively vague and open-ended.  In addition, variations arise through the APA’s 
interaction with other sources of administrative law, particularly the agency’s 
organic statute. 
2. Other Sources of Administrative Law.—The main corpus of federal 
administrative law concerns the interpretation and application of the APA’s 
procedural and judicial-review provisions to a vast array of government enti-
ties encompassed within the broad definition of “agency.”59  But the APA 
interacts in important ways with other sources of administrative law, 
including underlying constitutional principles concerning separation of 
powers and due process (and related judicial doctrines), other laws that gen-
erally apply to all or many agencies, and agencies’ organic statutes. 
Administrative law is informed and constrained by the constitutional 
principles of separation of powers and due process, including the rule of 
law.60  Separation of powers and due process constrain the institutional struc-
ture and operation of agencies, but doubts about the constitutionality of the 
 
55. See id. § 706(2)(E) (providing for reversal when an agency decision is “unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on 
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute”). 
56. See id. § 706 (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”); id. § 706(2)(C) 
(providing for reversal when an agency decision is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right”). 
57. Id. § 706. 
58. See id. § 559 (specifying that the procedural and judicial-review provisions of the APA “do 
not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law”).  
For further discussion, see infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
59. See id. § 551(1) (providing that “‘agency’ means each authority of the Government of the 
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” with certain 
specified exceptions). 
60. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common 
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010) (describing the interrelationship between constitutional 
concerns of separation of powers and due process, statutory and regulatory provisions, and judicial 
decisions as creating a “constitutional common law”). 
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administrative state have largely been erased61 even if particular administra-
tive arrangements may raise constitutional questions.62  These principles 
establish a basic understanding concerning the respective roles of Congress, 
the President, and the courts in relation to administrative agencies that in-
forms the application of the APA’s procedural requirements and judicial-
review provisions.63  In addition, the application of the APA reflects judicial 
doctrines derived from constitutional understandings such as the Chenery 
principle.64 
Congress has supplemented the APA with several additional, 
overarching statutes concerning administrative procedures or judicial review.  
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)65 and the Government in the 
Sunshine Act66 added greater transparency and public access to agency 
records and proceedings.  The Equal Access to Justice Act67 eases the burden 
of challenging agency action by permitting litigants in administrative and 
civil judicial proceedings to recover their attorneys’ fees from the 
government if the government’s position is not “substantially justified.”68  In 
addition, a number of statutes (and executive orders) now require agencies to 
engage in regulatory impact analysis before adopting major rules or taking 
other important actions.69  Notwithstanding these changes, the APA has 
 
61. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative 
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2144 (2008) (admitting that although many 
constitutional questions remain unsettled, “the basic legitimacy of the administrative state is no 
longer in doubt”). 
62. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 
(2010) (invalidating removal provisions of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, under 
which members were removable by the SEC only for cause). 
63. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(reasoning that courts must defer to agency constructions of ambiguous statutes because ambiguity 
reflects a legislative delegation of policy discretion to the agency); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542–43 (1978) (holding that courts have no power 
to impose rulemaking procedures beyond those required by the organic statute, the APA, agency 
regulations, or due process). 
64. See supra note 2. 
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (strengthening requirements for publication of agency rules and 
requiring agencies to provide access to agency records and documents unless one of several specific 
statutory exceptions applies). 
66. See id. §§ 552b, 557(d) (requiring agency proceedings to be conducted in public sessions 
and strengthening limitations on ex parte communications). 
67. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5, 15, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(4) (allowing fees for challenges at the agency level); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (allowing fees in “proceedings for judicial review of agency action”). 
69. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006), amended by 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 
857; Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006); Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C.).  These statutes generally require agencies to conduct a cost–benefit analysis and consider 
the impact of their rules on regulated entities, as does Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).  An early example of this approach, used to require 
consideration of a different set of interests, was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
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proven resistant to comprehensive reform and remains at the core of federal 
administrative law.70 
For present purposes, the most important additional source of 
administrative law is the agency’s organic statute, which interacts with the 
APA in various ways.  Under § 559, the APA’s procedural and judicial-
review provisions “do not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by 
statute or otherwise recognized by law,” but a “[s]ubsequent statute may not 
be held to supersede or modify” those provisions “except to the extent that it 
does so expressly.”71  Thus, the organic statute may exempt an agency from 
the APA, but the requirement that the exclusion be “express” is strictly ap-
plied and exemptions are rare.72  On the other hand, the organic statute may 
impose procedural or judicial-review requirements in addition to those of the 
APA.73  The organic statute also interacts with the APA by triggering (or not) 
its procedural requirements (such as formal rulemaking or adjudication) or 
implicating one of its exceptions to judicial review.74 
More fundamentally, the organic statute establishes the agency’s 
substantive mandate, authorizes the agency to take particular kinds of action 
to fulfill that mandate, and specifies the legal standards for taking such 
action.  In any given administrative law case, the organic statute colors the 
administrative law issue—it determines what is at stake, dictates the type of 
action the agency may take to further its statutory mandate, provides the 
substantive test for determining the propriety of the agency’s action, and 
governs the kinds of evidence or information the agency (or party) will use to 
justify (or attack) the agency’s decision.  These distinctive components of 
agencies’ organic statutes limit the universality of administrative law. 
Given these interactions, we may conceive of three broad categories of 
administrative law issues.  First, there are some issues, such as the interpre-
tation of the APA’s provisions, that we may characterize as “pure” 
administrative law issues.  Second, at the other end of the spectrum, some 
issues, such as the application of procedural provisions in the agency’s or-
ganic statute, are “unique” to the agency.  Third, there are “compound” 
issues, such as the application of the APA’s substantive-review provisions to 
 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006), under which federal agencies must prepare an environmental-impact 
statement to accompany major actions with significant environmental effects. 
70. See Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Reform of the Administrative Process: The American 
Experience and the Role of the Bar, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1875, 1875–76 (2005) (discussing 
unsuccessful efforts to revise the APA and suggesting that comprehensive statutory reform of 
administrative law might be unsuccessful because it is too ambitious and may be viewed as 
unnecessary). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 559. 
72. See, e.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to find an 
exemption). 
73. See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 8, at 294 (“APA provisions are supplemented or 
superseded by an agency’s organic statute.”). 
74. See supra notes 35–57 and accompanying text. 
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the agency’s application of a standard in its organic statute.  The extent to 
which agency-specific precedents are unexpected and problematic depends 
upon what kind of issue is involved. 
C. Agency-Specific Precedents and the Silo Effect 
Before examining the manifestation of agency-specific precedents in 
five case studies, we want to link the agency-specific precedents to a 
phenomenon that is often referred to in business and organizational-
management circles as the “silo effect” or “information silos.”75  The isolated 
silo rising above the plains is an evocative metaphor for the propensity of 
departments or divisions within a large organization to become isolated, with 
a resulting failure to communicate and pursue common goals.  The silo effect 
is often treated as a problem of information silos within organizations, but 
the phenomenon itself is not limited to information and could apply to other 
aspects of interagency cooperation such as regulatory agendas or 
jurisdictional turf wars.  The silo effect is a very real problem and concern 
for large organizations and one that is easy to recognize in a variety of 
organizational settings, including the activities of the federal government.76 
 
75. The origins of the term “silo effect” remain murky although it (like the invention of the 
Internet, see Patricia A. Broussard, Now You See It Now You Don’t: Addressing the Issue of 
Websites Which Are “Lost in Space,” 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 155, 163 & n.74 (2009)) has been 
attributed to Al Gore.  See Geoffrey C. Bowker, Biodiversity Datadiversity, 30 SOC. STUD. SCI. 643, 
646 (2000) (“[T]here are the problems of how to . . . ensure that one’s data doesn’t rot away in some 
‘information silo’ (in Al Gore’s memorable phrase) . . . .”).  For discussion of the concept of the silo 
effect or silo thinking, see Jean-luc Chatelain & Daniel B. Garrie, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly 
of Electronic Archiving: An Essay on the State of Enterprise Information Management, 2 J. LEGAL 
TECH. RISK MGMT. 90, 93 (2007) (“[S]ilo thinking . . . results in archiving projects that lack 
necessary business and legal features and functionalities because their design and implementation is 
largely driven by the information technology department without sufficient collegial consultation 
with functional and legal departments.”); Christopher Thorson, Note, Developments in Banking and 
Financial Law: Proposals to Reduce Systemic Risk Compared, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 458, 
460–61 (2009) (discussing a silo mentality “whereby managers do not consider the effects of their 
operations on other units, and risk managers struggle to develop a coordinated strategy”); Jonathan 
Tetzlaff, Risk Management in a Dangerous World: Practical Approaches, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 
291, 323 n.102 (1999–2000).  In describing the silo effect, Tetzlaff has stated, 
The “silo effect” is broadly recognized as a barrier to effective use of corporation 
resources.  “[I]n management jargon, “the silo effect” [refers to] operational areas [or] 
hierarchies within a larger hierarchy, lined up on the organizational chart like silos on 
the Plains.  The boundaries separating one from the other—like the metal walls of a 
silo—complicate attempts to cooperate across departmental lines.” 
Id. at 323 n.102 (alteration in original) (quoting Kevin Lumsdon, Why Executive Teams Fail and 
What to Do, HOSPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Aug. 5, 1995, at 24). 
76. The concept is most frequently applied in the context of information systems and 
management.  See, e.g., Chatelain & Garrie, supra note 75, at 93 (discussing “silo thinking” in the 
context of coordinating IT, business, and legal departments within a corporation); Barbara H. 
Wixom & Hugh J. Watson, An Empirical Investigation of the Factors Affecting Data Warehousing 
Success, 25 MIS Q. 17, 37 (2001) (discussing information silos in connection with information 
technology and data warehousing).  It has also found its way into the literature on business 
organizations.  See, e.g., James Austin & Ezequiel Reficco, Corporate Social Entrepreneurship, 11 
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 86, 87 (2009) (describing business use of cross-functional teams to 
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1. The Silo Effect at the Agency Level.—Although the concept can be 
and has been applied in various contexts,77 our focus here is on the silo effect 
in administrative law and its role in the creation of agency-specific 
precedents.  The tendency of administrative agencies to develop their own 
bureaucratic imperatives that create obstacles to information sharing and 
other forms of cooperation is well-known and periodically results in reform 
efforts designed to break down those barriers.  For example, the Department 
of Homeland Security was created in response to the failure to “connect the 
dots” before 9/11, a clear example of information silos within various 
intelligence, military, and law enforcement agencies that contributed to the 
government’s failure to take effective preventive action.78  Likewise, 
 
“work across silos”); Stefan Szymanski, “Silo” Thinking Let Us Down: Actions That Made Sense in 
Isolation Guaranteed a Financial Crisis When Added Together, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 28, 2008 (“[T]he 
coordination failure of the banks reflects a coordination failure inside business schools, a ‘silo,’ 
mentality in which the value of specifics with strictly limited applicability outweighs the value of a 
broader wisdom.”); Gillian Tett, The Dangers of Silo Thinking, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009 
(analyzing the effect of silo thinking on the collapse of Lehman Brothers); Tetzlaff, supra note 75, 
at 323 n.102 (discussing the silo effect as a barrier to the effective use of corporate resources). 
77. See, e.g., Ava J. Abramowitz, Implementing New Contracting Relationships to Create 
Successful Projects for All Parties in the Construction Process, CONSTRUCTION LAW, Summer 
2004, at 44, 46 (describing the pitfalls of silo thinking in the drafting of contracts); Allan Erbsen, 
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 529 (2008) (recommending thinking about solutions 
to constitutional law problems “as part of an integrated field of law permeating the Constitution’s 
text rather than as distinct silos of doctrine”); Robert E. Spekman et al., Research Note, An 
Empirical Investigation into Supply Chain Management: A Perspective on Partnerships, 28 INT’L J. 
PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 630, 633 (1998) (discussing a “co-operative” vision 
of firm organization that “emphasizes the need to integrate functional silos”); supra notes 75–76. 
78. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 31–32 
(2002) (discussing the proposed integration of federal protection responsibilities under the 
Department of Homeland Security in order to guard against future terrorist attacks); see also NAT’L 
COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 353–56 (2004) 
(finding that a lack of coordination among American intelligence agencies allowed the 9/11 
hijackers to operate in the United States); Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security 
Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 484–85 (2008) (discussing the poor evaluations the 
federal government received after 9/11); Michael P. Robotti, Grasping the Pendulum: Coordination 
Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence Officers Within the Department of Justice in a Post-
“Wall” Era, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 751, 782–83 (2009) (describing how the lack of 
coordination among agencies hindered criminal investigations into two eventual 9/11 hijackers).  
The poor government response in the disastrous aftermath of Hurricane Katrina also has been 
attributed in part to a lack of coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local disaster-
relief agencies.  See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 75 n.261 
(2010) (attributing the poor response to Hurricane Katrina at least partly to “poor coordination 
between the federal government and the incapacitated state and local governments”); Elizabeth A. 
Weeks, Lessons from Katrina: Response Recovery and the Public Health Infrastructure, 10 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 251, 259 (2007) (“Much controversy and the finger pointing and 
blame-game that followed Katrina stemmed from failure to coordinate local, state, and federal 
response.”).  Similarly, President Richard Nixon created the EPA by executive order to centralize 
environmental protection efforts occurring in multiple agencies.  See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 
1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note (2006) (stating that in 
light of the diffusion of environmental-protection responsibilities across various agencies, “the 
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centralized regulatory review in the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) can be understood as an effort to overcome silo thinking 
within agencies.79 
Despite the recognition that silo thinking afflicts administrative agencies 
as well as other large organizations, the implications of this tendency have 
received little attention in the administrative law literature.80  We think that 
this gap in the literature is unfortunate because the silo effect is an important 
problem for administrative practice and a better understanding of it may pro-
vide useful insights for administrative law theory and doctrine.  This is 
particularly true for the problem of agency-specific precedents.  Our under-
standing of the silo effect starts with the premise that it is the product of 
factors generally recognized in the field of organizational economics, 
including agency costs, transaction costs, and information costs.81 
In the broadest sense, the silo effect is an agency-cost problem because 
it reflects the divergence of interests and incentives between a large organi-
zation (the principal) and a particular department or division within it (the 
agent).  All federal administrative agencies are agents of the U.S. 
government (which in turn is an agent of the people) and are therefore 
intended to pursue the larger goals of that government such as national secu-
rity or the protection of public health and welfare.  Agencies and agency 
officials, however, have their own incentives (such as individual 
advancement or increased power), and they may use the authority delegated 
to them by Congress to promote their interests or the interests of the agency 
(such as increased budgets, additional personnel, or expanded authority)82 in 
 
present governmental structure for dealing with environmental pollution often defies effective and 
concerted action”). 
79. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986) (justifying centralized Executive Branch review 
of proposed regulations by an office such as OIRA on the ground that centralized review 
encourages policy coordination); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995) (supporting the maintenance of an executive office such as 
the Office of Management and Budget that is “entrusted with the job of coordinating modern 
regulation, promoting sensible priority setting, and ensuring conformity with the President’s basic 
mission”). 
80. By way of contrast, the silo effect is an often-used concept in the public administration 
literature in the United Kingdom.  See, e.g., Steve Bundred, Solutions to Silos: Joining Up 
Knowledge, 26 PUB. MONEY & MGMT. 125, 125 (2006) (discussing silo organization problems 
within the public sector of the United Kingdom). 
81. See, e.g., D. Scott Jones & Judy Cotta, Lessons from the Field: How One Hospital 
Combines Quality, Compliance, and Patient Safety, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Sept.–Oct. 
2009, at 53, 54 (noting that silo effects are present in health care organizations and are produced by 
both agency and information costs incurred in the division of risks along organizational and 
operational lines); Jason A. Smith, Training Individuals in Public Health Law, 36 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 50, 57 (2008) (noting a silo effect in public health law that is caused by transaction costs 
where “funding is directed to one narrow public health topic or area rather than to building a 
comprehensive infrastructure of public health law”). 
82. These incentives may be personal to the official involved (including interpersonal problems 
with other officials) or more agency and mission centered, but for our purposes the particular 
incentives do not matter. 
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a manner that is contrary to the larger interests of the government as a 
whole.83 
The silo effect also reflects the problem of transaction costs.84  Each 
agency (or other subdivision) is to some extent separate from other agencies, 
so the pursuit of larger governmental or organizational goals requires coop-
eration among them.  Achieving this cooperation requires some sort of 
agreement, however informal, which entails transaction costs arising from 
negotiation and enforcement of the agreement.  Transaction costs are 
inherent in any relationship involving multiple entities, even entities whose 
incentives and goals are nearly congruent.  As the missions or goals of the 
parties to any transaction become more distinct, however, transaction costs 
will increase because an increase in the divergence of the parties’ interests 
reduces the common ground for agreement and enhances the risk of cheating.  
Thus, the more that agencies have their own unique incentives and objectives 
(i.e., the greater the agency costs), the more difficult it becomes to negotiate 
an agreement among them or to monitor compliance with that agreement.85 
In addition to agency and transaction costs, the silo effect is also a 
problem of information costs.86  Information is a valuable commodity that 
requires resources to produce and maintain and may be especially so within a 
large organization.87  When valuable information is generated or maintained 
by one administrative agency (or other subdivision of a large organization), 
the agency may have incentives to extract something of value from other 
agencies in exchange for the information or to act as an information broker in 
order to enhance its position within the organizational hierarchy.  These 
incentives, which are the result of the agency costs described above, raise the 
information costs to the rest of the organization.  In addition, the exchange of 
information with other agencies will entail transaction costs that also add to 
 
83. An obvious example is the interests that agencies have in increasing or preserving their 
budgets even if the money might be put to more effective use elsewhere.  See Daryl J. Levinson, 
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 345, 381 (2000) (“The most commonly applied rational choice model, originally developed 
by William Niskanen, assumes that a policymaking bureaucrat will seek to maximize the size of her 
agency’s budget.”). 
84. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 
611, 614–15 (1989) (summarizing various categories of transaction costs but conceding that a “tidy 
categorization is probably not possible”). 
85. In addition, costs of a transaction increase exponentially as the number of parties to the 
transaction increases, so coordination is especially difficult when multiple agencies are involved. 
86. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1336 n.45 (2010) (describing different types of information costs and situations 
where information costs are likely to arise). 
87. For a discussion of information markets in large organizations, see THOMAS H. 
DAVENPORT & LAURENCE PRUSAK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: HOW ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE 
WHAT THEY KNOW 25–51 (1998).  For a discussion of information politics within organizations, 
see THOMAS H. DAVENPORT, INFORMATION ECOLOGY: MASTERING THE INFORMATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENT 67–81 (1997). 
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the costs of the information.  Thus, agency costs and transaction costs tend to 
create information silos within an organization.88 
2. The Silo Effect in Judicial Precedents.—The manifestation of the silo 
effect within administrative agencies is easy enough to understand, and the 
effect’s implications for the administrative process are obviously significant 
and worthy of further exploration.  Our focus here, however, is on the rela-
tionship between the silo effect and the appearance of agency-specific 
judicial precedents.  It is perhaps not as intuitively apparent why silo thinking 
should extend to judicial review of agency decision making.  Nevertheless, 
we believe that the same dynamic contributes to the formation of agency-
specific judicial precedents concerning the APA and other general 
administrative law doctrines. 
At first glance, one might not expect agency-specific silo effects to ap-
pear in judicial decisions because most federal courts, and in particular those 
that hear most administrative law disputes, are generalist courts.89  Although 
the federal courts are divided geographically into districts and circuits and 
consist of many individual judges, aside from a few specialized tribunals 
such as those that hear disputes concerning patents90 or tax liability,91 these 
 
88. See, e.g., Darby Dickerson, Professor Dumbledore’s Advice for Law Deans, 39 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 269, 282 (2008) (discussing the need to demolish information silos, “which impede 
communication and collaboration” and “arise when individuals or departments, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, fail to share information, when communications falter, and when crucial 
constituencies are ignored”); Linda Roberge et al., Data Warehouses and Data Mining Tools for the 
Legal Profession: Using Information Technology to Raise the Standard of Practice, 52 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2002) (referring to “isolated collections of data” as “information silos” and 
noting that “[t]he greater the number of silos, the harder it becomes to use data related to individual 
parts of an organization to understand the organization in its entirety”). 
89. Indeed, one advantage asserted for generalist courts is that they promote a broad view of the 
law and the propensity for “cross-pollination” among fields.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 156–57 (1985) (“Judicial specialization would also reduce 
the cross-pollination of legal ideas.”); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication 
of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1532 (2010) (“The generalist quality of federal court 
judges distinguish them sharply from the specialized administrative judges in the federal executive 
branch.”).  Some de facto subject matter specialization may occur across circuits, see Daniel J. 
Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 614 (1989) (“Among the existing regional circuits there is already 
a de facto division of judicial labor along subject matter lines.”), but this de facto specialization 
would appear to be limited and confined to a few broad areas. 
90. See Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized 
Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 847–
48 (2009) (noting that analyzing the validity of a patent requires specialized knowledge—a fact that 
is underscored by the requirement that attorneys have a technical degree prior to practicing before 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—and conceptualizing the expertise and experience of Federal 
Circuit judges in that context). 
91. See generally Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts 
and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135 (2005) (comparing the 
outcomes of tax cases in district courts to those of the Tax Court and examining common rationales 
for the differences). 
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divisions do not correspond to particular agencies.92  Thus, the federal courts 
of appeals and the Supreme Court hear administrative law cases involving 
many agencies and might be expected to apply general principles of admin-
istrative law that are not agency specific.93  Moreover, we might expect any 
silo thinking that occurs at the agency level to be counteracted as courts, in 
reviewing agency decisions, derive the doctrines that are needed to resolve 
these cases from generally applicable administrative law doctrines with 
which the courts are experienced and familiar. 
Nonetheless, in some areas, precedents concerning particular agencies 
have emerged that diverge and remain isolated from the larger body of ad-
ministrative law.  In the next Part of the Article, we offer a few examples as 
case studies of this phenomenon.  These case studies (as well as others that 
we could have examined) suggest not only that judicial review fails to com-
pletely negate the silo effect at the agency level but also that some agency-
specific precedents are judge made and do not originate with agency-level 
manifestations of the silo effect.  Descriptively, the case studies thus raise the 
question of why agency-specific precedents arise in the context of judicial 
review of agency decisions, which we address in Part IV of the Article.  
Normatively, the case studies raise the question and provide some insight 
into whether agency-specific precedents are undesirable and what might be 
done to prevent them, which we address in Part V of the Article. 
III. Case Studies of Agency-Specific Precedents 
In this Part we describe five case studies of agency-specific precedents, 
each involving a different agency and a different area of administrative law.  
The first two, involving the IRS and the FCC, concern relatively “pure” 
administrative law issues in which the identity of the agency or the content of 
its organic statutes should not affect the courts’ understanding of the admin-
istrative law doctrine.  The second two, involving the SSA and EPA, are 
compound issues in the sense that the distinctive features of the program or 
organic statute must be factored into the analysis of the administrative law 
issue.  The final example, involving the NLRB, is both an example of 
 
92. One notable exception is the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
hears appeals from a limited number of specialized agencies and courts.  Thus, as we discuss more 
fully infra at notes 353–78 and accompanying text, we might expect to see a larger number of 
agency-specific precedents arising in the Federal Circuit. 
93. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is sometimes thought of as a 
specialized administrative law court because applicable venue provisions permit, and many statutes 
require, judicial review of agency decisions in that circuit.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006) 
(vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit for challenges to “nationally applicable 
regulations” adopted under the Clean Air Act).  Critically for present purposes, however, this 
specialization is not agency specific because the D.C. Circuit reviews the decisions of many 
different agencies.  If anything, we would expect such administrative law specialization to work 
against the formation of agency-specific precedents because we would expect the judges of the D.C. 
Circuit to be more familiar with general administrative law doctrine. 
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agency-specific precedent and a counterexample—a case in which 
administrative law doctrine might be better off if a doctrine that was 
originally perpetuated in an individual agency’s doctrinal silo had remained 
there.  For each case study, we describe the generally applicable administra-
tive law doctrine, discuss how the precedent involving the relevant agency 
deviates from that doctrine, and offer some observations concerning agency-
specific precedents derived from the example under consideration. 
A. Legislative and Nonlegislative Rules in the IRS 
General administrative law doctrine distinguishes between a legislative 
rule, which has legally binding effects, and a nonlegislative rule, which does 
not.94  Two key consequences flow from the characterization of a rule as 
legislative or nonlegislative.  First, § 553 of the APA requires that most 
legislative rules be promulgated using notice-and-comment procedures.95  
The agency adopting the rule must publish notice in the Federal Register, 
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit written comments, and 
provide a statement of basis and purpose that explains the final rule.96  These 
requirements do not apply, however, to “interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.”97  Rules adopted without notice and comment under this provision 
generally are not considered to be legally binding; i.e., they are 
“nonlegislative” rules.98  Second, the degree of deference courts afford an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute differs depending on whether the inter-
 
94. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (suggesting that the essential 
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules is that legislative rules “‘affect[] individual 
rights and obligations,’” and are “‘binding’ or have the ‘force of law’” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 
U.S. 199, 232, 235–36 (1974))). 
95. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
96. Id.  Over the years and through the accumulation of judicial precedents, these procedures 
have developed into a “paper hearing” in which the agency is required to make all data and 
information available to the public and respond to significant comments and objections.  
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural 
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 553–
54 (2006). 
97. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
98. It is clear that general policy statements are not legally binding and that interpretive rules 
are not legally binding of their own force, but if interpretive rules are valid interpretations of 
statutes or legislative rules, the underlying statute or rule binds the party.  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 74, 77–78 (2008).  It is less clear, however, that rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice are nonlegislative because a rule could be binding and still 
concern organization, procedure, or practice.  See Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 247–48 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to determine whether the agency followed its 
procedural rules in terminating an employee because no other rules provided the employee with 
protection from the agency’s “otherwise unlimited discretion”); PIERCE, supra, at 78–79 
(contrasting two court decisions about the validity of specific procedural rules). 
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pretation is reflected in a legislative or nonlegislative rule.99  Our first case 
study involves the adoption of legislative and nonlegislative rules by the IRS 
where a significant and unfortunate divergence has emerged between the 
doctrine applicable to that agency’s rules and the general administrative law 
doctrine. 
1. General Administrative Law Doctrine.—Courts have struggled to 
define and apply the exceptions to the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirements for the adoption of legislative rules,100 but the doctrine is now 
fairly clear as a matter of general administrative law.  Although early cases at 
times applied a general rule that agencies were required to follow § 553 if a 
rule would have a “substantial impact,”101 over time the courts distinguished 
among the categories of nonlegislative rules and developed distinct 
approaches for each category: 
 An interpretive rule is “issued by an agency to advise the public of 
the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it 
administers.”102  Because agencies can also interpret statutes by 
means of legislative rules, the courts focus on whether a nominally 
interpretive rule goes beyond the requirements of the statute or 
regulation being interpreted to impose a new legal duty on the 
affected parties.103 
 
99. See PIERCE, supra note 98, at 80 (noting that legislative rules are normally subject to review 
but that it is generally “much more difficult to obtain judicial review of an interpretive rule or policy 
statement because pronouncements of that type do not have a legally binding effect”). 
100. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that 
the doctrine in this area has been described as “tenuous,” “fuzzy,” and “blurred,” and citing cases); 
Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing judicial efforts to distinguish 
between legislative and nonlegislative rules as “enshrouded in considerable smog”).  See generally 
Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the 
Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1994) (discussing the confusion that courts have dealt with when 
deciding whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative and outlining the relevant inquiries used by 
the courts); Robert A. Anthony, “Well, You Want the Permit, Don’t You?” Agency Efforts to Make 
Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1992) (comparing the 
rulemaking process and effect of legislative and nonlegislative rules); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000) (drawing 
a distinction between legislative and interpretive rules and chronicling the courts’ techniques of 
distinguishing between the two). 
101. See, e.g., Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970) (stating that 
the “basic policy” of § 553 requires that when a regulation “has a substantial impact on the 
regulated industry . . . notice and opportunity for comment should first be provided”). 
102. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
103. In Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008), for example, the 
court stated that “‘[i]nterpretive rules merely explain, but do not add to, the substantive law that 
already exists in the form of a statute or legislative rule,’ whereas legislative rules ‘create rights, 
impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by 
Congress.’” (quoting Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also 
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that while legislative rules “effect 
a change in existing law or policy or . . . affect individual rights and obligations, interpretive rules 
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 Policy statements are “statements issued by an agency to advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to 
exercise a discretionary power.”104  In view of this general 
understanding of what a policy statement is, courts typically focus on 
whether a rule is binding on the parties or the agency to determine 
whether it is exempt from notice-and-comment procedures under this 
exception.105 
 The exception for rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice (procedural rules) reflects the familiar but elusive distinction 
between matters of procedure and those of substance.  Application of 
this exception has proven to be especially difficult for the courts, as 
illustrated by a series of decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit 
in which the court struggled to articulate and apply a meaningful 
definition of that distinction.106 
 
clarify or explain existing law or regulation” and “merely represent[] the agency’s reading of 
statutes and rules rather than an attempt to make new law or modify existing law”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. U.S. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 n.153 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining that interpretive rules “simply ‘remind[]’ affected parties of existing 
duties”). 
104. CLARK, supra note 102, at 30 n.3. 
105. In Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2007), for 
example, the court declared that whether an agency guidance document is a legislative rule or a 
policy statement “turns on ‘whether the agency action binds private parties or the agency itself with 
the “force of law,”’” and that an “‘agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical 
matter’ . . . ‘if it either [1] appears on its face to be binding, or [2] is applied by the agency in a way 
that indicates it is binding.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 
382–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 
1136, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that policy for listing and delisting of endangered species 
was a legislative rule and not a policy statement because there was no evidence that the agency ever 
treated it as anything other than legally binding); Farrell v. Dep’t of the Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“If an agency policy statement is intended to impose obligations or to limit the 
rights of members of the public, it is subject to the [APA], and, with certain exceptions, must be 
published in the Federal Register as a regulation.”). 
106. See JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 
1980).  In Batterton, the court held that the exemption for procedural rules “covers agency actions 
that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in 
which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.”  648 F.2d at 707.  Bowen, 
however, acknowledged that because “even unambiguously procedural measures affect parties to 
some degree,” the court’s approach had “shifted focus from asking whether a given procedure has a 
‘substantial impact’ on parties . . . to inquiring more broadly whether the agency action also encodes 
a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on a given type of 
behavior.”  834 F.2d at 1047.  In JEM Broadcasting, the court distanced itself from the Bowen 
approach.  It rejected JEM’s argument that the FCC’s rules (which provided for the summary 
dismissal of license applications containing errors) “encod[ed] the substantive value judgment that 
applications containing minor errors should be sacrificed to promote efficient application 
processing.”  JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 328.  The court emphasized that such reasoning “threatens to 
swallow the procedural exception to notice and comment, for agency housekeeping rules often 
embody a judgment about what mechanics and processes are most efficient.”  Id. 
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Although nonlegislative rules can be adopted without following notice-
and-comment procedures, they do not have legally binding effects.107  This 
characteristic of nonlegislative rules limits the manner in which agencies 
may use them.  Most clearly, an agency may not treat nonlegislative rules as 
legally binding on a party, but an agency may rely on nonlegislative rules to 
some extent in support of action that is legally binding.108  For example, an 
agency may use legislative rules to foreclose factual issues in subsequent 
adjudications; the party cannot challenge the rule before the agency, and any 
challenge in court would be limited to the rulemaking record.109  In contrast, 
if an agency uses a nonlegislative rule to address factual issues, parties may 
contest the factual basis for the rule before the agency, and courts will not 
treat the rule as binding.110 
Courts afford less deference to agencies’ interpretations of their organic 
statutes embodied in nonlegislative rules than they do to interpretations 
reflected in legislative rules.111  Legislative rules are reviewed under the 
famous two-step test from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.112  Under that test, (1) if the court determines that the 
statute is “clear” on the precise question at issue, it “must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” and (2) if the court determines 
that the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”113  Nonlegislative rules, on the other 
hand, are usually reviewed under the less deferential test from Skidmore v. 
 
107. Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1034–35 (2005). 
108. See id. at 1041 n.163 (describing perspectives on agencies’ use of nonlegislative rules). 
109. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1983) (upholding SSA regulations 
determining the availability of jobs in the national economy for certain categories of disability 
claimants).  Parties can ordinarily challenge the validity of a legislative rule on judicial review of an 
adjudication in which it is applied, but that review will be on the basis of the rulemaking record.  
The party cannot introduce new evidence in the adjudicatory record to challenge the rule.  
Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On 
the Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 195–96 (1996). 
110. See Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While the Agency can meet 
its burden by reference to a Ruling [a nonlegislative rule], as the Supreme Court has held, 
nonetheless, the claimant should have the opportunity to consider whether it wishes to attempt to 
undercut the Commissioner’s proffer by calling claimant’s own expert.”). 
111. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (concluding that interpretive 
rules are not entitled to deference under the two-part Chevron test for judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations, which is discussed immediately below).  A subsequent decision, Barnhart 
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), suggests a multifactored approach to determine whether Chevron 
applies that might allow Chevron application to some nonlegislative rules.  See id. at 222 (stating 
that the nature of the legal issue, the expertise of an agency, the importance of the issue to 
administration of a statute, the complexity of such administration, and an agency’s consideration of 
the issue over time are all factors for analysis).  This discussion, however, appears in dicta and does 
not purport to overturn the holding of Christensen.  Id. 
112. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
113. Id. 
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Swift & Co.,114 pursuant to which “[t]he weight of [the agency’s] judgment in 
a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.”115 
2. IRS-Specific Interpretive Regulation Precedents.—While the 
administrative law doctrine concerning nonlegislative rules is in some 
respects fluid and open-ended, the general approach is fairly clear, well 
established, and broadly applicable to all agencies—except for the IRS.  The 
IRS has distinguished between “legislative regulations” adopted pursuant to a 
specific grant of rulemaking authority to implement a particular provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code and “interpretive regulations” adopted pursuant to 
the Code’s general grant of rulemaking authority.116  This approach reflects 
an historical understanding that the general grant of rulemaking authority did 
not confer the power to adopt legislative rules with the force and effect of 
law.117  That understanding, however, has been overtaken by changes in 
administrative law doctrine under which general grants of rulemaking 
authority are now ordinarily construed as conferring power to promulgate 
binding legislative rules.118  These changes in administrative law doctrine, 
however, have not penetrated fully into IRS practice or judicial precedents 
concerning IRS rules and regulations. 
As an initial matter, the terminology of legislative and interpretive 
regulations is confusing and no longer reflects actual IRS practice.  The term 
“regulation” is conventionally understood in administrative law circles as 
referring to binding legislative rules promulgated under § 553, published as 
 
114. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
115. Id. at 140. 
116. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476–77 (1979); Dresser 
Indus. v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1128, 113738 (5th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between “legislative” 
and “interpretive” Treasury Regulations).  The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of 
the Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Code].”  26 
U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2006).  Neither that provision nor any other provision of the Code exempts 
regulations adopted under § 7805(a) from the APA’s informal rulemaking procedures. 
117. This historical understanding appears to have been consistent with general administrative 
law doctrine until the 1960s when courts began to construe general grants of rulemaking authority 
as conferring the authority to promulgate legislative rules with binding legal effects.  See Kristen E. 
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1537, 1564–68 (2006) (arguing that general grants of rulemaking authority were understood as 
conferring only the authority to adopt nonbinding rules because broad authority to adopt binding 
legislative rules was thought to violate the nondelegation doctrine); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn 
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
467, 475 (2002) (arguing that under the original drafting convention that prevailed through the 
1960s, Congress signaled its intent to confer power to promulgate binding legislative rules by 
providing that violation of agency rules would be subject to some sanction, such as civil penalties). 
118.  See Merrill & Watts, supra note 117, at 472–73 (discussing how judicial preferences for 
legislative rulemaking led to the “assumption . . . that facially ambiguous rulemaking grants always 
include the authority to adopt rules having the force of law”). 
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regulations in the Federal Register, and codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.119  Thus, nonlegislative rules, which are not binding, do not 
constitute regulations as the term is conventionally understood; from an ad-
ministrative law perspective, an “interpretive regulation” is something of an 
oxymoron.  Indeed, while the term “interpretive” has been retained, IRS 
“interpretive regulations” are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations 
alongside legislative regulations; they are phrased as binding rules, and the 
IRS treats them as having binding effect.120  This confusion raises two impor-
tant issues for the courts: (1) the validity of some IRS general authority 
regulations that have not been adopted using the procedures required by 
§ 553 of the APA and (2) the appropriate standard of review of the 
substantive validity of those rules. 
The procedural issue raised by the IRS practice is whether some 
interpretive regulations are invalid because the IRS did not follow § 553 
procedures.  The IRS manual states broadly that “most IRS/Treasury 
regulations are interpretative, and therefore not subject to the [notice-and-
comment rulemaking] provisions of the APA.”121  Although the IRS also 
states that it “usually” publishes notice and solicits comments when promul-
gating interpretive regulations,122 a recent empirical study of IRS rulemaking 
concluded that the IRS often does not fully comply with § 553.123  If the IRS 
does not comply with § 553, the procedural validity of an interpretive regu-
lation will depend on whether it qualifies as a nonlegislative rule.  Thus, 
insofar as the IRS treats interpretive regulations as binding so as to create 
new legal duties, those regulations are legislative rules that must follow 
 
119. STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 280 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining that only those 
rules that “go through the 553 quasi-legislative procedure . . . will have the force and effect of law 
and will be called a . . . regulation”).  Regulations adopted using the APA’s formal rulemaking 
procedures or hybrid procedures under an agency’s organic statute are also binding. 
120. See Brief for the Appellant at 32, Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, No. 2008-5090 
(Fed. Cir. May 25, 2010), 2010 WL 2416251 (“It is readily apparent that Congress intended that 
rules and regulations issued under the authority granted by I.R.C. § 7805(a) to enforce the Internal 
Revenue Code would bind all persons who are subject to the federal tax laws.”).  In a passage that 
reflects the confusion created by the IRS’s terminology, the brief also states that “[t]his reference to 
regulations having the ‘force of law’ is not confined to legislative regulations, but applies equally to 
regulations issued pursuant to an agency’s ‘generally conferred authority’ to interpret and enforce 
the law.”  Id. at 31–32.  The problem with this statement is that in conventional administrative law, 
only “legislative” rules have the force of law, and, by definition, rules that are not legislative do not 
have the force of law. 
121. I.R.S. Administrative Procedure Act, IRM 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
122. I.R.S. Overview of Relevant Federal Administrative Law, IRM 32.1.2.3 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
123. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1730 (2007) (concluding after an empirical study of 232 regulatory projects that the 
“Treasury often fails to adhere to APA rulemaking requirements”); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB 
Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 258–59 
(“[T]he proper characterization of Treasury regulations for APA purposes remains in dispute.”). 
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§ 553 procedures, and the IRS’s failure to do so renders the regulations vul-
nerable to a procedural challenge.124 
Under general administrative law doctrine, whether the rule was 
promulgated pursuant to a specific or general grant of rulemaking authority is 
simply no longer relevant to the question whether it is legislative because 
general grants of rulemaking authority are now understood to delegate the 
power to promulgate binding rules creating new rights and duties.125  Thus, in 
the context of other agencies, it is clear that regulations issued under a gen-
eral grant of rulemaking authority are legislative in character and must be 
adopted using notice-and-comment procedures (absent another applicable 
exemption in the APA or the agency’s organic statute).126  Moreover, other 
agencies appear to use notice-and-comment procedures as a matter of course 
when they adopt binding regulations under general grants of rulemaking 
authority analogous to the one in the Internal Revenue Code.127 
The divergence between IRS practice and general administrative law 
doctrine thus confronts the courts with the question of whether to accommo-
date the practice or require conformity to generally applicable doctrine.  In 
one relatively early agency-specific precedent, Redhouse v. Commissioner,128 
the court appeared to accept the IRS’s position that IRS interpretive regula-
tions are exempt from § 553,129 but more recent cases draw that analysis into 
 
124. PIERCE, supra note 98, at 59. 
125. See Hickman, supra note 117, at 1566–67 (describing the origins of the distinction 
between specific and general grants of rulemaking authority as the product of a concern that general 
grants of authority to promulgate binding rules creating new rights and duties would violate the 
nondelegation doctrine). 
126. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that regulations issued by the EPA under a provision authorizing the Administrator “to 
prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions” are “binding rules” (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 7601 (1994))); Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. U.S. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 87374 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (treating the same statutory provision referenced in Natural Resources as the 
source of authority to adopt binding regulations). 
127. See, e.g., Russell v. N. Broward Hosp., 346 F.3d 1335, 134445 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing the notice-and-comment procedure used by the Department of Labor in adopting a 
regulation related to the Family Medical Leave Act); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 
851 (9th Cir. 2003) (assessing whether § 553 required the EPA to engage in a second round of 
notice-and-comment procedures in adopting regulations pursuant to a general grant of rulemaking 
authority); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting 
that regulations adopted by the Department of Labor under notice-and-comment procedures are 
binding on the regulated parties unless “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary” to 
congressional intent); Robinson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 440, 445 (2009) (holding that regulations 
created by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the notice-and-comment procedures are 
substantive regulations); cf. Killeen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 382 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing that the agency did not follow notice-and-comment procedures but only because it 
invoked the APA’s good-cause exception). 
128. 728 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1984). 
129. See id. at 1253 (stating that because a regulation was interpretive in character, it did have 
to meet the thirty-day notice requirement of § 553(d) even though it amended a binding regulation 
in the Code of Federal Regulations). 
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question.130  To this point, the courts have not squarely addressed the issue,131 
but if they apply general administrative law doctrine, some interpretive 
regulations—including some that have been in place for a long time—may be 
procedurally invalid.132  This result would cause considerable uncertainty and 
might undermine the IRS’s enforcement authority or provide a windfall to 
some taxpayers.  Courts might avoid some of these problems, however, if the 
remedy for failure to follow § 553 is an order precluding the IRS from 
treating the regulation in question as binding.133 
 
130. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 358, 363–66 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (rejecting 
the IRS argument that its nonlegislative regulation was exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements), rev’d on other grounds, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Hosp. Corp. of Am. 
& Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that because the 
taxpayer did not “challenge the temporary regulations as violations of the notice and comment 
requirements for rulemaking,” the court did not need to “reach the issue of whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and comment procedures before Treasury may 
promulgate temporary interpretive regulations that make substantive choices among permissible 
statutory interpretations”). 
131. See supra notes 128–30. 
132. It is not unheard of for courts to invalidate important agency regulations years after their 
adoption for lack of compliance with the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.  See, e.g., Shell 
Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (invalidating regulations critical to determining 
the scope of the EPA’s authority to regulate hazardous-waste management under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act).  The court in Shell Oil took some of the sting out of the 
invalidation of the regulations by suggesting that “[i]n light of the dangers that may be posed by a 
discontinuity in the regulation of hazardous wastes, . . . the agency may wish to consider reenacting 
the rules, in whole or part, on an interim basis under the ‘good cause’ exemption of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3)(B) pending full notice and opportunity for comment.”  Id. (citing Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., 
Inc. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123, 1131–34 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  The EPA took up the court’s suggestion, 
reissuing the invalidated regulations several months after the court’s decision on an interim basis 
pending notice and comment.  Hazardous Waste Management System, 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (proposed 
Mar. 3, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).  Eventually, the EPA readopted the same 
regulations permanently and the D.C. Circuit rejected a substantive challenge to them, concluding 
that the regulations were based on a reasonable interpretation by the EPA of key statutory 
definitions.  Am. Chemistry Council v. EPA, 337 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  This 
example suggests that courts are likely to seek out ways to minimize the kind of disruption that 
would result from invalidation of IRS interpretive regulations based on procedural violations of the 
APA.  Nevertheless, the EPA’s experience is also suggestive in that the court’s ultimate 
endorsement of the regulations came only after nearly a dozen years of uncertainty about the status 
of the hazardous waste regulations.  In addition, the readoption of the rule did not affect doubts 
about the status of enforcement actions for alleged violations of the regulations that occurred prior 
to their invalidation in Shell Oil.  See, e.g., United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 
380, 385 (8th Cir. 1992) (setting aside a criminal conviction based on a knowing violation of the 
invalidated rules on the ground that Shell Oil invalidated the rules retroactively from the time of 
adoption); Hardin Cnty., 1992 WL 175711, at *5 (EPA 1992) (holding that Shell Oil precluded civil 
as well as criminal enforcement of the invalidated rules). 
133. There might be other ways for courts to avoid severe disruptions as a result of the 
procedural invalidity of interpretive regulations.  For example, the interpretation reflected in the 
regulation could be accepted as an interpretation of a statutory provision or valid regulation, such 
that the duty arises from a different source but the same legal rule is applied.  Or the IRS might be 
able to issue a temporary regulation with binding legal effect to be followed by a permanent rule 
adopted using notice and comment.  In some cases, the good-cause exception of § 553(b)(3)(B) 
might permit repromulgation of the rule without notice and comment.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) 
(2006) (providing that notice-and-comment requirements do not apply “when the agency for good 
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A second issue concerns the standard of substantive review for statutory 
interpretations embedded in IRS interpretive regulations, for which there is a 
clear line of agency-specific Supreme Court precedents that deviate from the 
conventional Chevron/Skidmore framework.134  Under National Muffler 
Dealers Ass’n v. United States,135 “when a provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code is ambiguous . . . [the] Court has consistently deferred to the Treasury 
Department’s interpretive regulations so long as they implement the 
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.”136  In post-Chevron 
cases reviewing interpretive regulations, however, the Supreme Court been 
inconsistent as to whether National Muffler or Chevron applies.137 
Thus, the Supreme Court has left uncertain how the National Muffler 
test for judicial review of IRS interpretive regulations relates to Chevron and 
whether those interpretive regulations should be regarded as legislative rules 
entitled to Chevron deference or its equivalent.138  Some lower courts treat 
the National Muffler test for review of interpretive regulations as a less 
deferential test that applies precisely because Chevron does not.139  Others 
have held that interpretive regulations that were adopted using notice-and-
comment procedures are entitled to Chevron deference.140 
 
cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules 
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest”). 
134. Under generally applicable administrative law doctrine, the degree of deference afforded 
to statutory interpretations reached in the course of adopting binding regulations should not turn on 
whether the regulations were adopted under a general or specific grant of rulemaking authority.  
See, e.g., Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370, 376–80 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying the Chevron test 
to regulations issued by the Department of Labor pursuant to a statute directing the Secretary of 
Labor to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out” the Family and Medical Leave 
Act). 
135. 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979). 
136. Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 127 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
137. See, e.g., id. at 129 (failing to mention Chevron but citing National Muffler for the rule 
that when an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is consistent with the text of the statute, 
that interpretation should be given considerable deference); Hickman, supra note 117, at 1579–85 
(analyzing the Court’s reliance on National Muffler and Chevron and concluding that as of 2007, 
“the Court [had] cited National Muffler and Chevron each twice in majority opinions, and it [had] 
cited National Muffler three times to Chevron’s two in separate concurring or dissenting opinions”). 
138. In a subsequent case, Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382 (1998), the Court 
seemed to apply the National Muffler test as step two of Chevron, further confounding the issues 
because most lower courts understood the test as a less deferential alternative to Chevron.  See id. at 
389. 
139. See, e.g., Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197–200 (4th Cir. 1997) (treating the test for 
review of interpretive regulations as a less deferential test than Chevron, which applies because 
interpretive regulations are not legislative rules); Ann Jackson Family Found. v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d 
917, 920 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving less deference to interpretive regulations than to regulations issued 
with specific statutory authority). 
140. See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2008); Estate 
of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 437–38 (6th Cir. 2007) (both applying Chevron deference to 
interpretive regulations that were opened for public comment, which the courts viewed as indicative 
of the IRS’s intent to use delegated lawmaking authority). 
2011] Agency-Specific Precedents 525 
 
 
 
The confusion was aptly described by the court in Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co. v. United States:141 
  Determining the level of deference accorded to regulations is more 
difficult.  Initially it may appear that we can resolve the problem by 
resorting to the APA’s distinction between legislative and interpretive 
regulations . . . .  Administrative law scholars usually treat legislative 
regulations as rules of full legal effect—they create new legal duties 
binding on the parties and the courts and, therefore, require full notice 
and comment procedures.  Interpretive rules, on the other hand, only 
clarify existing duties and do not bind; thus, they do not require notice 
and comment.  In the tax world, however, these terms and 
classifications seem to provide more confusion than clarity.  Tax 
experts refer to specific authority regulations as “legislative” and to 
general authority regulations as “interpretive.”  The confusion arises 
because the “interpretive” designation does not mesh with the 
characteristics of the IRS’s general authority regulations.  While the 
IRS calls its general authority regulations interpretive, the agency 
promulgates them according to the same formal procedures it employs 
for its specific regulations.  Moreover, both the specific authority and 
general authority regulations, create duties and have binding effect.142 
In Bankers Life, the court concluded that the “nonlegislative regulation” at 
issue was entitled to Chevron deference.143  In doing so, it applied general 
administrative law doctrine rather than the agency-specific test from National 
Muffler.  In addition, the court focused on whether the agency adopted the 
regulations using notice-and-comment procedures (as it did in that case) and 
not on whether the IRS relied on a general or specific grant of rulemaking 
authority as the basis for the regulation.144  The trend in the lower courts ap-
pears to be in the direction of general administrative law (i.e., application of 
Chevron), but it remains unclear whether Bankers Life and other cases have 
shut down this line of agency-specific precedents.145 
The agency-specific precedents concerning procedural requirements and 
the standard of review for IRS interpretive regulations illustrate several basic 
points: 
 Agency-specific precedents may arise or persist when agency 
practices are resistant to changes in general administrative law 
 
141. 142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998). 
142. Id. at 978–79 (citation omitted). 
143. Id. at 983.  For further discussion, see Vorris J. Blankenship, Determining the Validity of 
Tax Regulations—Uncertainties Persist, 107 J. TAX’N 205, 208 (2007) (explaining that Chevron 
and National Muffler apply deference using an identical reasonableness standard that only appears 
to diverge because reasonableness changes along with the circumstances facing each agency); 
Hickman, supra note 117, at 1542 (arguing that tax regulations should be subjected to the same 
deference test that Chevron prescribes for agencies in general). 
144. Bankers Life, 142 F.3d at 980. 
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine.  Thus, in this case study, the courts are responding to the 
operation of the silo effect at the agency level, and the issue is the 
extent to which we may expect the courts to counteract (or enhance) 
that effect. 
 This case study illustrates some of the potential costs of agency-
specific precedents.  On the procedural side, agency-specific 
precedents may countenance the denial of opportunities for notice 
and comment on rules having the force of law, upsetting the balance 
of autonomy and accountability contemplated by § 553 of the APA.  
On the standard of review side, agency-specific precedents cause 
uncertainty and confusion concerning the applicable legal doctrine, 
again with implications for the balance of agency autonomy and 
accountability. 
 Breaking down agency-specific precedents may, in some cases, 
entail significant costs that would not have arisen in the absence of 
the silo effect.  For example, if the courts began invalidating 
interpretive regulations that did not fully comply with notice-and-
comment requirements, it would create many problems that could 
have been avoided had the IRS followed § 553 requirements in the 
first place when promulgating binding regulations. 
 Agency-specific precedents (and consequently their elimination) 
may in any given case operate to favor either the agency or the party 
opposing agency action.  Thus, while application of conventional 
administrative law doctrine to the procedural requirements for 
interpretive regulations might cause major headaches for the IRS 
(and be a boon to some taxpayers), application of conventional 
judicial-review doctrine might result in more deferential review 
(under the Chevron test) for interpretive regulations that do follow 
§ 553. 
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review and the FCC 
The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is the baseline 
standard of judicial review that applies to various forms of agency action and 
various kinds of agency decisions.146  Over time, the courts have struggled to 
articulate an approach to this standard that appropriately balances the need 
for judicial review to protect the rights of parties and the public against errors 
and abuse with an appropriate degree of deference to agency expertise that 
enables the agency to fulfill its assigned policy-making role.147  Our second 
case study of agency-specific precedents involves the development of a 
“reasoned decision making” approach to the application of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in the context of decisions involving the FCC and some 
 
146. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
147. See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
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other agencies.  Unlike the precedents relating to IRS interpretive 
regulations, the reasoned decision making precedents are not limited to the 
FCC but rather figure prominently in cases involving some other agencies.  
Still, the reasoned decision making approach to arbitrary and capricious re-
view that began as a set of precedents applicable to a limited number of 
agencies has not yet fully percolated into general administrative law doctrine, 
even though it might be a useful approach in a broader range of contexts. 
1. General Administrative Law Doctrine.—Under § 706(2)(A) of the 
APA, a reviewing court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” if it 
is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”148  Although this provision appears to list four distinct 
grounds, it is conventionally understood as creating a single standard of 
review, commonly referred to as the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.149  
Over the years, there has been considerable debate about how much 
deference to the exercise of administrative discretion this test requires—with 
some courts and commentators advocating a “hard look” approach in which 
courts carefully examine the agency’s reasoning and others advocating a 
more deferential approach.150  The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals on 
the issue with some cases indicating a more deferential approach than 
others151 (and some providing relatively equal fodder for litigants seeking 
either deferential or rigorous judicial scrutiny of agency exercises of policy 
discretion).152 
The result is that courts commonly quote several formulations of the 
standard in various combinations.  First, in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court stated that the standard requires a court to 
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration [by the 
agency] of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 
of judgment. . . .  Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching 
 
148. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
149. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
150. See PIERCE, supra note 98, at 84–85 (giving an example of in-depth judicial scrutiny); 
Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151, 151–52 (2006) 
(explaining the origins of the hard look doctrine); Harold Leventhal, Environmental 
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 513–14 (1974) (examining one 
judicial approach to the hard look doctrine); Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy 
and the Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2600 
(2002) (highlighting the rise of the hard look doctrine in the D.C. Circuit). 
151. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in 
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1052 (1995) (developing a 
model to explain the indeterminacy of judicial-review standards); infra notes 153–56 and 
accompanying text. 
152. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), discussed 
infra at note 153 and accompanying text. 
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and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The court 
is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.153 
Second, in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,154 the Court stated that under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review “[o]ur only task is to determine whether the Commission has 
considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made.”155  Finally, in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
Court identified specific factors that are relevant to the assessment of 
whether the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.  It explained 
that 
[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.156 
Although these statements share a common theme in that they focus on 
the reasons given by the agency for its decision, the specific formulations are 
not entirely consistent and, aside from the State Farm test, provide little in 
the way of specifics.  They are cited in various combinations without much 
attention to the differences between them or the possible inconsistent signals 
they send.157  And while State Farm might be considered to articulate a 
broadly applicable standard, it is not always cited or applied.158  More 
fundamentally, the Court has not articulated an approach that would bring 
 
153. Id. at 416 (citations omitted); see also id. at 415 (“[T]he generally applicable standards of 
§ 706 require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry.  Certainly, the Secretary’s 
decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. . . .  But that presumption is not to shield his 
action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.” (citations omitted)). 
154. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
155. Id. at 105. 
156. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
157. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting both 
Overton Park and all but the first State Farm factor without any further distinguishing analysis or 
discussion); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
both Baltimore Gas and the entire State Farm test); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting the entire State Farm test and passages from both Overton Park and Baltimore Gas). 
158. See Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and the EPA 
in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10371, 10394–95 (2001) (describing 
the failure of courts of appeals to cite State Farm when reviewing cases that challenge the EPA’s 
scientific determinations and proposing explanations for this phenomenon); Shapiro & Levy, supra 
note 151, at 1067–68 (reporting the results of a study showing that the Supreme Court has used 
State Farm in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an adjudicatory or rulemaking 
decision in only 15 of the 56 cases surveyed, while circuit courts have used it in only 45 of the 118 
cases surveyed). 
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these diverse formulations under a single umbrella and provide guidance to 
agencies, affected parties, and reviewing courts.159 
As we will develop below, however, we believe that in cases involving 
some agencies, such as the FCC, the courts have hit upon a useful formula-
tion of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review as a requirement of 
“reasoned decision making.”  Both Baltimore Gas & Electric and State Farm 
refer to a requirement that the agency decision be the product of reasoned 
decision making, but the language did not figure prominently in the Court’s 
general formulations of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in 
either case.160  To the extent that the reasoned decision making approach 
remains agency specific, it is another example of the silo effect. 
2. Agency-Specific “Reasoned Decision Making” Precedents.—Our 
second case study of agency-specific precedents concerns the reasoned deci-
sion making approach to judicial review.  In cases reviewing decisions by the 
FCC,161 the courts (particularly the D.C. Circuit) routinely use this formula-
tion to express the basic requirements of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review.162  Although the requirement that agencies provide reasons for 
their decisions is a long-standing feature of judicial review of agency 
 
159. See J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to 
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 69 (2010) (observing that it should not surprise observers 
that lower courts reach different conclusions than the Supreme Court on essentially the same 
questions because of the Court’s confusing administrative-deference doctrine). 
160. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52 (“In these cases, the agency’s explanation for rescission of 
the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to conclude that the rescission was the 
product of reasoned decisionmaking.”); Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 104 (“With these three guides in 
mind, we find the Commission’s zero-release assumption to be within the bounds of reasoned 
decisionmaking required by the APA.”).  Both cases engage in extended discussion of the general 
requirement that agencies give reasons for or explain their decisions, but the specific phrase 
reasoned decision making does not receive any prominence of place in the analysis. 
161. See, e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 374 F.3d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (granting the 
plaintiff’s petition for review after finding that the FCC’s denial of forbearance was not the product 
of reasoned decision making and was therefore arbitrary and capricious); Achernar Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 62 F.3d 1441, 1447–49 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding the FCC’s denial of construction permits 
where there was no evidence that the agency had engaged in reasoned decision making); Office of 
Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 779 F.2d 702, 713–14 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating 
an FCC order that revised regulations in a way that did not meet the FCC’s stated regulatory goal 
because the FCC’s rejection of one alternative revision meeting its goal did not evidence a rational 
decision making process); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 
327, 347–61 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
pole attachments for commingled Internet service should be reversed at step two of Chevron 
because it was not the product of reasoned decision making). 
162. A Westlaw search conducted in the ALLFEDS database on March 5, 2010, produced 
eighty-two cases involving the FCC as a party in which the court referenced the term “reasoned 
decisionmaking.” 
530 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:499 
 
action,163 we think the reasoned decision making approach is a useful way to 
focus judicial review, synthesize the various components of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, and provide guidance.  Nonetheless, the rea-
soned decision making approach as we describe it in this case study is, for 
the present at least, specific to the FCC and a few other agencies.164 
The concept of reasoned decision making focuses judicial review on the 
rationality of the agency’s decisional process—i.e., the issue is not whether 
the agency decision is correct but whether it is the product of a rational deci-
sion making process.165  This focus differs from a more general requirement 
that agencies provide reasons for their decisions by conveying the under-
standing that the reasons given must emerge from the decisional process.  It 
thus resonates with the Chenery principle that agency decisions must stand or 
fall based on the reasons given by the agency166 and the reasoned decision 
making concept structures the relationship between the court and the agency 
in appropriate ways.167  The reasoned decision making formulation also pro-
vides a useful way of synthesizing the components of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review so as to provide guidance to courts, parties 
contemplating challenges to agency decisions, and agencies. 
An agency decision represents a policy judgment made in light of 
applicable statutory (and regulatory) provisions and the information in the 
administrative record.168  It thus contains three components.  The first 
component includes the statutory standards and policies that determine the 
relevant factors for the agency to consider.  Thus, an agency decision is arbi-
trary and capricious if it fails to apply the proper standards or consider the 
statutorily relevant factors (or considers improper factors).169  Second, it in-
 
163. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 200 (1947) (noting that the 
Supreme Court had previously remanded Chenery I because the Commission’s decision was not 
supported by the reasons it offered). 
164. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
165. Thus, for example, a key component of reasoned decision making is a full consideration of 
the relevant statutory factors.  See Verizon Tel. Cos., 374 F.3d at 1235 (holding an FCC ruling was 
arbitrary because the Commission failed to consider important factors in its decision process); 
Achernar Broad. Co., 62 F.3d at 1447 (“‘While agency expertise deserves deference, it deserves 
deference only when it is exercised; no deference is due when the agency has stopped shy of 
carefully considering the disputed facts.’” (quoting Cities of Carlisle & Neolo v. FERC, 741 F.2d 
429, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
166. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
167. It is important for reviewing courts to focus on the reasons rather than the result in 
recognition of their duty to accept the result even if they disagree with it provided that the agency 
can offer a reasonable explanation for its decision. 
168. See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 8, at 149–50. 
169. These are the first two components of the State Farm test.  See supra text accompanying 
note 156; see also Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) 
(stating that the agency must have “considered the relevant factors”); Citizens to Pres. Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (stating that an agency decision must be “based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors”).  FCC cases treating agency consideration of relevant 
statutory factors as a component of reasoned decision making include, among others: Verizon Tel. 
Cos., 374 F.3d at 1235 (noting that “the Commission denied forbearance without ever considering 
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volves factual determinations based on evidence in the record, and reasoned 
decision making implies that factual determinations must be based on ade-
quate evidence in the record and must account for the contrary evidence.170  
Finally, the agency decision incorporates a policy rationale, i.e., a reasoned 
explanation for why the decision will further the statutory policies in light of 
the facts.171  In sum, as stated by Judge Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit, 
 
the requirements of § 10,” which was the section concerning forbearance in the Communications 
Act of 1934); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 427–28 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting a 
claim that the FCC “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem” when it issued the 
regulation); W. Union Int’l, Inc. v. FCC, 804 F.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that in 
evaluating whether a change of agency policy is permissible, “[t]he key is whether the agency 
changed its policy only after reasoned consideration of relevant factors”). 
170. This is the rest of the State Farm test.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  FCC 
cases treating adequate evidence in the record as a component of reasoned decision making include, 
among others: Alvin Lou Media, Inc. v. FCC, 571 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Commission 
must engage in reasoned decisionmaking and consider the entire record in an adjudicative 
hearing . . . .”); Consumer Elec. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The 
Commission’s analysis of the varying cost estimates was hardly a model of thorough consideration.  
Nevertheless, our review of the record convinces us that, given the uncertainty of cost projections 
and the inherent unreliability of all available information, the Commission’s assessment meets the 
minimum standard for reasoned decisionmaking.”); Ass’n of Pub.-Safety Commc’ns Officials-Int’l, 
Inc. v. FCC, 76 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the FCC “based its change in policy on 
reasoned decisionmaking supported by evidence in the record”); Celcom Commc’ns Corp. v. FCC, 
789 F.2d 67, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“We find that the preferences awarded by the Commission were 
amply supported by record evidence and reflected reasoned decisionmaking.”). 
171. See Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 105 (stating that the agency must “articulate[] a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made”).  FCC cases treating a rational 
explanation for why the decision would promote statutory policies in light of the facts as a 
component of reasoned decision making include, among others: M2Z Networks, Inc. v. FCC, 558 
F.3d 554, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The FCC named the factor (‘competitive market conditions’), and 
gave two reasons why the application [for exclusive right to provide wireless broadband Internet 
access] ‘would appear to compromise’ that factor—namely, by ‘cutting off consideration of a 
competitive bidding licensing framework and precluding consideration of other potential applicants 
for this spectrum.’”); Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314, 1322–23 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
FCC’s imposition of the maximum penalty because the FCC applied the relevant statutory factors to 
the evidence); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 740, 745–46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the FCC “reasonably concluded that certification of compliance, coupled with 
provisions for complaint and enforcement proceedings, [would] accomplish the statutory purpose of 
discontinuing payphone subsidies”); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 460 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (“It is well-established that ‘an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its 
discretion in a given manner’ and that explanation must be ‘sufficient to enable us to conclude that 
the [agency’s action] was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995))); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 
F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding a failure to explain why the extension of previous doctrine 
“made sense in terms of the statute or the Commission’s own regulations”); Alegria I, Inc. v. FCC, 
905 F.2d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding a failure to provide “a carefully reasoned decision in 
which the policy is adequately explained and its parameters defined so that future applicants will 
know the rules of the game with which they are expected to comply”); Comm. to Save WEAM v. 
FCC, 808 F.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Although the Commission may select the factors to be 
considered in finding the public interest, it must ‘articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for 
decision,’ . . . so that a court may ensure that the public interest finding results from ‘reasoned 
decisionmaking’ . . . .” (citations omitted)); Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (“In short, the key to the arbitrary and capricious standard is its requirement of reasoned 
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[t]he parameters of reasoned decisionmaking are readily discernible in 
the case law.  The mandate of the [APA] that a reviewing court set 
aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion” . . . requires the court to ensure that the agency’s decision 
is “rational, has support in the record, and is based on a consideration 
of relevant factors.”172 
Nonetheless, the courts have not, to this point, fully synthesized the 
reasoned decision making approach in the manner we have described, which 
in our view is unfortunate.  To the extent that more widespread application 
would produce more effective efforts at judicial synthesis, the development 
of this approach may have been impeded because its application is generally 
confined to the FCC and a few other agencies, such as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).173  It is interesting (but perhaps 
coincidental) that both FERC and the FCC are agencies that engage in 
 
decisionmaking: we will uphold the Commission’s decision if, but only if, we can discern a 
reasoned path from the facts and considerations before the Commission to the decision it reached.”). 
172. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 422–23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 
691 F.2d 525, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).  The courts have not always drawn clear dividing lines among 
the three components of reasoned decision making we have identified, at times referring to more 
than one of the components or leaving unclear which component of reasoned decision making was 
at issue.  See, e.g., City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(finding “undisputed omissions in data and methodology” that left the court unable to determine 
whether the agency’s selected means undercut its ends); Ventura Broad. Co. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 184, 
189–90 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that in resolving a challenge to the FCC’s selection of a license 
application based on a comparative evaluation, the court had to make sure “the Commission [had] 
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking[,] . . . [had] given reasoned consideration to all the material 
facts and issues, . . . that its factual findings [were] supported by substantial evidence[,] . . . [and 
that] if the agency depart[ed] from prior policy[,] . . . that it do so only with a reasoned analysis” 
(citations and internal quotations omitted)); N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1057 (4th 
Cir. 1977) (stating that the reasoned decision making requirement reflects “basic principles of 
administrative law” that require agencies such as the FCC “to make necessary supportive findings 
of fact . . . and to articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the 
significance of crucial facts” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
173. See, e.g., Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 234 F.3d 36, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Given that 
the only record basis on which FERC’s decision could be affirmed is minimized by the Commission 
itself, we are compelled to remand the case to the Commission so that it can reach a conclusion that 
is the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”).  A Westlaw search conducted in the ALLFEDS 
database on March 5, 2010, produced 129 cases involving FERC as a party that used the term 
reasoned decision making.  The earliest of these cases was Tenneco Oil Co. v. FERC, 571 F.2d 834, 
839 (5th Cir. 1978).  By way of contrast, similar searches produced no SSA cases and only two IRS 
cases.  Of the five agencies featured in our casebook, the NLRB (37 cases) and EPA (48 cases) fall 
somewhere in the middle in the sense that the approach is often used but apparently less uniformly 
and consistently than in judicial review of FCC or FERC decisions.  Interestingly, some of the early 
EPA cases referencing reasoned decision making used the term in connection with requiring 
agencies to use additional procedures, rather than as a standard of substantive review.  See, e.g., 
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Adversarial hearings will be 
helpful, therefore, in guaranteeing both reasoned decisionmaking and meaningful judicial review.”); 
see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting 
Marathon Oil), overruled by Dominion Energy Brayton Point, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
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ratemaking and licensing for regulated industries.174  In the final analysis, we 
do not wish to overstate the differences between the reasoned decision 
making approach and other formulations of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review, but we think administrative law would benefit from its 
further development and more universal application. 
The reasoned decision making approach is primarily a phenomenon of 
the federal courts of appeals, especially the D.C. Circuit, but the approach 
has also made an appearance in the Supreme Court.  Most Supreme Court 
references to the requirement of reasoned decision making have been in 
passing, as in Baltimore Gas & Electric, State Farm, and (more recently) 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.175  In Allentown Mack Sales & Service, 
Inc. v. NLRB,176 however, the Court engaged in a more elaborate discussion: 
  The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the proceedings 
of administrative agencies and related judicial review, establishes a 
scheme of “reasoned decisionmaking.” . . .  Not only must an agency’s 
decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the 
process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.  
Courts enforce this principle with regularity when they set aside 
agency regulations which, though well within the agencies’ scope of 
authority, are not supported by the reasons that the agencies 
adduce. . . .  [A]djudication is subject to the requirement of reasoned 
decisionmaking as well.  It is hard to imagine a more violent breach of 
that requirement than applying a rule of primary conduct or a standard 
of proof which is in fact different from the rule or standard formally 
announced.  And the consistent repetition of that breach can hardly 
mend it. 
 
174. It is possible that the reasoned decision making approach was particularly useful for 
dealing with ratemaking decisions or that reviewing courts are more likely to look to cases 
involving similar kinds of agency decisions. 
175. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1814 (2009) (“If the Constitution 
itself demands of agencies no more scientifically certain criteria [of the harmful effects of profanity 
on children] to comply with the First Amendment, neither does the Administrative Procedure Act to 
comply with the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.”).  Justice Thomas has also referred to 
the requirement in concurring and dissenting opinions that were joined by other justices.  See New 
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 36 (2002) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Here, FERC’s failure to do so prevents us from evaluating whether or 
not the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking when it determined that it was not ‘necessary’ 
to regulate bundled retail transmission.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 
U.S. 327, 347 (2002) (Thomas, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Nevertheless, because the FCC failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking before asserting 
jurisdiction over attachments transmitting these commingled services, I cannot agree with the Court 
that the judgment below should be reversed and the FCC’s decision on this point allowed to 
stand.”). 
176. 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
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  Reasoned decisionmaking, in which the rule announced is the rule 
applied, promotes sound results, and unreasoned decisionmaking the 
opposite.177 
References to the reasoned decision making requirement in NLRB cases 
appear to have increased since the Allentown Mack decision,178 but it remains 
to be seen whether the NLRB will simply be added to the few other agencies 
to which the reasoned decision making version of arbitrary and capricious 
review has become prominent or whether reasoned decision making will in-
stead become a more universally applicable understanding of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review, regardless of the agency involved. 
The agency-specific precedents concerning reasoned decision making 
differ from the agency-specific precedents concerning IRS interpretive regu-
lations and suggest some further observations: 
 While some agency-specific precedents, like those concerning IRS 
interpretive regulations, originate with the silo effect at the agency 
level, others, like the reasoned decision making precedents, do not 
respond to any agency-specific practice. 
 The reasoned decision making precedents illustrate another potential 
cost of agency-specific precedents—the loss of potentially useful 
administrative law doctrines that either remain limited to the agency 
to which they were first applied or leak out into the mainstream of 
administrative law only fitfully.  A related cost is that the 
development of the doctrine itself may be impeded by its limited 
application. 
 Agency-specific precedents may “break down” over time either 
because the general administrative law doctrine penetrates into the 
precedential silo (as in the case of the IRS precedents) or because the 
agency-specific precedents become accepted as generally applicable 
doctrine (which may be occurring with the reasoned decision making 
precedents). 
 Agency-specific precedents may arise at both the Supreme Court and 
lower court levels.  Nonetheless, Supreme Court decisions have a 
particular salience that, depending on the circumstances, may help to 
create agency-specific precedents or to break them down. 
 
177. Id. at 374–75 (citations omitted).  Interestingly, the Court’s discussion did not link the 
particular deficiency—failure to apply the rule announced—to any particular component of arbitrary 
and capricious review reflected in the Court’s prior statements of the test.  We think that reliance on 
the wrong rule might be characterized as either consideration of an improper factor or as a lack of 
rationality in the “connection” between the facts found and the ultimate decision. 
178. Of the thirty-six NLRB cases other than Allentown Mack produced by our Westlaw search, 
well over half (twenty-one) of the cases referencing the requirement of reasoned decision making 
come after the decision in Allentown Mack and typically cite it. 
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C. EPA Docketing Requirements 
The proper treatment of ex parte communications in notice-and-
comment rulemaking has been an important and difficult issue for 
administrative law doctrine.  Because rulemaking involves an across-the-
board legislative decision, it is ordinarily assumed that an on-the-record, 
adjudicatory-type proceeding is not required.179  Thus, § 553 of the APA 
does not prohibit ex parte communications in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and a certain amount of lobbying is to be expected in this sort of 
quasi-legislative process.180  Nonetheless, ex parte communications may un-
dermine the rulemaking process, be unfair to interested parties, and 
compromise the record for judicial review.181  Our third case study concerns 
the requirement that the EPA must docket for comment any ex parte commu-
nications of “central relevance” to the rulemaking.  Although this agency-
specific precedent is a product of the distinctive hybrid rulemaking proce-
dures that apply under the Clean Air Act, applying this approach more 
broadly might be a salutary development for administrative law. 
1. General Administrative Law Doctrine.—Under § 553 of the APA, 
legislative rules must comply with three basic procedural requirements: 
(1) notice; (2) an opportunity for public comment; and (3) a concise state-
ment of basis and purpose accompanying the final rule.182  In the 1960s and 
1970s, the courts began to develop these procedures into a “paper hearing” 
process.183  Interpreting § 553, the courts focused on the opportunity for 
comment, which allows parties to protect their interests by submitting 
arguments and information, provides the agency with broad input that im-
proves the quality of the agency rules, and creates the record for agency 
decision and judicial review.184  This view of the opportunity for comment 
implied that notice must be adequate to provide parties the opportunity for 
effective comment185 and that the agency’s statement of basis and purpose 
must reflect consideration of relevant comments.186 
 
179. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
180. See infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
181. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
182. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
183. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(Wright, J., stating reason for voting to grant rehearing en banc) (asserting that comments from 
disciplines more directly related to health care and poverty could have assisted the IRS in deciding 
whether to relax hospital obligations to the poor), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (“Section 553 was enacted to give the public an 
opportunity to participate in the rule-making process.  It also enables the agency promulgating the 
rule to educate itself before establishing rules and procedures which have a substantial impact on 
those regulated.”). 
185. This concept of notice requires agencies to include in the notice of proposed rulemaking 
critical data and information on which the rule is based and to provide a new notice and additional 
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In addition to paper hearing requirements grounded (at least ostensibly) 
in § 553, two kinds of “hybrid” rulemaking procedures that imposed re-
quirements beyond those contained in § 553 emerged in the 1970s.187  First, 
some agency organic statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, include so-called 
hybrid rulemaking procedures that incorporate some elements of formal ad-
judicatory procedures (such as oral argument or a closed record).188  Second, 
in some cases during the 1970s, the lower courts (especially the D.C. 
Circuit), imposed judge-made procedural requirements that did not originate 
in either the APA or agency organic statutes.189  The Supreme Court brought 
an abrupt halt to such judge-made procedures in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.190  Thus, 
rulemaking procedures that do not trigger formal rulemaking under § 556 and 
§ 557 of the APA today are governed by the paper hearing requirements 
 
opportunity for comment if the final rule differs materially from the proposed rule such that it is not 
a logical outgrowth of the rule as originally proposed.  See, e.g., S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 
F.2d 646, 665 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding a regulation even though the final version was 
substantially different from the proposed version because the changes were both in character with 
the original scheme and foreshadowed in the comments such that interested persons were 
sufficiently alerted to satisfy notice requirements); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“In order that rule-making proceedings . . . be conducted in [an] orderly 
fashion, information should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the time of 
issuance.  If this is not feasible, . . . information that is material to the subject . . . should be 
disclosed as it becomes available.”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631–32 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (addressing whether the EPA’s development of a methodology on the basis of 
submissions made at agency hearings required a new round of notice and comment). 
186. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that the 
requirement of a concise statement of basis and purpose “is not to be interpreted overliterally” and 
concluding that while the “regulation before us contains sufficient exposition of the purpose and 
basis of the regulation as a whole to satisfy this legislative minimum,” certain portions of the rule 
should be “remanded for the Administrator to supply an implementing statement that will enlighten 
the court”).  For a more recent application of this requirement, see Cent. & Sw. Servs. v. EPA, 220 
F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000).  This requirement also overlaps with substantive review under the 
arbitrary and capricious test.  See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 225 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (“[A]n agency must ‘demonstrate the rationality of its decision-making process by 
responding to those comments that are relevant and significant.’” (quoting Grand Canyon Air Tour 
Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); U.S. Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 
1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring the agency to “respond[] in a reasoned manner to significant 
comments received”). 
187. See generally Stephen F. Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975) (discussing several 
“judicial decisions that have ordered an agency . . . to afford opponents of a rule substantially 
greater procedural opportunities than are prescribed by section 553,” creating “a procedural 
category that might be termed ‘hybrid rulemaking’ or ‘notice-and-comment-plus’”). 
188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(2)–(6) (2006) (requiring the Administrator to “give 
interested persons an opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments” when the 
agency is promulgating a rule).  For further discussion, see infra notes 208–11 and accompanying 
text. 
189. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 348–56 (describing and criticizing decisions of the D.C. Circuit that 
imposed additional procedural requirements). 
190. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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(which remain intact notwithstanding Vermont Yankee191) derived from the 
application of § 553, which may be supplemented or superseded by hybrid 
procedural requirements in the organic statute.192 
Although ex parte communications are not prohibited by § 553, they 
present serious problems for paper hearings because they may undermine the 
opportunity for comment and frustrate the court’s ability to engage in 
meaningful judicial review.  In Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United 
States,193 a relatively early decision, the court invalidated a proceeding to 
allocate a television broadcast license because of improper ex parte 
communications, reasoning that the determination would resolve “conflicting 
private claims to a valuable privilege, and that basic fairness requires such a 
proceeding to be carried on in the open.”194  While Sangamon Valley was a 
narrow decision based on the adjudicatory characteristics of the agency 
action,195 in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,196 the court effectively announced 
a per se ban on ex parte communications in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,197 invalidating an FCC rule that allocated programming between 
broadcast and cable television networks because of extensive ex parte 
communications.198  HBO was decided just before Vermont Yankee, at the 
 
191. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236–40 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(finding a violation of § 553 when an agency released only redacted versions of studies consisting 
of staff-prepared scientific data because the redacted portions amounted to “critical factual material” 
due to the agency’s reliance upon them); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 372 F.3d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (stating that the notice of proposed rulemaking “must ‘provide sufficient factual detail and 
rationale for the rule to permit interested parties to comment meaningfully’” (quoting Fla. Power & 
Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988))); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530–31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that notice supplied 
by an agency must provide the public with an “accurate picture of the reasoning” used by the 
agency to develop the proposed rule). 
192. United States v. Sunny Cove Citrus Ass’n, 854 F. Supp. 669, 672–73 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
193. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
194. Id. at 224.  The proceeding was to determine which of two communities would be 
allocated a broadcast frequency and thus which of two competing stations would ultimately receive 
a license.  Id. at 223–24. 
195. See id. at 224 (referencing the FCC’s “quasi-judicial powers” in holding that the 
proceeding in question had to be reopened because “[a]gency action that substantially and 
prejudicially violates the agency’s rules cannot stand”). 
196. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
197. In addressing the issue, the court stated, 
Once a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued, . . . any agency official or 
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional 
process of the rulemaking proceeding, should [refuse to engage in ex parte 
communications]. . . .  If ex parte contacts nonetheless occur, we think that any written 
document or a summary of any oral communication must be placed in the public file 
established for each rulemaking docket immediately after the communication is 
received so that interested parties may comment thereon. 
Id. at 57 (citations omitted). 
198. The court reasoned that the communications violated the public-comment requirements of 
§ 553 because interested parties had no opportunity to respond to the secret communications, the 
communications frustrated judicial review by reducing the public record to a “mere sham,” and 
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peak of the D.C. Circuit’s willingness to order additional agency procedures, 
and the court has subsequently distanced itself from the decision.199 
It is interesting to note that many of these cases involved the FCC, 
which might suggest that these are agency-specific precedents.  In particular, 
because FCC decisions affecting licenses often have significant adjudicatory 
elements,200 ex parte communications may be especially problematic in FCC 
cases.201  In addition, the FCC uses a peculiar terminology that tends to 
reinforce these adjudicatory elements.202  In any event, these FCC decisions 
are often cited in cases involving other agencies,203 and our focus in this case 
study is not on ex parte communication precedents involving the FCC but on 
another major decision concerning ex parte communications that involved 
the EPA. 
2. EPA-Specific Docketing Precedents.—Administrative law casebooks 
conventionally focus on another major D.C. Circuit decision as a leading 
case on ex parte communications: Sierra Club v. Costle.204  The case contains 
 
Sangamon Valley applied because cable and broadcast networks were competing for a valuable 
privilege.  Id. at 52–59. 
199. See Air Transp. Ass’n v. FAA, 169 F.3d 1, 7 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (opining that HBO 
“could be thought to be undermined by Vermont Yankee”); Action for Children’s Television v. 
FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (characterizing application of HBO to the proceedings 
being reviewed as “a clear departure from established law when applied to informal rulemaking 
proceedings”); see also Viacom Int’l Inc. v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1044 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(characterizing HBO as limited to “cases involving competing claims for a specific valuable 
privilege under circumstances similar to adjudication”). 
200. Broadcast licensing is necessary because radio waves at similar frequencies interfere with 
each other, and the broadcast spectrum is therefore finite, which means that broadcast licensing will 
inherently involve conflicting claims to a valuable privilege. 
201. The impropriety of ex parte communications in judicial proceedings is widely recognized 
and accepted.  See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460 (1978) (stating that 
ex parte communication between judge and jury is “pregnant with possibilities for error”); Hereford 
v. Warren, 536 F.3d 523, 537 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that when “a judge holds a bench conference 
with only one party’s counsel in attendance, the judge is potentially permitting that party to hear 
secrets which could be wielded to the disadvantage of the other party, or is allowing that party to 
raise issues before the court without giving the other side an opportunity to argue in opposition”).  
The APA’s restrictions on ex parte communications in adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006), 
reflect similar concerns in the context of administrative proceedings.  Ex parte communications in 
adjudications not only undermine the rights of opposing parties but also threaten the impartiality of 
the decision maker.  Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262–65 (2009) 
(reflecting concern over one-sided access to and bias by the Judiciary in holding that due process 
required recusal of a state court judge from a case in which the president of one of the parties had 
made “extraordinary” contributions to the judge’s campaign). 
202. The FCC often promulgates rules by means of what it refers to as “orders” although the 
APA defines an “order” as “the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . in a matter other than rule 
making but including licensing.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(6); see also id. § 551(7) (defining “adjudication” 
as “agency process for the formulation of an order”). 
203. See, e.g., U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539–40 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(applying the reasoning of HBO to a case involving the Federal Maritime Commission). 
204. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 115–23 (4th ed. 2010); GLICKSMAN & LEVY, 
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an important discussion of ex parte communications within government, 
including efforts by congressional leaders or White House staff to influence 
the outcome of rulemaking.205  In addition, the case articulates a tolerant ap-
proach to ex parte communications based on the recognition that lobbying is 
appropriate and inevitable given the legislative character of rulemaking and 
the rulemaking process.206  Nonetheless, the court indicated that written ex 
parte communications and a summary of oral ex parte communications must 
be added to the administrative record when they are of “central relevance” to 
the proceedings so as to ensure an opportunity for public comment.207 
The latter requirement might be a useful and definitive resolution of the 
ex parte communication problem in light of paper hearing requirements.  Ex 
parte communications are not prohibited (unless Sangamon Valley applies), 
but if those communications contain important data and information or other 
considerations that are critical to the agency’s final rulemaking decision, then 
the material must be made part of the record for public comment.  However 
reasonable this accommodation may be as a matter of general administrative 
law, however, Sierra Club v. Costle was interpreting and applying the hybrid 
rulemaking provisions of the Clean Air Act, which require the EPA to in-
clude information in the notice of proposed rulemaking, docket information 
accumulated during the rulemaking, and make a decision based solely on the 
information in the rulemaking docket.208 
Specifically, one of these provisions requires the EPA to place 
documents received after the close of the comment period in the docket if the 
documents are of “central relevance” to the rulemaking.209  Not 
unreasonably, the court in Sierra Club v. Costle concluded that if the EPA 
received post-comment-period oral communications of “central relevance,” it 
had to place a summary of them in the docket as well.210  Although the court 
concluded that the EPA need not reopen the comment period in that case, it 
cautioned that “[i]f, however, documents of central importance upon which 
EPA intended to rely had been entered on the docket too late for any 
meaningful public comment prior to promulgation, then both the structure 
and spirit of [the statutory provision specifying the procedures applicable to 
rulemakings] would have been violated.”211 
Sierra Club is often treated by administrative law experts as establishing 
generally applicable rules for the treatment of ex parte communications in 
 
supra note 8, at 373–83 (both including Sierra Club in their discussions of ex parte 
communications). 
205. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 404–10. 
206. Id. at 400–01. 
207. Id. at 402–04. 
208. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(2)–(6) (2006). 
209. Id. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i). 
210. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 402–04. 
211. Id. at 398. 
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rulemakings without much attention to the implications of the Clean Air 
Act’s hybrid procedures for the decision in that case.212  Nonetheless, while 
courts have cited the case many times for various propositions,213 especially 
for its treatment of ex parte communications within the Executive Branch214 
and its general attitude toward ex parte communications in informal 
rulemaking,215 they have not applied the “central relevance” test for inclusion 
of documents in the rulemaking record except in cases involving the EPA.216  
Further, all but one of the EPA cases referencing the term arose under the 
Clean Air Act.  In the only case that did not, the court refused to apply the 
docketing requirement precisely because the generally applicable provisions 
of the APA applied rather than the special procedures of the Clean Air Act.217 
At first blush, at least, the EPA-specific docketing precedents would 
seem to be entirely appropriate given the significance of the Clean Air Act’s 
 
212. See, e.g., Michael O. Spivey & Jeffrey G. Micklos, Developing Provider-Sponsored 
Organization Solvency Standards Through Negotiated Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 262 & 
n.10 (1999) (arguing that “[a] degree of ‘negotiation’ seems destined to occur in rulemaking within 
[agencies whose rulemakings involve technical expertise] either on a formal or informal basis” and 
describing Sierra Club as a case “holding that [an] agency . . . accepting documents after 
publication of [a] proposed rule was not impermissible on [the] condition that [the] agency place[] 
in [the] docket all documents centrally relevant to [the] rulemaking”); see also Cary Coglianese et 
al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations 
for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 933 n.19 (2009) (citing Sierra Club for 
the proposition that “there is no ‘ex parte contacts doctrine’ in informal rulemaking”); Kevin M. 
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 294 
n.136 (2006) (describing Sierra Club as a case that “embrac[ed] broad permissibility of ex parte 
contacts between [the] White House and agencies during informal rulemaking”).  Some scholars do 
note the application of special Clean Air Act hybrid rulemaking procedures in Sierra Club.  See, 
e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 
81 TEXAS L. REV. 1443, 1456 n.42 (2003) (“The Clean Air Act’s ‘docketing’ requirement for all ex 
parte contacts of ‘central relevance’ is an example of a procedure that must be followed which 
departs from the traditional [requirements] . . . of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
213. On March 1, 2010, Insta-cite showed 146 cases citing the decision, but many of these 
references did not concern ex parte communications. 
214. See, e.g., Walker v. Pierce, 665 F. Supp. 831, 839 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Sierra Club for 
the proposition that “an executive agency is entitled to take into account broad administration 
policies that are not in direct conflict with the applicable governing statute”). 
215. See, e.g., Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(relying on Sierra Club for the proposition that “ex parte contact is not shunned in the 
administrative agency arena as it is in the judicial context”). 
216. A Westlaw search in the ALLFEDS database on March 6, 2010 for cases containing the 
terms Sierra Club v. Costle and central relevance revealed only thirteen other cases, all of which 
involved the EPA.  Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash. 
v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. U.S. EPA, 836 F.2d 
777 (3d Cir. 1987); Union Oil Co. U.S. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Air Pollution Control Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 739 
F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. U.S. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 
1007 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981); PPG Indus., 
Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
217. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 86 F.3d at 1222. 
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hybrid procedures to the court’s decision.  But the central relevance approach 
resonates with more generally applicable § 553 paper hearing requirements 
insofar as failure to disclose ex parte communications of central relevance to 
the decision means that interested parties have no notice of the information 
contained in the communications and no opportunity to comment on that 
information.  The central relevance test might therefore be more useful as a 
broader resolution of the ex parte communication issue in the context of 
§ 553, in the sense that while ex parte communications are not banned by 
§ 553, agencies should docket those comments that are of central relevance 
to the issues in a rulemaking in a manner that permits meaningful public 
comment.218 
There are some decisions not involving the EPA that apply Sierra 
Club’s reasoning in a general way.  One non-EPA decision has cited Sierra 
Club for the proposition that the “relative significance of an ex parte 
communication to the eventual agency action is a factor in determining 
whether disclosure of the communication is required.”219  Another decision 
cited the case to establish the principle that “[a]n agency commits serious 
procedural error when it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a 
proposed rule in time to allow for meaningful commentary.”220  But Sierra 
 
218. In some cases, the docketing of information not referenced in the notice of proposed 
rulemaking may require an extension of the comment period or new notice so as to make comment 
possible.  See, e.g., Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977) (concluding 
that whether an agency must engage in an additional round of notice and comment turns on whether 
its original notice would “fairly apprise interested persons of the ‘subjects and issues’ [of the 
rulemaking]”). 
219. Braniff Master Exec. Council of Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 693 
F.2d 220, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
220. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530–31 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); cf. Colorado v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Sierra 
Club to support the holding that the agency “sufficiently explain[ed] the assumptions and 
methodology used in preparing the [computer] model” used in formulating regulations governing 
the valuation of damaged natural resources); Golding v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 697, 728–29 
(2001) (citing Sierra Club for the proposition that “[c]ourts also have permitted evidence beyond 
the record if ‘plaintiff makes a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” that creates 
“serious doubts about the fundamental integrity” of the administrative action’”) (internal quotations 
omitted), aff’d, 47 Fed. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 
(D.D.C. 2004) (citing Sierra Club to support the statement that “[i]t is clear that when an agency 
relies on studies or data after the comment period has ended, no meaningful commentary on such 
data is possible”).  Similarly, some courts have cited Sierra Club for the generally accepted 
proposition that an agency need not engage in a second round of notice and comment simply 
because its final rule differed from its proposed rule, as long as the final rule was a logical 
outgrowth of the proposal.  See, e.g., Brazos Elec. Power Coop. v. Sw. Power Admin., 819 F.2d 
537, 543 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he original notice will be deemed sufficient if the final rule is a 
‘logical outgrowth’ of the published provisions.”); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 
F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that a substantially revised final rule complies with APA 
procedures if “the changes in the original rule ‘are in character with the original scheme’ and the 
final rule is a ‘logical outgrowth’ of the notice and comments already given” (citations omitted)); cf. 
Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Sierra Club for the 
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Club’s specific “central relevance” test remains tied to the Clean Air Act 
rulemaking context in which it originated.221 
The EPA docketing precedents may be seen as an example of an 
administrative law issue that is unique to the agency and at the very least 
involves a compound issue of general and agency-specific administrative 
law.  As a result, these precedents have distinctive features that differentiate 
this case study from the IRS and FCC case studies and that suggest some ad-
ditional observations: 
 Agency-specific precedents may be especially likely to arise and 
persist when distinctive provisions of the agency’s organic statute 
apply insofar as those provisions are unique to the agency.  In this 
respect, courts may be especially likely to confine their precedents to 
other cases arising under the organic statute. 
 While agency-specific precedents that are the product of specific 
provisions of the organic statute do not apply directly to other 
agencies, they may reflect generally applicable principles that might 
be relevant or useful by analogy.222  Thus, even agency-specific 
precedents involving unique administrative law provisions may have 
potential applicability beyond the agency of origination. 
 Although it is only one example, the EPA docketing precedents 
might suggest that the courts attach greater significance to the 
applicability of a unique provision of the organic statute than do 
academic commentators.  At least it appears that administrative law 
casebooks and treatises may treat Sierra Club as a generally 
applicable precedent while courts are less inclined to do so.223 
D. The Treating Physician Rule in the Social Security Administration 
The substantial evidence standard of review applies to factual findings 
made by agencies in formal APA adjudications as well as under various or-
 
proposition that statutory notice requirements do not require an agency to “select a final rule from 
among the precise proposals under consideration during the comment period”). 
221. We do not wish to overstate the extent to which the central relevance test for docketing ex 
parte communications differs from the general paper hearing requirements of § 553 that have been 
applied to require similar kinds of disclosures.  Indeed, it is precisely because of the overlap that we 
think broader application of the central relevance test might be useful—because it is a relatively 
clear and appropriate test for what material should be docketed for comment. 
222. Ultimately, it might not be appropriate for the courts to adopt such a generally applicable 
requirement if it is not a fair construction of § 553.  Nonetheless, if the approach is a sound one, it 
might be adopted through statutory amendment, or agencies might voluntarily undertake such 
disclosures in order to foster greater transparency. 
223. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.  This difference in perception makes 
sense insofar as courts and commentators tend to view administrative law differently.  The courts 
are primarily concerned with identifying and applying the law to resolve a particular case even if the 
general fabric of administrative law is also a concern.  Commentators, however, tend to be more 
focused on the broader administrative law implications of a case and less concerned with the 
specific resolution of the particular issue before the court. 
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ganic statutes.224  Although the standard applies broadly to all kinds of 
findings under all kinds of statutes, its core meaning remains the same.  Our 
fourth case study concerns the development of a special rule, known as the 
“treating physician rule,” for applying the substantial evidence test in the 
context of disability determinations by the Social Security Administration 
(SSA).  This agency-specific line of precedents originated in the courts in 
response to an agency practice the courts regarded as improper.  It concerns a 
compound issue in that it reflects distinctive programmatic features, but the 
underlying justification for the rule appears to be of sufficiently general ap-
plicability that its infusion into general administrative law doctrine might be 
justified. 
1. General Administrative Law Doctrine.—The substantial evidence 
standard is conventionally described using language from Universal Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB,225 which declared that substantial evidence is “more than a 
mere scintilla” and consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”226  Although the case in-
volved a provision of the National Labor Relations Act,227 it is broadly cited 
in cases involving the APA and other statutes incorporating the substantial 
evidence standard.228  Universal Camera emphasized that then-recent 
revisions to the standard requiring courts to consider the record “as a whole” 
directed courts to assume a more significant role when reviewing the NLRB 
and to consider the evidence against the agency’s finding as well as the evi-
dence supporting it.229  The Court also addressed the weight to be given to 
ALJ findings that are reversed by the agency230 (which has de novo decision-
making authority), an issue we will discuss more fully below in connection 
with the fifth case study.231 
 
224. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006) 
(specifying the substantial evidence test as the applicable standard of review for certain rulemakings 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (2006) (providing that 
courts must affirm SSA decisions that are “supported by substantial evidence”). 
225. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
226. Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006) (providing that the NLRB’s determinations “with respect to 
questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be 
conclusive”). 
228. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit 
must use the substantial evidence standard when reviewing findings of fact by the Patent and 
Trademark Office); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (applying the 
substantial evidence standard in the context of the Federal Trade Commission Act); Am. Textile 
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (considering the substantial evidence standard in the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration context); Siegel v. SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 156 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (holding that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s finding that Siegel, a broker, 
violated National Association of Securities Dealers rules). 
229. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490. 
230. Id. at 492–97. 
231. See infra subpart III(E). 
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The substantial evidence test is much easier to state than it is to apply.  
In particular, it is difficult to “consider” the evidence contrary to the agency’s 
finding, which is required, without reweighing the evidence, which the re-
viewing court is forbidden from doing.  This difficulty is especially apparent 
when it comes to conflicting expert testimony.  The agency itself often has 
expertise in the field and may be expected to evaluate expert testimony 
accordingly.  At the same time, agencies should not be able to reject the 
expert testimony introduced by parties out of hand and without good reason.  
To this point, the courts have not developed any generally applicable admin-
istrative law doctrine to address this problem, although specialized rules have 
developed in some fields. 
2. SSA-Specific Treating Physician Precedents.—One area in which the 
agency’s treatment of expert testimony has been particularly troublesome is 
the SSA’s evaluation of medical testimony concerning disability.  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s optimism that medical testimony and 
its evaluation are neutral,232 the SSA’s treatment of such evidence has been 
the source of ongoing controversy.  Typically, disability claimants rely on 
medical evidence from their treating physicians who usually have treated 
them over a period of years and are familiar with their conditions.233  In many 
cases, however, the SSA (or the state agency making the initial 
determination) will order an examination with a consulting physician under 
contract with the SSA (or state agency).234  Such an examination may be 
necessary and entirely appropriate to address medical factors not already 
addressed by medical professionals. 
During the 1980s, however, the SSA adopted a series of controversial 
policies and practices to restrict benefits, and courts became concerned that 
the SSA was improperly denying benefits to hundreds of thousands of 
claimants.235  One practice that received considerable judicial attention was 
the SSA’s tendency to reject or discount the evidence of the treating physi-
cian and rely instead on the opinion of a consulting examiner even though the 
examiner, whose objectivity might be considered suspect, often had seen the 
 
232. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344–45 (1976) (concluding that a risk of error 
from the lack of a hearing before the termination of disability benefits was slight because 
determinations were made on the basis of objective medical evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 402–04 (1971) (concluding that reliance on hearsay evidence from medical reports did not 
violate due process because those reports were “routine, standard, and unbiased”). 
233. See RICHARD C. RUSKELL, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS HANDBOOK § 1:6 
(2010) (recommending that claimants’ representatives, as a “best practice,” obtain statements from 
treating sources whenever possible). 
234. See, e.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402–03 (explaining that three of the five reporting 
physicians were selected by the agency). 
235. See Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for 
Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 484–502 (discussing controversial SSA policies during the 1980s). 
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claimant only once for a short time.236  The courts reacted to this practice by 
holding that SSA decisions rejecting the treating physician’s opinion and re-
lying on a consulting examiner were not supported by substantial evidence.237  
This treating physician rule took various forms in various circuits.238  After a 
period of SSA resistance to the rule and rising tensions between the agency 
and the courts, the SSA adopted regulations prescribing when the opinion of 
a treating physician will be given “controlling weight.”239 
Although the treating physician rule concerns the “ultimate” factual 
question of whether a claimant is disabled under the definition of disability 
found in the Social Security Act and is now governed by regulation, it de-
rives from the general application of the substantial evidence standard of 
review—expert opinions contrary to the agency’s conclusion are part of the 
“whole record” and cannot be ignored or discounted without adequate 
reasons.  It is therefore generalizable in principle to other agency decisions 
based on potentially conflicting medical opinions and could apply in mod-
ified form to other kinds of factual findings in which conflicting expert 
testimony is at issue. 
By and large, however, the courts have refused to apply the rule in other 
contexts.  In Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord,240 for example, the 
Supreme Court held that the treating physician rule did not apply under the 
 
236. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 30–34 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing attempts by 
the courts to require agencies to respect the opinion of the treating physician who was familiar with 
the patient and also agency resistance to these attempts). 
237. See, e.g., id. at 31 (noting the court’s adherence to the judicially developed rule that a 
treating physician’s opinion on the subject of medical disability is binding on the fact finder unless 
contradicted by substantial evidence). 
238. The rule in the Second Circuit, for example, was that 
a treating physician’s opinion on the subject of medical disability, i.e., diagnosis and 
nature and degree of impairment, is: (i) binding on the fact-finder unless contradicted 
by substantial evidence; and (ii) entitled to some extra weight because the treating 
physician is usually more familiar with a claimant’s medical condition than are other 
physicians, although resolution of genuine conflicts between the opinion of the treating 
physician, with its extra weight, and any substantial evidence to the contrary remains 
the responsibility of the fact-finder. 
Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986).  Other circuits adopted a similar rule.  See, e.g., 
Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[O]rdinarily the opinions, diagnoses and 
medical evidence of a treating physician . . . should be accorded considerable weight in determining 
disability.”); Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Unless good cause is shown 
to the contrary, the Secretary must give substantial weight to the testimony of the claimant’s treating 
physician.”); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Secretary is not 
bound by the opinion of a . . . treating physician, [but] that opinion is entitled to great 
weight . . . [and] it may be disregarded only if there is persuasive contradictory evidence.”). 
239. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2010).  Although these regulations allow the SSA 
broader discretion to reject the treating physician’s opinion than cases like Schisler did, courts have 
upheld the regulations.  See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503–05 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
new regulations are less deferential to the treating physician but applying the regulation anyway). 
240. 538 U.S. 822 (2003). 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).241  Critically, the Court 
regarded the treating physician rule to be the product of the SSA’s regulation 
as opposed to a specific application of the substantial evidence standard of 
review.242  If the Court had focused on the historical origins of the rule as an 
application of the substantial evidence standard, the case for applying the 
rule more broadly would have been much more powerful.  Nonetheless, the 
Court also observed that “critical differences between the Social Security 
disability program and ERISA benefit plans caution against importing a 
treating physician rule from the former area into the latter.”243  Similarly, in 
White v. Principi,244 the Federal Circuit refused to extend the treating 
physician rule to the context of veterans’ benefits.245  On the other hand, 
there is some support for applying the rule under Medicare or Medicaid, even 
if the issue has not been definitively resolved and the trend seems to be away 
from its application.246 
Thus, the courts have explicitly declined to extend the treating physician 
rule beyond the Social Security disability context.  This refusal may well be 
justified by the differences between the programs and statutory or regulatory 
provisions involved, but the substantial evidence standard of review should 
mean the same thing under the Social Security Act as it does under the APA 
or other organic statutes.247  As Universal Camera framed the substantial 
evidence standard, the question is whether a “reasonable mind might 
accept”248 the opinion of a consulting examiner who has had a limited 
 
241. Id. at 829. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 832–33.  In particular, the Court emphasized that the SSA’s rules arise from the need 
to administer a comprehensive uniform nationwide program, while ERISA relates to voluntary 
programs that may vary considerably from employer to employer.  Id. at 833. 
244. 243 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
245. See id. at 1381 (“[U]nlike the Social Security benefits statutes, the [Veterans 
Administration] benefits statutes and regulations do not provide any basis for the ‘treating 
physician’ rule and, in fact, appear to conflict with such a rule.”). 
246. In Friedman v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services, 819 F.2d 42 (2d 
Cir. 1987), the court declined to resolve the issue: 
Even if we assume that the treating physician rule developed in Social Security 
disability cases . . . applies in Medicare reimbursement cases, compare [Gartmann v. 
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 633 F. Supp. 671, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 
1986)] (stating that [the] treating physician rule “may well apply with even greater 
force in the context of Medicare reimbursement”) with [Rendzio v. Sec’y of Health, 
Ed. & Welfare, 403 F. Supp. 917, 919 (E.D. Mich. 1975)] (noting that “persuasive 
authority” advises against extending treating physician rule to Medicare 
determinations), there is insufficient evidence in the instant case to put that rule in 
issue. 
Id. at 46.  Subsequently, the Second Circuit expressed “disagreement” with Gartmann.  See New 
York ex rel. Bodnar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 903 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(rejecting the contention that Medicare “is bound to provide reimbursement when ‘dual 
certification’ is made by the attending physician and the [utilization review committee]”). 
247. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
248. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). 
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opportunity to examine a patient “as adequate to support a conclusion”249 that 
the claimant is not disabled, in light of the contrary evidence in the record 
from a treating physician who has had significantly more involvement with 
the patient.  In the absence of some explanation of why the agency has cho-
sen to credit the opinion of the consulting physician over that of the treating 
physician, such a conclusion is arguably not supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole.  It may be, however, that the 
courts’ refusal to extend the rule reflects a sense that the rule is the product of 
judicial mistrust of the SSA rather than a generalizable application of the 
substantial evidence standard.250 
The treating physician rule is an example of agency-specific precedents 
concerning a compound administrative law issue that involves application of 
a general principle in the context of a distinctive agency program.251  It sug-
gests some further observations concerning agency-specific precedents: 
 Agency-specific precedents may arise as a judicial response to a 
specific problem confronted by courts in the context of a particular 
program.  Social Security disability determinations frequently 
required the agency to evaluate conflicting medical evidence from 
treating physicians and consulting examiners, and courts developed 
special rules for addressing this recurring question. 
 In such cases, the particular administrative context in which the issue 
arises may justify confining such precedents to the agency of origin, 
especially if the issue does not arise frequently in other programs or 
if there are distinctive features of the program at issue that make the 
rule inappropriate in other contexts.  Nonetheless, to the extent that 
the agency-specific rule reflects the application of generally 
applicable doctrine, such precedents may be generalizable to other 
contexts. 
 Some agency-specific precedents may be caused or reinforced by 
judicial concerns respecting a particular agency as opposed to 
distinctive statutory or programmatic features.  These concerns may 
be an additional factor in the courts’ refusal to extend the precedents 
to other agencies.252 
 
249. Id. 
250. See Levy, supra note 235, at 506–07 (noting a lack of judicial deference to the SSA’s 
positions); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 1110, 1115 (1995) (arguing that the substantial increase in reversals of SSA findings was fueled 
by judges’ displeasure with “what they perceived to be the heartless policies of the Reagan 
Administration toward disabled people”). 
251. The treating physician rule originated as a general application of the substantial evidence 
standard, but the current rule is the product of agency regulations that provide a distinctive legal 
basis for the rule. 
252. The propriety of judicial adoption of agency-specific rules of administrative law in 
response to particular concerns about the agency is an important and fundamental question that is 
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E. Credibility Determinations at the NLRB 
Our final case study concerns another pure administrative law issue in 
which the phenomenon of agency-specific precedents has contributed to the 
survival of a questionable doctrine (like the IRS example), while also helping 
to limit that questionable doctrine and prevent its spread to other agencies.  
The administrative law issue is the treatment of credibility determinations by 
an ALJ when the agency reverses the ALJ’s decision.  This issue was first 
addressed in the context of the NLRB, which led to the creation of NLRB-
specific precedents on the issue. 
1. General Administrative Law Doctrine.—In many agency 
adjudications, an initial hearing is conducted by an ALJ or other hearing 
officer even though the agency itself retains de novo decisional authority.253  
When the agency reverses the factual findings of the ALJ or hearing officer, 
the question becomes how a court should treat the conflicting opinions of the 
ALJ and the agency when it conducts judicial review under the substantial 
evidence standard.  In the Universal Camera litigation, this issue befuddled 
no less a figure than Judge Learned Hand, who concluded that the reviewing 
court should disregard the hearing officer’s findings if they are reversed by 
the NLRB.254  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the hearing 
officer’s findings were part of the “whole record” that courts must consider 
when determining whether the NLRB’s finding is supported by substantial 
evidence.255  This directive has proven to be particularly difficult to apply in 
relation to ALJ determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses. 
In the Universal Camera case itself, the critical issue was whether an 
employee had been fired because of misconduct, as the hearing examiner 
believed, or because of his union activities, as found by the NLRB.256  The 
testimony regarding the events surrounding the discharge was conflicting, 
with the hearing examiner crediting the employer’s witnesses and the NLRB 
giving heed to those of the employee.257  In the initial decision, the court of 
 
beyond the scope of this Article.  We simply note here that such factors may explain the persistence 
of some agency-specific precedents. 
253. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
254. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 752–53 (2d Cir. 1950), rev’d, 340 U.S. 
474 (1951).  Judge Hand reasoned that giving weight to the hearing examiner’s determinations 
would effectively require the Board to defer to the hearing examiner, which was inconsistent with 
the Board’s de novo decisional authority.  Id.  At the time, “hearing examiners” rather than ALJs 
conducted hearings.  Some agencies still conduct relatively formal adjudications subject to 
substantial evidence review by hearing officers who are not ALJs.  For purposes of this discussion, 
however, the distinction is not material. 
255. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492–97 (1951).  The Court concluded 
that “evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced 
examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different 
from the Board’s than when he has reached the same conclusion.”  Id. at 496. 
256. Universal Camera, 179 F.2d at 750–51. 
257. Id. at 751. 
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appeals upheld the NLRB, but on remand from the Supreme Court it 
concluded that, once it factored in the hearing examiner’s findings regarding 
credibility, the NLRB’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence 
on the record as a whole.258  The court of appeals emphasized that the NLRB 
had an insufficient basis for rejecting the hearing examiner’s demeanor-based 
credibility determinations.259  In an influential concurring opinion, Judge 
Frank drew a distinction between “testimonial” and “derivative” 
inferences.260  Under this approach, an examiner’s finding “binds” the agency 
if it is a demeanor-based credibility determination, notwithstanding the 
statutory authority of the agency to decide the case de novo.261 
Shortly after the decision on remand in Universal Camera, the D.C. 
Circuit applied this approach in Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC,262 
only to be reversed by the Supreme Court.263  The Supreme Court disap-
proved of the appellate court’s “understanding that the Examiner’s findings 
based on demeanor of a witness are not to be overruled by a Board without a 
‘very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded,’” and after ex-
pressly referencing the decision on remand in Universal Camera, the Court 
stated flatly, “We think this attitude goes too far.”264  Although Allentown 
involved the FCC rather than the NLRB, the Court seems to have articulated 
a generally applicable principle (not confined to FCC cases) for the applica-
tion of the substantial evidence standard of review when the agency reverses 
a hearing officer who observed the witnesses’ demeanor.  In any event, the 
Court’s express disapproval of the decision on remand in Universal Camera 
ought to have ended that approach in at least the NLRB context. 
2. NLRB-Specific Credibility Rules.—Notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Allentown Broadcasting, the Universal Camera approach 
resurfaced in NLRB cases, eventually leading to an influential decision, 
Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB.265  In Penasquitos, the Ninth Circuit 
declared that “evidence in the record which, when taken alone, may amount 
 
258. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430–31 (2d Cir. 1951). 
259. See id. at 431 (noting that the Board must give at least some regard to the examiner’s 
findings given that the examiner and not the Board heard the witnesses’ testimony and could judge 
credibility). 
260. Id. at 432 (Frank, J., concurring) (stating that an examiner’s finding “binds the Board only 
to the extent that it is a ‘testimonial inference,’ or ‘primary inference,’ i.e., an inference that a fact to 
which a witness orally testified is an actual fact because that witness so testified and because 
observation of the witness induces a belief in that testimony” but that the Board “is not bound by the 
examiner’s ‘secondary inferences,’ or ‘derivative inferences,’ i.e., facts to which no witness orally 
testified but which the examiner inferred from facts orally testified by witnesses whom the examiner 
believed”). 
261. Id. 
262. 222 F.2d 781, 785–86 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev’d, 349 U.S. 358 (1955). 
263. FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955). 
264. Id. at 364 (citation omitted). 
265. 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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to ‘substantial evidence’ and therefore support the Board’s decision, will 
often be insufficient when the trial examiner has, on the basis of the 
witnesses’ demeanor, made credibility determinations contrary to the Board’s 
position.”266  Although the court indicated that an ALJ’s “determinations of 
credibility based on demeanor” are not “conclusive on the Board,” it none-
theless stated broadly that “the special deference deservedly afforded the 
administrative law judge’s factual determinations based on testimonial 
inferences will weigh heavily in our review of a contrary finding by the 
Board.”267  Penasquitos Village has been frequently cited, and although most 
of the cases according special deference to testimonial inferences by ALJs or 
hearing officers involve the NLRB, that approach has been extended to other 
agencies.268 
This approach is problematic for two reasons.  First, notwithstanding the 
court’s disclaimer that an ALJ’s demeanor-based credibility determinations 
are not “conclusive,” in practice this approach treats them as very nearly 
so.269  In Jackson v. Veterans Administration, for example, the court refused 
to permit the agency to reject a hearing officer’s testimonial inferences on 
one issue even though it was clear from the hearing officer’s treatment of 
another issue that his credibility determinations were unreliable and possibly 
biased.270  This sort of result is simply inconsistent with the vesting of deci-
 
266. Id. at 1078. 
267. Id. at 1079; see also W.F. Bolin Co. v. NLRB, 70 F.3d 863, 872–73 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Penasquitos Village, 565 F.2d at 1079). 
268. See, e.g., Haebe v. Dep’t of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Paredes-
Urrestarazu v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 801, 818–19 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Pogue v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 
768 F.2d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor & Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 694 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1982) (all citing to Penasquitos 
Village).  Agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration have specifically endorsed the 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Zoltanski v. FAA, 372 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding an approach 
giving special deference to an ALJ who has heard testimony directly instead of to the reviewing 
Administrator). 
269. See, e.g., Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1300 (noting that “with respect to conflicting determinations 
concerning demeanor-based credibility, the administrative judge ‘is without question the better 
judge of who to believe’” (quoting Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1332)); Kimm v. Dep’t of Treasury, 61 
F.3d 888, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that an appellate court will not sustain the rejection of an 
administrative law judge’s findings based on the demeanor of a witness unless the agency has 
“articulated sound reasons” for doing so).  In particular, it is nearly impossible to rehabilitate 
discredited testimony in the absence of some strong corroborating evidence, which means that when 
the case comes down to conflicting accounts of two witnesses, the agency is effectively precluded 
from reversing the ALJ or hearing examiner. 
270. Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1328.  The case involved several alleged incidents of sexual 
harassment involving the same supervisor and employee, and the ALJ credited the supervisor and 
discredited the employee on all of the allegations.  Id. at 1327–29.  The Merit Systems Protection 
Board, however, credited the complaining employee.  Id.  With regard to one incident, the court 
affirmed the Board because other witnesses confirmed the complainant’s account.  Id. at 1332.  On 
the other instances, however, the court ruled that the Board was not at liberty to reject the hearing 
examiner’s demeanor-based credibility determinations.  Id.  Insofar as the hearing examiner had 
credited the alleged harasser’s testimony on one incident despite contrary evidence from other 
witnesses confirming the complainant’s account of the events, it is hard to see why the examiner’s 
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sional responsibility in the agency (not the hearing officer) and the statutory 
provisions for de novo determination of the facts by the agency.  Second, 
notwithstanding its prevalence in the folklore of the legal system, the notion 
that demeanor provides a particularly useful tool for determining credibility 
is simply not borne out by the empirical evidence.271  Whatever advantages 
the observation of witnesses may present, they should not prevent an agency 
from reversing the demeanor-based inferences of a hearing officer or ALJ if 
the agency offers a reasonable explanation for doing so and there is substan-
tial evidence in the record to support the ultimate agency determination. 
The testimonial-inference cases are at once illustrative of potential 
problems with agency-specific precedents and a potential caution against 
incorporating agency-specific precedents into the general body of 
administrative law.  This case study suggests several additional observations: 
 It may be unclear whether agency-specific precedents respond to any 
distinctive features of an agency statute or program.  In this case 
study, the treatment of ALJ credibility determinations would appear 
to involve a pure administrative law issue that cuts across all agency 
adjudications, but it may also respond to some unexpressed concerns 
about the NLRB.272 
 Agency-specific precedents may contribute to the survival or 
reemergence of a doctrine that has been rejected in other contexts.  
The treatment of ALJ demeanor-based credibility determinations as 
effectively binding on the agency was rejected by the Supreme Court 
in a case involving the FCC but reinvigorated in subsequent NLRB 
cases that did not cite the FCC decision. 
 In some instances, agency-specific precedents may help to contain or 
prevent the spread of a “bad” administrative law doctrine.  Thus, to 
the extent that one believes that Penasquitos articulates an erroneous 
or misguided doctrine, it would be best if this particular doctrine 
remained confined to as few agencies as possible.273 
 
blanket acceptance of the supervisor’s testimony and rejection of the employee’s testimony should 
receive any special respect with regard to other disputed events. 
271. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991) 
(“According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of demeanor in 
deciding whether to believe a witness.  On the contrary, there is some evidence that the observation 
of demeanor diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments.”). 
272. One possible explanation, for example, might be judicial concerns that the Board—which 
is composed of political appointees and might be agenda driven—is less likely than ALJs to engage 
in neutral fact-finding.  See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 8, at 472–73 (describing abrupt shifts 
in Board policy that often accompany changes in the Board’s composition). 
273. The same point might also be made with respect to the judge-made treating physician rule, 
which might be criticized as an instance of judicial overreaching. 
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IV. Agency-Specific Precedents and the Silo Effect 
As a general matter, we think our case studies, while anecdotal, are not 
isolated instances and that the phenomenon of agency-specific precedents is 
real and worthy of further investigation.274  Of course, core administrative 
law principles and iconic cases are applied broadly, sometimes precisely 
because the Court intended them to be definitive, generally applicable 
doctrinal pronouncements.275  Our case studies suggest, however, that 
agency-specific precedents concerning agency procedures and judicial re-
view arise in various areas with respect to various agencies.276  In this Part, 
we explore the causes of the development and persistence of agency-specific 
precedents while suggesting that the phenomenon cannot be fully explained 
by specific features of agency organic statutes or distinctive aspects of the 
agency programs or practices.  We posit that information costs also create 
incentives among practitioners and judges who favor reliance on precedents 
that involve the same agency as the one involved in the dispute in question; 
i.e., agency-specific precedents are a product of the silo effect. 
A. Agency-Specific Statutes, Programs, and Practices 
In some of our case studies, agency-specific precedents reflected 
agency-specific statutes (or regulations), distinctive programmatic features, 
or judicial reactions to a particular agency’s practices.  For a variety of 
reasons, we might expect judicial precedents to be agency specific in such 
circumstances.  Nonetheless, agency-specific statutes, programs, and 
practices do not provide a complete explanation for agency-specific 
precedents. 
 
274. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law 
Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 
2081 (2009) (observing that “[r]eviewing courts [in cases involving the NLRB] tend to cite only 
other NLRB cases, many of them predating important developments in the contemporary law of 
judicial review” and that, as a result, the Board is “isolated from those developments in 
administrative law that apply to agency adjudications”).  A full assessment of the extent of silo 
thinking and the related phenomenon of agency-specific precedents requires more comprehensive 
and empirical analysis than we were able to conduct in preparing this Article.  We intend to pursue 
those inquiries in future research. 
275. Vermont Yankee and Chevron, for example, were apparently intended to send a broad 
message to the lower courts concerning questions of administrative procedure and statutory 
interpretation, respectively.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984) (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative interpretations ‘has been 
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has 
involved reconciling conflicting policies.’” (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 
(1961))); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978) (stating that reviewing courts “generally” may not impose added procedural requirements on 
an agency). 
276. Although we do not contend that agency-specific precedents are so widespread as to 
undermine the existence or utility of a body of general administrative law, our observations suggest 
that it is unwise to take for granted that a given administrative law principle is universally applied. 
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The “central relevance” test for docketing ex parte communications in 
EPA rulemaking is an agency-specific precedent that can be traced directly to 
the hybrid rulemaking provisions of the Clean Air Act.277  It is hardly 
surprising that, in cases arising under this sort of agency-specific statute, 
courts would rely most heavily on other cases involving the same statute and 
agency.  Nor is it surprising that courts would be hesitant to transplant into 
the APA a test derived from the language of agency-specific hybrid 
procedures that reflect a congressional decision to require greater procedural 
formality or accountability than is required under § 553.278  In other areas, 
however, it may not be material that a case arises under the organic statute as 
opposed to the APA.  For example, substantial evidence review of SSA and 
NLRB adjudications arises under the agencies’ respective organic statutes, 
not the APA, but the substantial evidence standard is understood to mean the 
same thing under all three statutes.279 
Even when a generally applicable administrative law statute or principle 
is involved, agency-specific precedents may arise from distinctive features of 
the program administered by the agency.  This point is illustrated by the de-
velopment of the treating physician rule, which arose as a response to the 
particular circumstances of the disability-determination process.280  
Distinctive programmatic features (such as the nonadversarial character of 
disability hearings281) may have agency-specific implications for the applica-
tion of general administrative law doctrine.  In addition, a particular problem 
or issue (such as the weight accorded a treating physician’s opinion) may 
arise with great frequency under an agency-specific program.  Ultimately, the 
courts may choose to accommodate agency-specific programmatic features 
 
277. See supra notes 204–23 and accompanying text. 
278. See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:35 (3d ed. 2010) 
(describing Congress’s refusal to enact a general hybrid procedural requirement in the APA, despite 
its adoption of hybrid procedures in specific statutes). 
279. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (describing the 
substantial evidence standard under the Wagner Act as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that the substantial evidence standard under 
the APA requires “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion” (citation omitted)); Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
the substantial evidence standard in SSA cases as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (citations omitted)). 
280. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 829, 832–33 (2003) 
(explaining that the treating physician rule imposed by the Ninth Circuit “was originally developed 
by Courts of Appeals as a means to control disability determinations by administrative law judges 
under the Social Security Act” and that “critical differences between the Social Security disability 
program and ERISA benefit plans caution against importing a treating physician rule from the 
former area into the latter”). 
281. See, e.g., Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, the 
burden to prove disability in a social security case is on the claimant, . . . but a social security 
disability hearing is nonadversarial . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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or develop agency-specific doctrines to address what the courts consider to 
be peculiar and improper agency practices.282 
In some instances, agency-specific precedents may respond to agency 
practices that do not have their foundations in either statutes (or regulations) 
or distinctive programmatic features.  The IRS’s practice concerning inter-
pretive regulations, for example, does not respond to any agency-specific 
statute concerning nonlegislative rules.283  Likewise, while the IRS’s program 
(assessment and collection of taxes) has many distinctive features, there is no 
apparent link between those features and the administrative law doctrine 
concerning legislative and nonlegislative rules.284  Thus, the emergence of 
this distinctive IRS practice concerning interpretive regulations may be an 
example of the silo effect at work at the agency level.  The emergence of 
such agency-specific practices and judicial precedents accommodating them 
may be especially likely when, as in the case of the IRS, a longstanding 
agency practice (particularly one that predates the APA) persists in the face 
of changes in general administrative law doctrine.285 
While agency-specific statutes, programs, and practices may explain 
many agency-specific precedents, our case studies suggest that they are not a 
complete explanation.  Some agency-specific precedents, such as the rea-
soned decision making precedents involving the FCC and the NLRB 
precedents concerning credibility determinations, arise with respect to 
relatively “pure” administrative law issues and do not appear to respond to 
any agency-specific statute, program, or practice.286  Even when agency-
 
282. Thus, the treating physician rule originated as an SSA-specific application of the 
substantial evidence test that responded to perceived bias against claimants in the assessment of 
treating physicians’ and consulting examiners’ opinions.  See Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501 
(9th Cir. 1983) (noting the increasing number of circuits adopting the treating physician rule).  
Subsequently, however, the SSA adopted a regulation specifically addressing the issue, which was 
accepted by the courts, thus accommodating the (reformed) SSA practice.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1527(d)(2) (2010).  It is also worth noting that once the regulation was adopted, the treating 
physician rule may have been converted into an agency-specific precedent that derives from an 
agency-specific legal source.  Thus for example, Black & Decker treated the rule as the product of 
the regulation rather than as a product of the substantial evidence test.  See Black & Decker, 58 U.S. 
at 832–33. 
283. That the IRS’s organic statute contains both specific and general grants of rulemaking 
authority does not distinguish it from many other agencies. 
284. See supra subpart III(A). 
285. The courts may carry forward such preexisting agency-specific precedents out of concern 
for disrupting settled practices and expectations.  This may explain courts’ continued use of the 
National Muffler test for review of IRS interpretive regulations.  The National Muffler test 
originated in cases decided before the adoption of the APA, see Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (citing Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)), and 
persists notwithstanding the adoption of the supposedly universal Chevron test for statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration 
in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 498 
(2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court in post-Chevron tax cases involving the validity of section 
7805(a) regulations has tended to ignore Chevron . . . , leaving the lower courts in a muddle on this 
point” and citing cases in which the Court relied on National Muffler without citing Chevron). 
286. See supra subparts III(B), (E). 
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specific features play a role in the development of agency-specific 
precedents, moreover, additional considerations may contribute to their de-
velopment and persistence.  As we explain below, we believe that agency-
specific precedents are a manifestation of the silo effect—a kind of 
information silo—that arises because of the informational dynamic of the 
judicial process.287 
B. Precedents as Information Silos 
Our analysis begins with the premise that precedents are a kind of 
information.  Significant costs are associated with finding, analyzing, and 
applying judicial precedents.288  The value of precedents, conversely, is re-
flected in their influence on or support for the outcome of judicial 
proceedings to review agency action in the direction favored by the person 
relying on them.289  To the extent that precedents are used to argue for a 
given outcome, much of their value to a party depends on whether any given 
precedent and its reasoning support the party’s position, although awareness 
of contrary precedents is also essential.  Holding result and rationale 
constant, the value of a precedent depends on other factors such as the level 
of the court and the degree of factual and legal similarity between cases. 
If precedents are understood as valuable information, it is not surprising 
that precedential silos might arise.290  The question is why the silos arise in 
the form of agency-specific precedents.  We might expect agencies to de-
velop administrative practices or procedures that deviate from general 
administrative law doctrine because their organizational structure creates the 
agency, transaction, and information costs that would foster the silo effect 
along agency lines.291  But most federal courts that engage in judicial review 
of agency action are courts of general jurisdiction whose judicial-review 
functions are not confined to particular agencies.292  Thus, the organizational 
structure of the courts does not replicate the structure of agencies in a way 
that we would expect to foster agency-specific precedential silos. 
Of course, some courts that review the decisions of some agencies are 
specialized, especially certain Article I courts such as the Tax Court and the 
 
287. See supra notes 75–93 and accompanying text. 
288. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 817 
(2002) (explaining the high information costs associated with learning the law). 
289. Here the focus is on litigation.  Precedents may also provide valuable information about 
the likely legal consequences of a given course of action, which can be used to provide guidance to 
clients in deciding whether and how to act. 
290. There can be enormous resistance to the dissemination of knowledge because the 
possession of knowledge and the exercise of administrative power intertwine.  The possession of 
valuable information gives the individual or organization power, creating disincentives to the 
sharing of that information. 
291. In some other countries, courts are specialized by subject matter in ways that confine their 
jurisdiction (at least in some cases) to particular agencies.  See infra note 296. 
292. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
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Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.293  In keeping with the role of agency 
costs in the creation of the silo effect, we would expect these specialized 
courts to be more prone to the development of agency-specific precedents 
that reduce information costs to the court and increase the weight and dura-
bility of the court’s precedents.294  To the extent that the Federal Circuit 
reviews decisions arising in a relatively small number of specialized agencies 
and courts, we might expect similar incentives to foster agency-specific 
precedents in that court’s jurisprudence.295  This sort of specialization among 
courts conducting judicial review is the exception, however, and generalist 
courts (including the federal district courts, the regional circuit courts of 
appeals, and the Supreme Court) have jurisdiction over the judicial review of 
most agency decisions.296 
Insofar as courts in the United States are organized primarily along 
geographic lines, we might expect precedential silos to arise geographically.  
Thus, for example, the silo effect may help to explain why state courts de-
velop their own distinctive lines of common law doctrine and why they may 
be reluctant to change that doctrine to conform to that of other states.  Similar 
factors are likely at work within circuits.297  In terms of information costs, 
judges within a circuit are likely to be more familiar with the precedent of 
that circuit, so reliance on those precedents reduces information costs.  In 
terms of agency costs, judges within a circuit may place extra value on 
adherence to circuit precedent because it increases the durability and impact 
of that court’s decisions, and they may tend to devalue geographic uniformity 
because its benefits fall primarily to others (i.e., these benefits are positive 
externalities).298 
 
293. 26 U.S.C. § 7442 (2006); 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (2006). 
294. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
295. For discussion of the Federal Circuit’s limited and specialized jurisdiction, see generally 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); Miller & Curry, supra note 90. 
296. In contrast, the courts in some other countries are specialized by subject matter.  In 
Germany, for example, judges in courts of generalized jurisdiction typically specialize by subject 
matter, and there are separate court hierarchies for labor, tax, social security, and general 
administrative law matters.  Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German 
Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 31–34, 45 (1981). 
297. Nonetheless, we might expect fewer geographic-silo precedents among the federal circuits 
on questions of federal law than among states on questions of state law.  First, the federal courts are 
construing the same statute or constitutional provision while state courts are often dealing with 
state-specific sources of law.  Second, federal courts are likely to place a higher value on 
uniformity—an important national interest—than state courts.  Finally, there are more states than 
circuits, which means there are more opportunities for state courts to deviate from the general 
practice of sister states. 
298. The durability and impact of a precedent affect the extent to which it sets the law in 
accordance with the judge’s ideological preferences and may enhance the authoring judge’s judicial 
reputation and influence.  See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 151, at 1055–56 (discussing why judges 
may “gain utility from influencing public events in accordance with their worldview”).  An 
additional factor may also be a desire to promote collegiality insofar as judges work most closely 
with other judges in the same circuit.  Following the decisions of other judges in the same circuit 
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Our point here, however, is not to explore the implications of the silo 
effect for intercircuit uniformity (although that too is worthy of exploration) 
but rather to note that from an organizational economics perspective, we 
would not expect agency-specific precedents to be the result of the silo effect 
produced by the organizational structure of the Judiciary.  The agency-
specific precedents in our case studies involve agencies whose decisions are 
reviewed by generalist courts (although the IRS cases usually involve initial 
review in a specialized court299).  And some of the agency-specific 
precedents we identify originated in the Judiciary300 and thus cannot be 
explained in terms of the persistence of silo effects that originated at the 
agency level.  It is possible that a kind of informal specialization occurs 
within a court, particularly within the courts of appeals, even though cases 
are assigned randomly to panels.  The panel itself decides which judge will 
write the opinion, and there may well be a natural tendency for opinions in-
volving a given agency to be assigned to a judge who already has some 
familiarity with the agency.301  We doubt, however, that this sort of informal 
specialization offers a complete explanation for agency-specific precedents. 
The natural question that remains, then, is why agency-specific 
precedential silos would be common notwithstanding the organizational 
structure of the Judiciary.  As we develop in the following subpart, we think 
the critical factor is the judicial-review process itself, in which the courts rely 
heavily on the attorneys representing the parties as providers of information 
regarding precedents. 
C. Attorney Specialization and Agency-Specific Precedents 
Our adversarial system of adjudication places most of the information 
costs of finding, analyzing, and applying precedents on the parties litigating 
 
will promote collegiality and failing to do so may have collegiality costs.  Conversely, rejecting 
circuit precedent in order to foster geographic uniformity promotes the rationalization of standards, 
reducing the transaction and information costs for those who must comply with the law in multiple 
jurisdictions but offering little direct benefit to the judges on the circuit (although deviation from 
precedents in other circuits might damage a judge’s reputation for craft). 
299. Depending on the circumstances this may be either the Tax Court (an Article I Court) or 
the Court of Claims (now an Article III Court), but some tax cases may also originate in federal 
district court. 
300. See supra subparts III(B)–(D). 
301. One article, for example, recently noted 
the unusual degree to which Justice Blackmun anchored the Court’s treatment of 
tax law during his twenty-four terms.  Although all Justices bring distinctive 
professional backgrounds and experiences to the Court, Blackmun’s role as a tax 
law expert—one who practiced in the area for over two decades and also wrote 
articles and taught courses on the subject—may help account for his exceptional 
role in this specialized field. 
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing 
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1300 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
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the case rather than on the courts.302  Parties, through their attorneys, provide 
information to the courts by submitting briefs with arguments and authorities.  
In deciding a case, courts naturally start with the cases relied on by the 
parties, which minimizes judicial information costs.303  Thus, to the extent 
that the structure of the part of the legal profession that litigates cases in-
volving judicial review of agency decisions affects the kinds of information 
provided to the courts, it will also affect the courts’ information costs. 
1. Attorney Specialization and Information Costs.—Many agencies 
oversee very complex and technical regulatory and benefit programs that 
result in frequent litigation.304  These conditions often make attorney speciali-
zation desirable and lead to the development of a specialized bar.305  In the 
agencies that are the focus of our case studies—the IRS, FCC, EPA, SSA, 
and NLRB—specialization is the norm.306  It is true that some attorneys may 
have a broader administrative law practice or even be specialists in general 
administrative law, but the organizational structure of the administrative law 
bar tends toward specialization by agency.  This specialization occurs not 
only in the private bar but also within the government, at least to the extent 
that agencies are represented by agency attorneys or by attorneys in 
specialized divisions of the Department of Justice.307  Attorney specialization 
 
302. See John H. Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose Counting Isn’t Enough, 
JUDGES’ J., Fall 1979, at 4, 4 (criticizing a comparison of U.S. and European investments in judicial 
resources for its failure to consider the broader, active role of judges in nonadversarial civil law 
systems).  See generally John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 823 (1985) (comparing the respective roles of lawyers and judges in the American and 
German legal systems). 
303. See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic 
Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 429 (1997) (noting that courts operating under the adversary 
system rely on the parties to gather and present evidence). 
304. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 16 
(2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy10congbudgjust.pdf (reporting that at least 574 
enforcement cases were filed by the SEC each fiscal year between 2005 and 2008). 
305. Cf. John V. Tunney & Jane Lakes Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 333, 341 (1975) (“The concept of the lawyer-generalist, equipped to handle any and all legal 
tasks, has become an anachronism as laws and regulations have increased in numbers and 
complexity.”). 
306. Specialization may be more or less dominant in different fields.  Tax attorneys, for 
example, are almost always highly specialized while specialization may be less common in cases 
involving the SSA, where claimants are often represented by attorneys for legal aid or general 
practitioners.  Nonetheless, specialized Social Security disability firms are increasingly common.  
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Erkulwater, The Judicial Transformation of Social Security Disability: The 
Case of Mental Disorders and Childhood Disability, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 401, 424 (2002) (discussing 
the emergence of “[n]umerous boutique law firms specializing in Social Security cases and 
organizations defending disabled claimants”). 
307. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 293–96 (1994) (describing the various 
entities responsible for representing the FCC in court).  Centralized litigating authority may produce 
some tension between the agency and the Department of Justice or the Solicitor General’s Office.  
See generally Devins, supra (analyzing the allocation of litigating authority within the federal 
government); Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and 
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affects the information costs of finding and analyzing administrative law 
decisions in ways that foster the silo effect. 
One important factor that contributes to specialization is information 
costs.308  Generalist practitioners incur significant information costs in 
becoming familiar with the statutes, regulations, precedents, and other 
sources of law and policy for any given agency or agency program.  When 
attorneys specialize, they invest resources to become familiar with the law 
involving the agency, significantly lowering the marginal information costs 
within their area of expertise.  Because resources are devoted to the area of 
specialization, however, specialists will devote relatively fewer resources to 
learning the statutes, regulations, precedents, and other sources of law and 
policy dealing with other agencies.  Thus, we might expect specialized attor-
neys to rely most heavily on precedents involving a particular agency even 
for pure administrative law issues, including the application of the APA. 
Well-trained attorneys, even specialists, are of course capable of doing 
the research required to determine how the courts treat the same or analogous 
questions when dealing with the decisions of other agencies.  But the spe-
cialist may have limited incentives to search for precedents involving other 
agencies.  This sort of research adds significantly to the information costs of 
finding and using administrative law doctrine.  To specialists in a particular 
field, the cases involving the agency are familiar, and the costs of finding and 
applying those precedents are relatively small.  Moving beyond the familiar 
world of the specific agency opens up a much larger set of precedents that 
must be combed for favorable or unfavorable doctrine.  It is easy enough to 
conduct a broader Westlaw or Lexis search that identifies a number of cases 
with potentially useful doctrine, but it is something else entirely to review 
those cases and identify useful doctrine.309  In addition, dealing with cases 
involving a different agency may entail mastering a different organic statute 
or understanding the novel (to the specialist attorney) context in which unfa-
miliar agencies operate.310 
 
the Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549 (1993) (arguing for greater litigating 
autonomy for independent agencies). 
308. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
309. We experienced this difference firsthand in the work on our book.  When we searched for 
a case to illustrate a given administrative law issue, confining the search to one of our five 
agencies—or even all five of them at once—generally produced a manageable number of cases.  In 
contrast, more general searches tended to produce an unmanageable number of cases, many of 
which were far less relevant to the issues that concerned us. 
310. To the extent the attorney is being paid on an hourly basis, there may be financial 
incentives to undertake the more extensive search and analysis of precedents involving other 
agencies.  In such cases, the costs are ultimately borne by the client in the form of higher fees.  The 
client’s willingness to pay, however, is likely to constrain the attorney’s decision.  In view of these 
considerations, we might expect that reliance on agency-specific precedents is more likely when the 
amount at stake is relatively small and, conversely, that more comprehensive research will be 
undertaken for major cases with a lot at stake.  See infra notes 345–46 and accompanying text. 
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We do not mean to overstate the costs of finding out about general 
administrative law—for which various secondary sources gather and 
organize the leading cases311—but expending the resources to look beyond 
the agency-specific precedents concerning administrative law issues only 
makes sense if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.312  As noted 
above, for a practitioner litigating against an agency, the value of a precedent 
depends on its ability to influence the outcome.313  In this context, that influ-
ence depends on the extent to which the application of the general 
administrative law doctrine rather than the agency-specific precedent would 
materially affect the outcome, which must be discounted by the likelihood 
that the court would apply the general administrative law doctrine. 
The degree to which administrative law doctrines materially affect the 
outcome of a case varies considerably.  For many administrative law cases, 
particularly those articulating and applying a standard of judicial review, the 
administrative law doctrine may be secondary and unlikely to influence the 
outcome.314  In such a case, there is no reason to move beyond the familiar 
agency-specific precedents that may be cited to the courts in formulaic 
fashion.  Of course, in some cases the administrative law doctrine does 
matter.  When the agency-specific precedents are unfavorable, there may be 
incentives to seek more favorable precedents involving other agencies, 
especially if there is a lot at stake.315 
Even if they might favorably affect the outcome of the case, precedents 
from other agencies will be of little value if (as in the treating physician rule 
case study316) courts refuse to rely on them.  Practitioners and judges alike 
are steeped in the methods of common law reasoning in which the force of a 
precedent is greater when it arises in a similar legal context.317  Thus, 
 
311. E.g., PIERCE, supra note 98. 
312. Over time, however, we might expect specialists who work with an agency to acquire 
greater familiarity with general administrative law doctrine, which could awaken them to the 
possibilities presented by moving outside agency-specific precedents and reduce the information 
costs of doing so.  See infra notes 417–20 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
314. In Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), the Supreme Court observed that the 
difference between two nominally different standards of judicial review “is a subtle one—so fine 
that (apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing 
court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different 
outcome.”  Id. at 162–63.  For further discussion of Zurko, see infra notes 357–78 and 
accompanying text. 
315. Conversely, when precedents involving the agency are favorable, information about 
negative precedents outside the agency may also be valuable because the opposing party may bring 
them to the court’s attention and the attorney must be prepared to address them. 
316. See supra notes 238–46 and accompanying text. 
317. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the role of 
precedent in the American legal system and specifically how factual and contextual differences may 
affect a court’s adherence to a particular precedent); cf. Hayden C. Covington, The American 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 190, 190 (1946) (discussing the historical development 
of stare decisis and the criticism of its inflexible use). 
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precedents involving the same agency will naturally have an increased 
salience and weight,318 and reliance on cases involving a different agency 
may be a risky proposition, especially if that agency has distinctive statutory 
or programmatic features.  For these reasons, even generalist attorneys may 
tend to focus on cases involving the same agency simply because such cases 
would seem to be the most relevant from a precedential standpoint. 
One potential countervailing factor is the role played by the Department 
of Justice and the Solicitor General’s office, both of which often conduct liti-
gation on behalf of agencies and have an institutional interest in promoting 
uniformity of doctrine that the private bar and agency attorneys lack.319  
Thus, we might expect generalist lawyers representing the government to 
invoke general administrative law doctrine, which would tend to force a spe-
cialist representing private parties to respond in kind.320  Although these 
considerations will ameliorate the effects of specialization to some extent, 
agencies are often represented by agency attorneys or specialized attorneys 
within the Department of Justice.321  In the final analysis, we believe that 
practitioner specialization affects marginal information costs so as to induce 
the creation and maintenance of silo effects because the marginal costs of 
finding and analyzing agency-specific precedents are small, while the costs 
of moving beyond the agency may be significantly greater and the marginal 
benefits of doing so are typically relatively small. 
2. Judicial Information Costs.—The silo effect produced by attorney 
specialization has a significant impact on the information costs of courts 
engaged in judicial review.  As noted previously, the adversarial system re-
lies primarily on the parties to research the law and present it to the courts.322  
Thus, if agencies and practitioners do not research or present precedents ex-
tending beyond the agencies they know, the information costs of finding and 
applying more generally applicable administrative law doctrine are passed 
along to courts.  Under these circumstances, courts also have incentives to 
rely more heavily on agency-specific precedents, especially when they are 
 
318. Of course, other factors will also influence the weight of such precedents, including the 
level of the court that decided the case.  Thus, for example, Supreme Court decisions have 
especially significant weight and may be more likely to break down an agency-specific line of 
cases.  See infra notes 343–47 and accompanying text. 
319. Indeed, one common argument for Solicitor General control over government litigation is 
that it tends to promote uniformity in federal law.  As one former Solicitor General put it, “[The 
agencies’] preoccupation is with the immediate result, or at least their purview is likely limited to 
their particular work.  The Solicitor General must seek a broad perspective of the total law business 
of the United States, not merely the program of any single agency.”  Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney 
for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 231 (1955). 
320. Thus, even when agency-specific precedents favor their position, specialized practitioners 
must be sufficiently familiar with general administrative law doctrine so as to anticipate and 
respond to unfavorable precedents involving other agencies. 
321. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
322. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
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burdened with heavy caseloads that put a premium on expeditious resolution 
of individual cases.  These incentives interact with other factors that may 
contribute to or dampen the silo effect within administrative law precedents. 
In assessing judicial incentives, we must first ask what judges reviewing 
administrative law decisions value—an issue that has received considerable 
attention in the literature.323  In general terms, we may posit that judges value 
“craft” and their reputation for craft, “outcomes” that are consistent with 
their ideology, and “leisure” (by which we mean time that may be devoted to 
more highly valued uses).324  The cost of researching and analyzing (or 
having clerks or research attorneys do so) is a type of leisure cost in the sense 
that it is time that cannot be spent on other activities.325  We should not over-
state these costs because federal judges may be familiar with general 
administrative law doctrine and have resources available to conduct the ne-
cessary research, but the information costs are nonetheless real. 
While the information costs to judges from finding and using precedents 
beyond the specific agency are a species of leisure (or opportunity) costs, the 
benefit to judges depends on the extent to which doing so will improve a 
judge’s craft (and reputation for craft) or enable the judge to achieve a pre-
ferred outcome.326  From a craft perspective, the norms of the profession 
determine the appropriateness of reliance on precedent.327  While broad cita-
tion to and familiarity with generally applicable administrative law may 
signify a high level of craft, craft norms may also call for giving greater 
weight to agency-specific precedents.  To the extent that agency-specific 
statutes or programmatic features are involved, it may be improper to apply 
general administrative law doctrine to an agency or to extend an agency-
specific precedent to other agencies.328  Even as to general administrative law 
questions, a court is likely to view a case involving the same agency as more 
 
323. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU 
L. REV. 469, 496–97 (1998) (discussing how the possibility of further appeals affects judicial 
incentives for appellate judges); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 151, at 1055–58 (describing how 
judicial-review incentives may affect standards of review).  See generally FRANK B. CROSS, 
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007) (discussing various models of and 
empirical data concerning judicial decision-making behavior); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006) (discussing the extent to which ideological and political considerations 
influence judicial decisions). 
324. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 151, at 1054–58. 
325. In this sense, it is also an opportunity cost.  Cf. id. at 1056 (observing that “social choice 
scholars posit that judges seek to reduce their work and expand their leisure time”). 
326. See id. at 1057 (suggesting that judges generally do not seek to “reduce their workload” at 
the expense of craft or outcome incentives). 
327. Id. at 1054 (explaining that judges gain professional respect based on how craft oriented 
they are). 
328. See supra notes 277–87 and accompanying text.  Note, however, that addressing the 
relationship between general administrative law and an agency-specific precedent might improve 
the craft of an opinion (or enhance the judge’s reputation for craft). 
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authoritative (all other things being equal) than one involving a different 
agency.329 
From an ideological perspective, the value of applying general 
administrative law principles rather than agency-specific precedents to 
resolve a dispute or of applying an agency-specific precedent to another 
agency will depend on the ability of those general principles to affect the 
outcome in a favorable direction.330  In this respect, the incentives of judges 
are very similar to those of practitioners—ideological value would depend on 
how outcome determinative the administrative law question is and how likely 
it is that the court will rely on the precedent.  On the latter point, of course, a 
judge controls whether he or she will rely on precedents from other agencies 
while practitioners can only guess.  But judicial reliance on precedents from 
other agencies is constrained because lower court judges must be concerned 
about the possibility of reversal on appeal, and judges on collegial courts 
must be concerned about their ability to persuade others to join their 
opinions.331 
3. Judicial Structure and Precedential Silos.—The extent to which 
information costs will tend to create and sustain agency-specific precedents 
is affected by the nature and level of the court crafting or applying 
administrative law doctrine.332  Most clearly, specialization within the courts 
would tend to strongly reinforce the silo effect created by attorney 
specialization.  Specialized courts that review the decision of a single agency 
(or a few agencies), such as the Tax Court or the Court of Federal Claims, 
would be prone to the silo effect in their own right.  The costs of relying on 
their own decisions, which will be familiar, are minimal while looking 
beyond those precedents might entail significant costs.  In addition to the in-
formation costs, the specialized court would also have an institutional interest 
 
329. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 285, at 498–99 (explaining that courts have more consistently 
applied the tax-specific National Muffler standard when reviewing IRS decisions than the generally 
applicable Chevron standard). 
330. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156–57 (1998) 
(suggesting that empirical evidence demonstrates that judges often “decide cases according to their 
political proclivities” and then choose their sources accordingly). 
331. See id. at 2175 (describing minority judges on appellate courts as “whistleblowers” that 
keep the majority’s ideological propensities in check); Drahozal, supra note 323, at 483–85 
(explaining how the institutional characteristics of different courts affect judicial incentives). 
332. This issue is suggested, for example, by the reasoned decision making silo, see supra notes 
161–78 and accompanying text, where the reasoned decision making approach was developed 
primarily by the courts of appeals (notwithstanding some casual references in Supreme Court 
decisions) but where a more developed application of the approach by the Supreme Court may 
contribute to a breaking down of the silo and the generalization of the doctrine. 
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in relying on its own precedents so as to promote their weight and 
durability.333 
As discussed previously, federal courts of appeals are, for the most part, 
generalist courts.334  Depending on the specific agency and statutory 
framework, courts of appeals may conduct (1) direct review of an agency 
decision;335 (2) review of the decision of a specialized court (which may be 
an Article III or Article I court);336 or (3) review of a decision of a federal 
district court of general jurisdiction.337  We might expect that in some cases, 
agency-specific precedents may be passed along from a specialized court to 
an appellate court,338 especially if the appellate court has a relatively narrow 
jurisdiction.339  Although the federal district courts are not specialized, their 
review of agency decisions tends to concentrate on only a few agencies be-
cause review of many agencies is channeled directly to the courts of 
appeals.340  If funneling of particular agency decisions to district courts 
produces agency-specific precedents at that level,341 these precedents may be 
passed along to the courts of appeals as well.  On the other hand, in most 
cases the appellate court’s jurisdiction extends to review of a wide variety of 
federal agencies, and the court is more likely to know about and apply gen-
eral administrative law doctrine.342 
 
333. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.  The weight and durability of precedents 
increase their ideological value and may enhance the author’s craft reputation.  Viewed 
institutionally, a court therefore has an interest in promoting the weight and durability of its 
precedents that goes beyond the particular outcome of a case. 
334. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
335. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840–41 
(1984) (noting that the respondents filed their petition for review of EPA regulations directly with 
the court of appeals). 
336. See, e.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 456 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a ruling 
from the Tax Court). 
337. See, e.g., Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reviewing the 
decision of the district court for the District of Columbia). 
338. The lower, specialized court is likely to cite disproportionately cases involving the agency 
whose practices are regularly brought before the court, and the appellate court may be most familiar 
with its own cases dealing with the agency.  Thus, the costs for the appellate court of engaging in a 
search for a broader range of precedents may be significant.  If the standard of the appellate court’s 
review of the lower court’s decision is deferential, the chances are even smaller that the appellate 
court will displace agency-specific precedents with more general administrative law doctrine. 
339. Thus, we might expect agency-specific precedents to be especially common in the Federal 
Circuit, which has a relatively narrow jurisdiction involving a few specialized lower courts.  See 
infra notes 353–78 and accompanying text. 
340. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2006) (providing for direct court of appeals review of SEC 
orders). 
341. This propensity might be further reinforced by the labor-intensive nature of managing 
litigation and trials, which limits the resources available to district courts for researching precedents. 
342. See, e.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459–61 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
Tax Court had improperly looked beyond the administrative record when reviewing IRS decisions 
on discretionary relief in “collection due process hearings”).  The specialized lower court would be 
obligated to follow the appellate court’s application of general administrative law principles. 
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Although there are some examples of agency-specific precedents arising 
at the Supreme Court level,343 in general we might expect that the Supreme 
Court is more likely than lower courts to reach beyond a given agency for 
administrative law principles.  First, the government is represented by the 
Solicitor General, the kind of generalist lawyer whose knowledge and inter-
est are more likely to focus on the broader administrative law.344  Second, the 
parties have greater incentives to look beyond the agency-specific precedents 
because Supreme Court cases typically involve important matters, so the po-
tential benefits of useful precedents from other agencies are great.345  Third, 
precedents involving other agencies are likely to be more valuable because 
Supreme Court precedents on point are relatively rare.346  Finally, judging by 
the extensive research typically reflected in modern Supreme Court 
decisions, the Court seems to have the resources and incentives to engage in 
research that extends beyond the confines of the particular agency whose ac-
tions are at issue.347 
How a Supreme Court decision is likely to affect the existence of 
agency-specific precedents going forward represents a different question.  On 
the one hand, given the weight and prominence of Supreme Court 
precedents, it would seem more likely that parties, agencies, and courts 
would find and apply Supreme Court precedents on general administrative 
law doctrine even if those decisions involve agencies other than those that 
are parties to the litigation.348  Although the Supreme Court may intend a 
decision to apply broadly, it is also possible that a Supreme Court decision 
involving a given agency will contribute to the development of agency-
specific precedents involving that agency because parties, the agency, and 
 
343. For example, the National Muffler approach to judicial review of IRS interpretive 
regulations appears to have been originated and perpetuated by the Supreme Court while lower 
courts have struggled to reconcile that test with conventional administrative law.  See supra notes 
134–45 and accompanying text. 
344. This interest would not be relevant, of course, if agency-specific statutes, programs, or 
practices justified departures from generally applicable administrative law doctrine. 
345. PAUL M. COLLINS JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 63 (2008). 
346. There are fewer Supreme Court precedents to choose from, and cases that make it to the 
Supreme Court often involve novel and disputed questions.  If there are few cases involving an 
agency, and none is directly on point, it will normally be necessary to look to precedents involving 
other agencies to resolve administrative law questions.  On the other hand, where relevant 
precedents involving the agency do exist, the Court might be especially likely to rely on them. 
347. The extensive nature of the research reflected in Supreme Court decisions may derive in 
part from the more extensive information provided by parties and amici who are willing to invest 
the resources to present precedents and other information to the Court.  In addition, the members of 
the Court have more clerks who work on fewer cases than most lower court judges do, making the 
opportunity costs of covering the waterfront of administrative law precedents easier to bear. 
348. For example, administrative law treatises provide fairly comprehensive coverage of 
significant Supreme Court decisions applying administrative law doctrines but cannot be equally 
comprehensive concerning the much larger universe of courts of appeals decisions. 
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the courts return consistently to that case and ignore other decisions (even 
Supreme Court decisions) on the same issue that involve other agencies.349 
The foregoing discussion suggests a final point about agency-specific 
precedents—they are not static.  While some agency-specific precedents re-
spond to distinctive features of the agency or to an authoritative 
pronouncement (perhaps in a Supreme Court decision) involving the agency, 
we also suspect that many agency-specific precedents take root in routine 
reliance on formulations of administrative law doctrine in cases involving the 
same agency or in run-of-the-mill cases in which the formulation of admin-
istrative law doctrine is unlikely to affect the outcome.  Regardless of its 
origins, a particular formulation is picked up and repeated in multiple cases, 
gathering weight, becoming a standard formulation for the agency, and tak-
ing on a life of its own, without much attention to whether the agency-
specific formulation deviates from the general administrative law doctrine.  
The stronger the agency-specific precedent and the more it deviates from 
standard administrative law doctrine, however, the more visible and signifi-
cant it becomes and the more likely it is that practitioners and courts will 
have the incentives to break it down. 
D. The Dynamics of Agency-Specific Precedential Silos 
In summary, this provisional understanding allows us to hazard some 
predictions about when the silo effect is most likely to contribute to the for-
mation and persistence of agency-specific precedents.350  We would expect 
agency-specific precedents to arise with the greatest frequency and have the 
greatest durability when there are agency-specific sources of administrative 
law, distinctive programmatic features, or specific agency practices.  In the 
absence of such agency-specific statutes, programs, or practices, we might 
expect agency-specific precedents to arise with some frequency if litigation 
involving the agency tends to be conducted by a specialized bar that does not 
engage in general administrative law practice.351  The extent to which judicial 
decisions are likely to reinforce and create precedential silos, as opposed to 
 
349. The testimonial-inference silo in the NLRB illustrates this possibility.  Courts kept 
returning to the Universal Camera decision (albeit the lower court opinion after remand from the 
Supreme Court), even after that approach was repudiated by the Supreme Court in a case involving 
the FCC.  See supra notes 262–71 and accompanying text.  Another illustration is the persistence of 
the National Muffler test for judicial review of IRS interpretive regulations notwithstanding the later 
adoption of the Chevron test and related doctrines.  See supra notes 134–45 and accompanying text. 
350. These hypotheses are subject to empirical verification or refutation, and we intend to 
follow up the analysis in this Article with that kind of empirical research to determine the frequency 
and locus of agency-specific precedents. 
351. In such instances, attorneys are likely to provide to the courts primarily precedents 
concerning the agency involved, which in turn makes it likely that courts will rely primarily on 
those precedents.  These conditions prevailed for all of the agencies featured in our case studies. 
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breaking them down, depends on the extent to which the court is specialized 
and the level of the court.352 
Thus, we would predict that agency-specific precedents would be an 
especially common phenomenon in cases decided by the Federal Circuit, 
which reviews a few specialized agencies (some with distinctive statutes or 
programs) that are typically served by a specialized bar—often on appeal 
from review by a specialized lower court.353  For example, decisions of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) might generate a 
considerable body of agency-specific precedents.  Most private patent 
attorneys are specialized and work largely in the patent area or at least the 
intellectual property field.354  Patent attorneys even have to pass a special bar 
examination to qualify for practice in the area.355  Likewise, the attorneys 
who work for the agency are likely to specialize.  Further, Congress has 
vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions by 
the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences concerning patent ap-
plications and interferences.356 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dickinson v. Zurko357 illustrates how 
several of these factors may combine to create agency-specific precedents 
relating to the PTO as well as the Supreme Court’s potential role in 
displacing agency-specific doctrine in favor of conformity to general 
administrative law doctrine.358  The issue in Zurko was whether the 
 
352. For example, we might expect numerous precedential silos to exist in the Tax Court, 
which is highly specialized and at a relatively low level.  We would expect generalist courts of 
appeals to break down these silos to a certain degree, but the specialization of the tax bar and any 
deference given to Tax Court decisions may tend to perpetuate them even in the courts of appeals. 
353. For example, veterans benefit claims are initially determined by a specialized agency, 
reviewed by a specialized Article I court, and then subject to limited review by the Federal Circuit, 
and claimant representatives tend to be highly specialized (and are not always lawyers).  See 
generally Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the Veterans 
Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303 (2004) (discussing the history and design of the 
veterans benefit system). 
354. In addition, the PTO was created ninety-seven years before Congress created the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, which is often regarded as the first independent federal agency, see 
Mashaw, Federalist Foundations, supra note 17, at 1260, so that many of its practices and the 
administrative law precedents they generated predated the enactment of the APA. 
355. F. Russell Denton, Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball: A Model for Recalibrating 
Patent Scope, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 29 (2008). 
356. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
357. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
358. One pair of observers has noted that “the inattention to administrative law principles has 
long been a striking feature of the patent system.  In contrast to commentators and practitioners in 
other technically complex areas . . . the patent law community has tended to pay little attention to 
administrative law.”  Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007).  Another 
example of agency-specific precedents involving the PTO relates to the burden of proving 
unpatentability, which the courts have placed on the PTO.  See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened 
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 139 (2008) (stating that even when 
the PTO can make a prima facie case for unpatentability, it retains the burden of proving 
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substantial evidence standard from § 706(2)(E) of the APA applies when the 
Federal Circuit reviews the PTO’s findings of fact.  The Federal Circuit held 
that the “clearly erroneous” standard normally applicable to appellate court 
review of trial court findings applied to review of the PTO’s findings of fact 
rather than the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review.359  Insofar as 
the clearly erroneous standard of review is conventionally understood as be-
ing less deferential than the substantial evidence standard, the Federal Circuit 
may have had an institutional interest in maintaining this agency-specific 
precedent so as to increase its ability to overturn PTO findings. 
The Federal Circuit relied on § 559 of the APA, which provides that the 
APA does “not limit or repeal additional requirements . . . recognized by 
law.”360  According to the court, when Congress adopted the APA in 1946, 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor to the 
Federal Circuit, applied the “clearly erroneous” standard.361  Thus, the court 
concluded that the “special tradition of strict review consequently amounted 
to an ‘additional requirement’ that under § 559 trumps the requirements 
imposed by § 706.”362  This reasoning illustrates the potential role of 
administrative law predating the APA’s adoption to persist in ways that con-
tribute to the creation and retention of agency-specific precedents.  The 
Solicitor General, however, argued for generally applicable administrative 
law doctrine in the form of judicial review using the APA standards.363 
 
unpatentability).  This allocation of the burden of proof to the agency would appear to lack any 
foundation in general administrative law doctrine, see In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (describing the “uncertain” origins of this allocation of the burden of proof), and is 
arguably inconsistent with Vermont Yankee.  For further discussion, see generally John M. Golden, 
The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-specialized Courts, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010) (referencing recent reversals of the Federal Circuit by the Supreme 
Court in the field of patent law but suggesting that a similar experience of the D.C. Circuit in the 
field of administrative law suggests that such Supreme Court intervention is neither unusual nor 
particularly problematic). 
359. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 153. 
360. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006). 
361. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154. 
362. Id.  The Solicitor General’s brief on behalf of the PTO, however, interpreted the pre-APA 
case law as establishing a standard of judicial review of PTO decisions that did not differ in any 
significant way from the APA’s standards.  See Brief for the Petitioner, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 
U.S. 150 (1999) (No. 98-377), 1998 WL 886731 at *32 (stating that the prior decisions of the 
CCPA on which the Federal Circuit relied in Zurko “did not adopt any clear standard of review 
different from that prescribed by the APA”).  The Supreme Court apparently accepted that 
characterization.  See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 161 (“[W]e cannot agree with the Federal Circuit that in 
1946, when Congress enacted the APA, the CCPA ‘recognized’ the use of a stricter court/court, 
rather than a less strict court/agency, review standard for PTO decisions.”).  Thus, any deviation 
between the standards of review under § 706 of the APA and the clearly erroneous standard 
endorsed by the Federal Circuit developed after the enactment of the APA in the course of 
subsequent CCPA and Federal Circuit review of PTO decisions over time. 
363. Specifically, the Solicitor General’s brief asserted that the APA was in effect a statutory 
restatement designed to “codify” the “general practice” of administrative law at the time of the 
Act’s adoption, “while eliding deviations from the norm.”  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 362, 
at *29 (emphasis removed).  The Solicitor General further asserted that the effect of a statutory 
restatement such as the APA was “to eliminate anomalies, not to preserve them” and that 
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The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, 
emphasizing “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial 
review of administrative action.”364  Citing the portion of § 559 that provides 
that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the 
provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so 
expressly,”365 the Court concluded that § 559’s clause saving pre-APA law 
applies only when the “[e]xistence of the additional requirement [is] 
clear.”366  Combing through decades worth of CCPA precedents, the Court 
held that the use of the clearly erroneous standard to review PTO findings of 
fact was not sufficiently clear when the APA was adopted to qualify as an 
“additional requiremen[t] . . . recognized by law” for purposes of § 559.367 
The Court also found unpersuasive several policy arguments that the 
Federal Circuit made in support of its agency-specific approach to judicial 
review of PTO factual findings.368  The Federal Circuit Court asserted that 
changing its application of the “clearly erroneous” standard would 
“undermine[] the public’s confidence” in the patent system and conflict with 
principles of stare decisis.369  Similarly, amici argued before the Supreme 
Court that it was better that the law remained settled than that it be settled 
correctly.370  The Court responded that, regardless of how the CCPA and 
Federal Circuit had treated the issue, the Supreme Court itself had not yet 
settled the matter.371  Further, adoption of the Federal Circuit’s expansive 
interpretation of the § 559 exception for pre-APA law would establish a 
 
notwithstanding the novel analysis advanced by the court of appeals in this 
case . . . nothing in the history or general purposes of the APA suggests that Congress 
intended the first sentence of what is now Section 559 to preserve whatever standards 
of review courts, including the Federal Circuit’s predecessors, may have been applying 
in reviewing administrative decisions before the adoption of the Act. 
Id. at *29–30. 
364. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154; see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 
(1951) (stating that the legislative intent in enacting the APA was to promote uniform standards of 
judicial review of administrative actions); 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Francis E. 
Walter) (explaining when courts could review administrative agency decisions under the APA and 
what standards of review should apply). 
365. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155 (alteration in original).  The Solicitor General’s brief argued that 
this language “indicates an intention that the rules and standards explicitly set out in the [APA] 
should establish a common and permanent framework for administrative action—not one subject to 
casual or inferred variation.”  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 362, at *24.  Similarly, the brief 
objected to the “unjustified[] anomaly of subjecting the determinations of one federal agency to a 
different standard of judicial review than that applied to those of every other agency whose 
decisions are similarly subject to APA review.”  Id. at *36. 
366. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155. 
367. Id. at 161 (alterations in original). 
368. Id. at 161–65. 
369. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
370. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162. 
371. Id. 
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precedent “that itself could prove disruptive by too readily permitting other 
agencies to depart from uniform APA requirements.”372 
The Court also discounted the Federal Circuit’s expertise as a reason for 
departing from normal APA scope-of-review principles.  The Court noted the 
importance of the Federal Circuit’s capacity to examine PTO factual findings 
“through the lens of patent-related experience—and properly so, for the 
Federal Circuit is a specialized court.”373  It added, however, that this 
“comparative expertise, by enabling the Circuit better to understand the basis 
for the PTO’s finding of fact, may play a more important role in assuring 
proper review than would a theoretically somewhat stricter standard.”374  
Finally, the Federal Circuit reasoned that application of the clearly erroneous 
standard would promote better fact-finding by the PTO because the PTO 
would have incentives to create more complete administrative records to sur-
vive judicial review under the more rigorous standard.375  The Supreme Court 
found this rationale unpersuasive because neither the Federal Circuit nor the 
amici supporting its approach was able to provide a cogent explanation of 
“why direct review of the PTO’s patent denials demands a stricter fact-
related review standard than is applicable to other agencies.”376  Instead, the 
Court concluded that “Congress has set forth the appropriate standard in the 
APA.”377 
Thus, the congruence of several of the factors we noted above 
contributed to the Federal Circuit’s creation of a PTO-specific standard of 
judicial review of agency fact-findings.  Yet, as we also suggest may 
commonly occur, the Supreme Court, supported by the arguments of the 
Solicitor General, leveled the administrative law landscape by insisting that 
the Federal Circuit adhere to generally applicable APA-generated 
administrative law norms.378  The policy discussion in Zurko, however, raises 
another important set of questions surrounding the phenomenon of agency-
 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 163. 
374. Id. 
375. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
376. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165. 
377. Id. 
378. It is worth noting, however, that the concern over the standard of review may have been 
much ado about nothing.  Although the Federal Circuit’s original decision in the case indicated that 
the application of the clearly erroneous rather than the substantial evidence standard of review made 
a difference to the outcome, see In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449 (“Concluding that the outcome of this 
appeal turns on the standard of review used by this court to review board fact finding, we accepted 
the Commissioner’s suggestion that we rehear the appeal in banc . . . .”), the Supreme Court 
observed that the difference between the two standards “is a subtle one—so fine that (apart from the 
present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that 
use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”  Zurko, 
527 U.S. at 162–63.  Notwithstanding its earlier pronouncement, however, on remand from the 
Supreme Court the Federal Circuit reached the same result under the substantial evidence standard 
after all.  In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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specific precedents—their normative implications.  We address those 
implications in the following Part. 
V. Normative Implications 
If agency-specific precedents are a manifestation of the silo effect, the 
question becomes what, if anything, to do about the dynamic that generates 
those precedents.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko emphasized the 
desirability of a uniform and consistent administrative law doctrine and re-
jected policy arguments in favor of departures from generally applicable 
doctrine.379  This analysis reflects the normative assumption that generally 
applicable administrative law doctrine is a good thing and that agency-
specific departures from it are not.  If the Court is right, the related question 
arises as to what can be done about the prevalence of agency-specific 
precedents. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Agency-Specific Precedents 
While Zurko extols the virtues of consistency in administrative law, the 
benefits of consistency must be assessed in light of the countervailing costs 
(i.e., the potential benefits of agency-specific precedents).  The relative bal-
ance of costs and benefits—and thus whether agency-specific precedents are 
a “good” or “bad” thing—depends on a number of factors, including 
statutory provisions, legal uncertainty, and optimization of administrative 
law doctrine.  Our analysis of these factors suggests that while some agency-
specific precedents may be justified, others clearly are not. 
1. Statutory Provisions.—Broadly speaking, administrative law doctrine 
represents a balance between two competing sets of concerns.  On the one 
hand, Congress creates expert administrative agencies and gives them au-
thority to implement regulatory and benefit programs to further a public 
purpose.380  These considerations warrant giving agencies the autonomy and 
flexibility they need to fulfill their statutory mandates.  On the other hand, 
agency action can have significant adverse consequences for affected parties 
(including both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries), and safe-
guards are necessary to ensure accountability and protect against error and 
abuse.  Administrative law doctrine reflects an ongoing balance between 
these competing concerns, and applicable statutory provisions represent a 
binding congressional judgment concerning that balance.381 
 
379. See supra notes 364–78 and accompanying text. 
380. Critics of the modern regulatory state may well argue that such public purposes are smoke 
screens for laws that redistribute wealth in favor of concentrated, politically powerful interests, but 
administrative law is founded on the assumption that regulatory and benefit programs are intended 
to fulfill a public purpose. 
381. This point assumes, of course, that the balance struck is within constitutional parameters. 
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The APA’s procedural requirements and judicial-review provisions thus 
represent a particular balance between agency autonomy and accountability.  
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Zurko, Congress intended for this 
balance to apply broadly to all administrative agencies.382  But the goal of 
universality is not absolute, and the APA also is designed to permit flexibility 
and variation across agencies.  Its generally applicable provisions may be 
supplemented or superseded by the organic statute (as in the case of hybrid 
procedures), which would thus represent a congressional determination that 
an exception to general applicability should be made, presumably to strike a 
different balance of autonomy and accountability.383  In addition, even when 
the APA does apply, it allows for considerable flexibility.  Agencies have 
broad discretion to choose among various modes of action and applicable 
procedures while the APA’s standards of review are stated in terms that are 
broad enough to encompass a variety of different formulations.384 
In view of these legislative balances, whether agency-specific 
precedents are legally justified depends on the extent to which distinctive 
features of the agency justify deviation or variation from the consistent and 
universal application of the APA and other generally applicable administra-
tive law.  Unfounded deviations from generally applicable APA provisions, 
as in Zurko, are improper.  They upset the congressional balance of auton-
omy and accountability and undermine the legislative goal of universality 
without justification.  Agency-specific precedents might, however, be justi-
fied by agency-specific statutes, programs, or practices. 
The specific provisions of organic statutes present the strongest legal 
justification for agency-specific precedents and may even compel them.  The 
APA expressly accommodates such agency-specific statutes, which therefore 
represent a valid basis for refusing to apply the APA’s generally applicable 
provisions.385  More fundamentally, provisions such as the hybrid rulemaking 
procedures of the Clean Air Act strike a different legislative balance between 
autonomy and accountability.386  Even in such situations, however, the 
distinctive provisions of the organic statutes operate in relation to and may be 
informed by the broader fabric of administrative law, and conversely, 
 
382. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155 (“The APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of 
variation and diversity.”).  Thus § 551 defines “agency” broadly, and § 559 indicates that the APA 
applies in the absence of a clear statutory mandate to the contrary.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 559 (2006). 
383.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1) (2006) (providing that the APA does not apply to EPA 
rulemakings under the Clean Air Act except as expressly provided in that Act). 
384. See, e.g., Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 349 (1st Cir. 
2004) (“The APA lays out only the most skeletal framework for conducting agency adjudications, 
leaving broad discretion to the affected agencies in formulating detailed procedural rules.” 
(citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1980))). 
385. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
386. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text; supra note 383.  On the other hand, as in 
the case of the Clean Air Act’s substantial evidence standard of review, provisions of the organic 
statute may not differ materially from the APA standard.  In such cases, agency-specific precedents 
may not be justified. 
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agency-specific precedents that derive from specific provisions of the organic 
statute may contain general principles that can be usefully incorporated into 
general administrative law doctrine. 
In the absence of such agency-specific statutory provisions, agency-
specific programs present less powerful justifications for agency-specific 
precedents.  In such cases, the APA applies and any accommodations must 
be consistent with the APA’s provisions and concerned with preserving 
uniformity in its application.  Nonetheless, programmatic features may 
justify variation in the application of the APA.  Borrowing the terminology 
of equal protection theory, it makes sense to apply the same administrative 
law to “similarly situated” agencies, but if the agencies are not similarly 
situated, differences in treatment may be justified.387  For any given agency 
program, the extent to which its distinctive features justify an agency-specific 
precedent may be unclear or a matter of opinion.  It may also be difficult to 
separate the administrative law issue from the application of the organic 
statute.  Both problems are well illustrated by the treating physician rule, 
which may or may not be justified as a response to an agency practice in the 
treatment of medical opinions.388 
Agency-specific practices present the most problematic case for agency-
specific precedents, which may deviate from generally applicable 
administrative law so as to either accommodate the agency practice or 
prevent it.  There seems to be little legal justification for inconsistent appli-
cation of general administrative law doctrine (and certainly no basis for 
declining to apply the APA) to accommodate an aberrational agency practice 
such as the IRS’s view that § 553 procedures are not required for 
“interpretive regulations.”389  Nonetheless, particularly if the practice is a 
longstanding one, refusing to accommodate it may upset settled expectations 
and create problems for the agency or the public.  Likewise, courts are not 
authorized to deviate from the APA in order to block or control an agency-
specific practice of which they disapprove,390 but there may be some room 
within the APA, particularly the standards of review, for agency-specific 
responses.  The question remains whether this sort of agency-specific 
 
387. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (holding that 
all persons similarly situated must be treated alike under the law); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. 
Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1407–08 (2010) 
(characterizing equal protection law as requiring that similarly situated individuals be treated alike); 
Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and “Classes of One,” 89 KY. L.J. 
69, 99 (2000) (recounting the history of equal protection theory as continuously interpreting equal 
protection law as requiring the equal treatment of similarly situated individuals). 
388. See supra notes 232–50 and accompanying text.  The rule originated as an application of 
the substantial evidence test but was eventually codified (as modified) by an SSA regulation, and its 
propriety was a matter of some disagreement. 
389. See supra notes 121–33 and accompanying text. 
390. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
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precedent unduly departs from the congressional balance between agency 
autonomy and the protection of affected parties or unnecessarily and 
improperly sacrifices consistency in the application of the APA—both of 
which may be a matter of disagreement. 
2. Legal Uncertainty.—A second important factor in assessing the costs 
and benefits of agency-specific precedents is legal uncertainty and the re-
sulting transaction costs for private parties, agencies, and courts.391  For 
private parties, legal uncertainty increases information costs, requires addi-
tional planning, and creates risk.  For agencies, legal uncertainty may 
increase information and planning costs, undermine compliance and 
enforcement, and distort agency policy.392  For courts, legal uncertainty leads 
to litigation and makes settlement more difficult because parties may enter-
tain substantially different assessments of the likely outcome of litigation.393  
While it is therefore clear that legal uncertainty is to be avoided when 
possible, it is less clear which way this consideration cuts in relation to 
agency-specific precedents. 
Zurko assumes that consistent application of administrative law doctrine 
across agencies promotes legal certainty,394 which may ordinarily be the case.  
To the extent that the law varies from agency to agency, the costs associated 
with correctly ascertaining the applicable doctrine increase.  Agency-specific 
precedents may also create uncertainty as to how the courts will treat them in 
relation to general administrative law.  In some instances, the uncertainty 
arises from the possible application of general administrative law to the 
agency, as in Zurko and IRS procedural regulations.395  The proliferation and 
persistence of agency-specific precedents also creates uncertainty for broader 
administrative law because the applicability of general administrative law 
principles is then unreliable.396 
At the same time, however, there are countervailing problems of 
uncertainty that would arise from the elimination of agency-specific 
precedents.  Most obviously, to the extent that agency-specific precedents are 
 
391. In contrast, perhaps legal scholars may benefit from legal uncertainty insofar as it gives us 
more to write about and increases the value of our work.  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 93 (5th ed. 2008). 
392. See supra section IV(C)(1).  See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (arguing that vagueness-
related uncertainty about legal obligations results in inefficient outcomes). 
393. On the other hand, legal uncertainty may permit an outcome-oriented judge to reach a 
desired result. 
394. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999) (requiring clear evidence of 
legislative intent for a departure from a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative 
action). 
395. See supra note 358 and accompanying text; supra notes 116–45 and accompanying text. 
396. This uncertainty is twofold.  First, agency-specific precedents involving another agency 
might be applied.  Second, the prevalence of agency-specific precedents might encourage the court 
to craft an agency-specific rule of its own rather than apply general administrative law doctrine. 
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longstanding and well established, their elimination may upset settled 
expectations and create considerable uncertainty.  This would be the case, for 
example, if IRS procedural regulations were invalidated for failure to follow 
§ 553 procedures.  Even in the absence of such reliance interests, legal cer-
tainty is also a function of the specificity of rules insofar as more specific 
rules are more certain and predictable in application.397  There will often be a 
trade-off between a rule’s universality and its specificity—universal 
applicability requires greater flexibility because more specific rules are not 
easily adapted and applied to varied circumstances.398 
3. Optimization of Doctrine.—A third factor relevant to the costs and 
benefits of agency-specific precedents is their substantive merit.  Of course, 
this consideration overlaps with the first two factors because the substantive 
merit of an administrative law rule is to some extent dependent on whether it 
comports with the statute and promotes legal certainty, but many other fac-
tors may ultimately affect the substantive merit of an administrative law rule.  
Our focus here is not how to weigh these factors but the extent to which 
agency-specific precedents may increase or diminish the likelihood that ad-
ministrative law will reflect the optimal administrative law rule, however 
defined.399  To facilitate analysis of this question, we posit that precedent 
operates as a kind of judicial marketplace of ideas in which desirable and 
useful precedents take hold and are followed while undesirable ones even-
tually wither and die or are overruled.400  The question becomes the extent to 
which agency-specific precedents impair or facilitate this marketplace of 
ideas. 
In general terms, agency-specific precedents would seem to impair the 
operation of this marketplace of judicial ideas.  First and most directly, as 
discussed in Part III, agency-specific precedents are a reflection of informa-
tion costs, and imperfect information is a well-recognized type of market 
defect.401  To the extent that courts do not consider potentially applicable 
 
397. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972) 
(explaining the tendency to prefer specific legal rules to general legal principles and the concurrent 
tension between reliability and flexibility). 
398. Again, the treating physician rule provides a useful illustration insofar as it is much more 
specific than any general formulation of the “substantial evidence” standard of review but could not 
easily be applied to other agencies (except perhaps those evaluating similar medical evidence). 
399. To provide a simple illustration, if the Supreme Court was correct in Vermont Yankee that 
adding further procedures in rulemaking will not improve agency decisions, the rule against 
imposing additional procedures is clearly superior to one that permits such imposition.  Requiring 
additional procedures would interfere with agency autonomy without increasing accountability, 
which is a suboptimal result regardless of whether one values autonomy or accountability more 
highly. 
400. This assumes, of course, that if presented with a choice, courts are more likely to choose 
the superior administrative doctrine. 
401. See Levy, supra note 26, at 346 n.72 (describing imperfect information as an example of a 
market defect). 
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precedents, they are less likely to choose the optimal precedent.402  Thus, 
agency-specific precedents may perpetuate erroneous decisions or condone 
problematic administrative practices.  They may also deprive the general 
body of administrative law of useful developments and doctrines.403  Second, 
and perhaps less clearly, the marketplace of ideas may operate less effec-
tively within an agency-specific precedential silo because there are fewer 
precedents from which to choose and fewer decisions developing them.404 
But there may also be benefits from agency-specific precedents, which 
create a kind of agency federalism with similar advantages.405  Most clearly, 
because each agency is unique—and derives its authority from unique statu-
tory provisions with disparate goals and means for achieving them—
optimization of administrative law doctrine may require tailoring to particu-
lar circumstances.406  Likewise, agency-specific precedents may function as a 
kind of laboratory of administrative law experimentation407 in which varia-
tions in judicial approaches among agencies allow for doctrinal innovations, 
the best of which eventually find their way into general administrative law.  
Thus, for example, the reasoned decision making precedents were initially 
developed in a few agency-specific lines of precedent but may be filtering 
into broader doctrine over time.408  Conversely, agency-specific precedents 
may help to prevent the spread of bad doctrine by confining unfortunate pre-
cedents to a single agency.409 
This discussion leaves us with no clear normative conclusions for the 
content of administrative law.  It is reasonably plain that agency-specific 
precedents are at least sometimes undesirable, but that may be in the eye of 
the beholder in any given case.  As we discuss in the following subpart, what 
 
402. In some cases, switching from agency-specific precedents to general administrative law 
doctrine might be suboptimal because the rule reflected in the agency-specific precedents is a 
superior rule.  Nonetheless, this possibility is not a justification for refusing to consider general 
administrative law.  Indeed, if the agency-specific precedents are truly superior (as we think the 
reasoned decision making precedents are), the optimal result would be to adopt the agency-specific 
precedent as the general rule.  While it is possible that a court might replace an optimal agency-
specific precedent with an inferior general doctrine, more information about available precedents is, 
over time, likely to improve the content of the law. 
403. See supra subpart IV(B). 
404. In economic markets, the analogy would be to lack of competitive conditions (i.e., an 
insufficient number of buyers or sellers).  This factor may have impeded the development of the 
reasoned decision making approach.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
405. Cf. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State 
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 1517, 1534 (2009) (identifying the ability to learn from 
the experiences of state innovators as an argument in favor of the American system of federalism). 
406. Thus, for example, it is not immediately apparent that the balance between autonomy and 
control should be the same for every agency. 
407. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”). 
408. See supra notes 161–78 and accompanying text. 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 265–73. 
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to do about “bad” lines of agency-specific precedents is even less clear, 
although we have some preliminary thoughts. 
B. Responses to Agency-Specific Precedents 
It is unlikely that the adverse consequences of the creation and 
maintenance of agency-specific precedents can be addressed through changes 
to the content of administrative law, such as new procedural requirements or 
judicial-review provisions, which appear to be ill suited to address either the 
causes or effects of agency-specific precedents.  It would be difficult if not 
impossible to craft a generally applicable procedure or review provision that 
would effectively target only “undesirable” agency-specific precedents.  So-
lutions aimed at the information costs that contribute to the silo effect and to 
agency-specific precedents are most likely to have some possibility of 
success.  In this connection, it seems to us that the identification of the 
phenomenon of agency-specific precedents presents some normative impli-
cations for judges, academics, and practitioners in administrative law fields. 
For administrative law generalists—such as those of us who write 
administrative law textbooks, treatises, or articles on overarching 
administrative law issues—the existence of agency-specific precedents 
should make us wary of assuming that an administrative law precedent, 
however generalizable, is necessarily accepted and applied in other 
administrative law contexts.  Instead, a particular doctrine may remain in the 
silo of a given agency.  Even when an administrative law precedent is 
generalizable to most agencies, we must be aware that a particular agency 
may have generated its own unique agency-specific precedents that deviate 
from the generally applicable administrative law doctrine. 
Generalist attorneys within the government are especially well situated 
to address the problem of agency-specific precedents, particularly attorneys 
within the Solicitor General’s office.  As our analysis suggests and Dickinson 
v. Zurko illustrates,410 the Supreme Court has the authority and information to 
break down agency-specific precedents.  In light of the Office of the Solicitor 
General’s special role in Supreme Court litigation, it has the opportunity to 
address agency-specific precedents in two ways.411  First, as “gatekeeper” for 
agency litigation at the Supreme Court level, the Solicitor General can refrain 
from arguing in support of agency-specific precedents.412  Second, because 
the Court often pays attention to the Solicitor General’s views on whether to 
 
410. See supra notes 357–78 and accompanying text. 
411. See generally Devins, supra note 307 (discussing the role of the Solicitor General’s Office 
in representing agencies before the Supreme Court). 
412. This suggestion has implications for the ongoing debate over the proper role of centralized 
litigating authority and its potential for interference with agency policy.  See supra note 307.  We 
take no position on this debate other than to suggest that the problem of agency-specific precedents 
is a factor to take into account when assessing the balance of competing considerations. 
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grant certiorari413 (and perhaps on the merits as well), the Solicitor General 
can encourage the Court to take cases in order to break down agency-specific 
precedential silos. 
For agencies, the key point is to be aware of the possibility that the 
“administrative law” with which they are familiar does not conform to the 
generally accepted doctrine.414  This possibility may suggest that it would be 
wise for the agency to take steps to conform its practices and procedures to 
generally applicable legal doctrine in order to reduce the risk that important 
policies and practices will be vulnerable to challenge.  Even longstanding 
practices (such as the IRS’s interpretive regulations) may be something of a 
ticking time bomb415 that could go off whenever a party makes the right argu-
ment to a receptive court.  Agencies might also benefit substantively from the 
application of general administrative law doctrine when it is more favorable 
to their position (as in Zurko where the Supreme Court adopted a general 
administrative law approach to judicial review that made it more difficult for 
reviewing courts to reverse agency factual determinations).416 
Specialists who focus on a particular agency and regulatory or benefit 
program should be aware that general administrative law principles may pro-
vide new avenues and arguments for challenging agency action that appears 
safe from attack under applicable agency-specific precedents (or the 
possibility that generally applicable administrative law doctrine might be 
used to defend agency action that is vulnerable under agency-specific 
precedents).417  This possibility suggests that it is important for practitioners 
who specialize in an area that involves a single agency to develop some fa-
miliarity with the general principles of administrative law, at least to the 
point at which they might recognize the possibility that aspects of the 
doctrine concerning their agency are anomalous.418  In some cases, 
 
413. See George F. Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration’s 
Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1229 (1996) 
(“While the Supreme Court grants certiorari to less than five percent of the petitions filed in any 
given year, the success rate of petitions from the Solicitor General’s office is consistently near 
seventy-five percent.”). 
414. As in the case of the IRS interpretive regulation silo, this divergence may present an 
opportunity for practitioners who want to challenge agency action or a risk for the agency whose 
practices do not conform to the conventional understanding. 
415. As we indicate above, the courts may take steps to reduce the disruption likely to flow 
from invalidation of doctrine that results from silo thinking by agencies or the elimination of 
agency-specific precedents in the courts.  See supra note 132. 
416. Alternatively, the agency might benefit from the extension of agency-specific precedents 
involving another agency.  See supra notes 357–78 and accompanying text. 
417. This statement reflects the assumption that private practitioners ordinarily represent parties 
whose position is adverse to that of the agency, but the general point is also true if a party’s position 
is aligned with the agency.  If so, generally applicable administrative law or agency-specific 
precedents involving another agency may help practitioners defend the agency position (or present 
potential problems for the defense of the agency’s position). 
418. Practitioners may also wish to be aware of agency-specific precedents involving other 
agencies, the extension of which might be beneficial to their position. 
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consultation with experts in general administrative law may be desirable, at 
least when clients have a lot at stake in their challenge to an administrative 
decision so that the information costs involved may be outweighed by the 
benefits resulting from elimination of a line of agency-specific precedents. 
More broadly, perhaps, the phenomenon of agency-specific precedents 
suggests that collaboration between administrative law generalists and spe-
cialists who focus on particular agencies may be highly productive.  Most 
administrative law generalists also have developed some specialized exper-
tise in at least one substantive field involving a particular agency or 
agencies.419  But it is not possible for them to be specialists in every field that 
has an administrative agency and therefore an administrative law component.  
Similarly, specialists in a substantive field such as labor law, environmental 
law, or tax law also must have some knowledge of administrative law, 
although they typically focus on the administrative law that applies to their 
agency.420  Collaboration between generalists and specialists, whether in 
practice or in academia, offers the best hope of identifying and eliminating 
undesirable silo thinking and agency-specific precedents in administrative 
law and also of facilitating the movement of beneficial agency-specific 
precedents into the administrative law mainstream. 
C. Beyond Administrative Law 
Although our focus has been on agency-specific precedents, we think 
the phenomenon of precedential silos and our analysis of it has application in 
other fields as well.  As indicated above, some scholars have noted the 
presence of silo thinking in fields as disparate as contract and constitutional 
law.421  Similarly, pockets of legal doctrine that do not conform to norms and 
principles that are intended to apply broadly seem to exist in other areas.  For 
example, courts have at times applied the rules of civil procedure differently 
depending on the parties (which may be administrative agencies) or the sub-
ject involved, even in situations in which the textual foundation for carving 
out special treatment is not obvious.422 
 
419. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative 
Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 58 (1984) (discussing how judicial activism has prompted 
specialization, moving away from the generalist approach). 
420. Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme 
Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1999) (describing as unfortunate, the view of some of the 
Supreme Court Justices that “environmental law has become no more than a subspecies of 
administrative law, raising no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a 
substantive area of law”). 
421. See supra note 77. 
422. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 65, 65 (2010) (“Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are trans-substantive, they 
have a greater detrimental effect on certain substantive claims. . . .  [A] plausibility pleading 
standard . . . makes it more difficult for potentially meritorious civil rights claims alleging 
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Indeed, some of the same forces that produce agency-specific 
precedents may contribute to these aberrational doctrinal pockets of civil 
procedure.  In particular, we might expect aberrational doctrinal pockets in 
civil procedure to arise in fields that involve a highly specialized subject 
matter and practicing bar such as intellectual property law.423  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court has played the same role in civil procedure cases as it has in 
administrative law cases such as Zurko424 by reversing context-specific rules 
crafted by specialized courts such as the Federal Circuit and requiring the 
lower courts to adhere to generally applicable procedural norms.425  The 
potential causes and normative implications of those context-specific 
precedents also seem to provide fertile topics for further investigation and 
analysis.426 
VI. Conclusion 
Our central goal in this Article has been to identify the phenomenon of 
agency-specific precedents in administrative law and to begin a conversation 
about its implications.  While we do not have comprehensive empirical data 
to support our claim that the phenomenon exists, we think our five case 
studies, as well as other examples referenced at various points in the Article, 
provide solid anecdotal evidence that agency-specific precedents are 
reasonably common.  Certainly, the evidence is strong enough to justify more 
 
intentional discrimination to survive dismissal.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”?  
How Coke’s One-Way Binding Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and 
Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 77, 91 (“[D]espite the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the courts’ application of such rules has historically not been evenhanded.”).  
See generally Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An 
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 
2081–84 (1989) (examining why the Rules were drafted with a principle of flexibility); Robert M. 
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718, 
725 (1975) (noting that the trans-substantive character of the Federal Rules is based on the premise 
that “procedure [should be] generalized across substantive lines” and not “confined to cases of [a] 
particular description” (citation omitted)). 
423. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Cheesbro, Note, A Pirate’s Treasure?: Heightened Pleadings 
Standards for Copyright Infringement Complaints After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 241, 255 (2009) (“Despite the wide acceptance that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are transsubstantive, many practical remnants of the earlier Copyright Rules are still 
extant at the trial court level during the pleading stage.”). 
424. See supra notes 357–78 and accompanying text. 
425. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s alteration of the generally applicable test for the availability of civil injunctive 
relief—which requires a showing of the inadequacy of plaintiff’s monetary remedies and a 
balancing of hardships between the parties, court, and public—in patent cases). 
426. Other factors may also be at work in these contexts, however, such as the courts’ 
preference or antipathy for particular kinds of claims.  See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et al., Some 
Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for 
Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1490 (1997) (“The growing number of 
summary judgments and directed verdicts in favor of defendants in Title VII cases indicates judicial 
antipathy for finding that employer behavior has been motivated by racial prejudice.”). 
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careful examination and analysis, which we expect to undertake in future 
projects. 
If we are right and agency-specific precedents are common, the 
phenomenon raises a host of significant implications for administrative law.  
We have offered a preliminary assessment of the causes of agency-specific 
precedent and possible normative responses.  Agency-specific statutes, 
programs, and practices may explain and justify many agency-specific 
precedents, but the phenomenon cannot be completely explained in those 
terms—other factors must account for the creation and durability of some 
agency-specific precedents.  We believe that the information costs of finding 
and presenting or considering precedents create a silo effect that contributes 
to the creation and durability of agency-specific precedents. 
The normative implications of the phenomenon are very difficult to 
assess because there are so many factors and variations involved.  Whether 
an agency-specific precedent undermines or furthers the congressional bal-
ance of agency autonomy and accountability or improperly deviates from the 
general principle of uniformity depends on the particular context and will 
often be open to debate.  The implications of agency-specific precedents for 
legal uncertainty and the optimization of administrative law doctrine are 
likewise difficult to assess.  Nonetheless, it seems to us reasonably plain that, 
in some instances at least, agency-specific precedents are unjustified depar-
tures from generally applicable doctrine that create legal uncertainty and 
undermine the optimization of administrative law doctrine. 
If this conclusion is correct, the next question is what to do about it.  At 
this point, we do not advocate any systemic response, in part because it is so 
difficult to say whether agency-specific precedents are justified or desirable 
in any given case.  Ultimately, insofar as agency-specific precedents relate to 
information costs, the best response may be the development of more 
information.  Greater awareness of and attention to the phenomenon of 
agency-specific precedents may help to reduce information costs for practi-
tioners and courts, combating the silo effect.  Thus, we hope that others 
active in the field of administrative law, whether specialists or generalists, 
will find the concept of agency-specific precedential silos to be of interest 
and that this Article will help to engender a broader conversation about 
agency-specific precedents and their implications. 
